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# Voting Rights of Denizens and Expats: Adjusting Democracy Indices to the Age of Mass Migration

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# Voting Rights of Denizens and Expats: Adjusting Democracy Indices to the Age of Mass Migration

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## Abstract

Contemporary migration flows affect virtually all aspects of the social fabric, democracy included. Focusing their attention on the competitiveness aspects of the regime, comparative measurements of democracy have underestimated the complexity of the Dahlian dimension of inclusiveness, a sine-qua-non condition for defining a polyarchy. Firmly anchored in the literature and democratic theory, this measurement paper proposes a new index of inclusiveness: *Electoral Residential Inclusiveness*. This measure assesses how large the overlap between those who make the law and those who are subject to it is. It is shown how some regimes—including some of those that have been systematically considered strong democracies—exhibit such a considerable gap between these two groups that their democratic credentials should be questioned. This index has a clear impact on the way we measure and, most important, understand democracies. Unpacking this forgotten dimension, this work helps to fine tune the efforts to measure democracies.

## Keywords

## 1. Theoretical Puzzle

Since the enormously influential work of Robert Dahl (1971), democracy has been conceptualized as a competitive/contested and participatory/inclusive regime. In the absence of any of these attributes, it is impossible to talk about polyarchy. Both dimensions are necessary for democracy, so neither is sufficient. A competitive regime without broad inclusion constitutes a competitive oligarchy; an inclusive system absent competition constitutes an inclusive hegemony. From the participatory angle, although universal suffrage has become one of the mantras of contemporary democracies, this is no more than an ideal point of reference, since every regime limits membership in the political community in some way or another (for example, through age requirements to vote).

If a significant portion of adults in a polity enjoys political rights—at least, the ability to vote and hold office —we assume that the Dahlian inclusion requirements are met. As many authors argue that universal suffrage can be taken for guaranteed in the post-1945 era, the literature quickly jumps to the analysis of the second dimension of polyarchy: *competitiveness*. Indeed, the literature on democracy and democratization has paid more attention to the competitive dimension than to inclusion. This imbalance was already noticed by Munck and Verkuilen almost 20 years ago: "the fact of not including participation in its various facets is a problem even for the study of democracy in recent times" (2002: 11).[2]

Although democracy has witnessed a constant struggle between those who wish to extend the limits of the *demos* and those who want to restrict them, the universality of suffrage is widely accepted as desirable.[3] Nonetheless, discussing democracy also involves considering the boundaries of who belongs to the democratic "club" (Blatter et al. 2015; Coppedge et al. 2008). In other words, the discussion is about the shape of the political community and its members, the citizens, something that has been known as the "boundary problem" (Simmons 2013), which for Walzer constitutes "the first and most important distributive question" (1983: 31).[4]

Virtually every democracy has witnessed moments of high exclusion. Traditionally, the limitation was based on gender, property, or literacy (sometimes even on religion or ethnic origin). Today, hardly

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[2] Perhaps the literature has delved into the competitive aspects of democracy rather than the participative dimension due to a participatory bias caused by the trauma lived during the Weimar Republic, which collapsed against fascism, and the enforced totalitarian participation in post-war Eastern Europe (Pateman 1970: 2).

[3] Even though some contemporary voices argue against it (e.g., Brennan 2011).

[4] Citizenship has become such a divided concept that it inevitably leads to confusion (Bosniak 2006: 3). Citizenship— "a bouquet of ideals" in the words of Pedroza (2019)—is a polysemic concept, and it is not my interest to discuss its genealogy, dimensions, and interpretations in this work. Nor am I interested in dealing with how citizenship is acquired; for an in-depth study on citizenship regimes, see Vink (2017).

anyone would define a regime as democratic where, for example, women could not vote. This does not mean that there is a universal progressive movement towards greater inclusion. Who belongs to the political community remains a highly divisive issue, including, for example, over criminal offenders. It is clear that the battle for suffrage has not come to an end; it is only fought along different fronts (Schmid et al. 2019; Beckman 2009).[5]

While there is no unique pattern in how struggles for enfranchisement have evolved, it is possible to identify at least three battles: class (Przeworski and Sprague 1986; Collier 1999), gender (Banaszak 1996; Paxton and Hughes 2007; Schwindt-Bayer and Reyes-Housholder 2017), and race (Bateman 2018; Valelly 2004; Lublin 1999). Despite their differences, these studies address realities where individuals and groups cannot *de jure* participate in the electoral game. This has not been uncommon in competitive regimes.

Exclusion acquires a new significance in the context of mass migrations, but migrations have not been a necessary condition for exclusion. If we return to the essays of Simmel (1908) on the stranger (*das Fremde*) or the writings of Marx (1843) on the Jewish question, we find that the idea that certain individuals are members of society but not members of the political community is an ancient concern in the social sciences. This concern remains fundamental for the understanding of contemporary citizenship, and mass migrations make the problem even more evident.

This work claims that political rights of migrants are the latest frontier in enfranchisement. At a time when mass migrations have acquired unprecedented dimensions and visibility (e.g., Venezuela, Syria, and Sub-Saharan Africa), the democracies that absorb migratory flows put under immense stress. These waves present a challenge to democratic theory as they imbalance the relationship between those who decide who will make the laws (sometimes making them directly) and those who are affected by them. Of course, migration not only unbalances the receiving communities but also changes the societies of origin; "migration adds noncitizens to the resident population and emigration adds non-residents to the citizenry" (Arrighi and Bauböck 2017: 619).

In many societies that we consider healthy democracies, significant portions of the population lacks fundamental political rights (Blatter et al. 2017).[6] In some cases, like Switzerland, the exclusion from

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[5]     After all, citizenship is, in the words of Wimmer, a form of legalized discrimination (2013: 74); or, using Kochenov's words (2019), "the story of citizenship as a tale not of liberation, dignity, and nationhood but of complacency, hypocrisy, and domination."

[6]     It is crucial to notice that the foci of study at this stage are political rights at the national level only. A complete world is found at the subnational level but falls well beyond the scope of this research. This is to say, when I am talking about enfranchisement, I am referring to the electoral right provided to participate in the highest levels of

the political game affects up to 30% of the community and includes even third-generation immigrants (Nguyen 2016). Moreover, it could be the case that someone's grandfather arrived in Switzerland a century ago yet her grandchild—born in Switzerland, as her parents—cannot vote at the federal level (not to mention the possibility of running for elected office).

Imagine a hypothetical situation where, due to a crisis of magnitude, a significant percentage of the Swiss citizenry leaves the country and those who stay are mostly non-citizen residents (many of these cannot emigrate because they do not have a passport from Switzerland or any other country).[7] Under this scenario, most of the citizens would be non-residents (with political rights), and the majority of the inhabitants of the country would be non-citizen residents (without political rights). Could we continue to consider that country such a high-quality democracy as it is typically considered today?[8]

The Swiss example serves as a springboard for the central question of this research: How small should this gap be so as not to severely violate the principle of equality in a political community to such a degree that it would be impossible to define a regime as democratic? Following the literature, and for the sake of parsimony, this work divides a given society into three different groups of people: resident citizens (RC), non-citizen residents (NC), and non-resident citizens (NR). While each political community has had different combinations of these three groups since ancient times, current trends of immigration, seem to make the differences more acute. Robert Dahl explains,

> Both historically and contemporaneously, regimes also vary in the proportion of the population entitled to participate on a more or less equal plane in controlling and contesting the conduct of the government: to participate, so to speak, in the system of public contestation. A scale reflecting the breadth of the right to participate in public contestation would enable us to compare different regimes according to their inclusiveness (Dahl 1971: 4).

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policymaking. If in a given country, permanent non-citizen residents vote at the local or municipal level only, I do not count these individuals as enfranchised.

[7] See: https://goo.gl/k8Qofi [Accessed, May 5, 2019]. Note that this group of people does not have a Swiss passport, and they only have what is known as a Permit C ("Ausweis C") for permanent residence. Concerning this particular group, some authors speak of "denizenship" (Hammar 1990). This concept implies "a status of residential quasi-citizenship combined with external formal citizenship" (Bauböck 2007: 2396). See also Pedroza (2019).

[8] Looking at the problem differently, perhaps a bit more realistically, there are Arab Gulf States that have more foreigners than citizen residents. What if one of these states finally introduced democratic institutions? For example, about 90% of the United Arab Emirates' population is foreign born (constituted mainly of 38.2% Indian, Egyptian 10.2%, Bangladeshi 9.5%, Pakistani 9.4%, among other smaller communities.) See: https://www.migrationpolicy.org/country-resource/united-arab-emirates [Accessed, May 8, 2020].

Figure 1 sketches four scenarios related to the relationship between the three types of persons in different historical times. Figure 1a depicts the typical, classic example of Athens, where citizens were a clear minority within a highly disenfranchised society (women, slaves, metics, etc.). Figure 1b describes most nation-states before immigration waves. Figure 1c portrays the current situation where diasporas have increased their relative size. Finally, Figure 1d depicts a potential future, as described above, with the hypothetical crises in Switzerland. Nonetheless, in times with highly porous borders and increasing transmigration, we must reconsider the transit from 1b to 1c, and even 1d.[9]



**Figure 1**

By definition, the resident citizens are the members of the democratic club (and in several places, these citizens extend the membership to the non-resident citizens).[10] Indeed, with the increasing size of diasporas around the world (Mégret and Girard 2014; Sheffer 2003), a plethora of contextual, "country-specific factors concerning the history and nature of the relationship between the government and emigrant groups are usually determinant" (Collyer 2013).

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[9]  The leitmotif of the literature on democratization has focused on the study of the transition from figure 1a to figure 1b. However, this literature, especially its comparative and empirical works, has not been sensitive enough to post-1b scenarios.

[10]  While the first antecedents of the extra-territorial vote could be found as far back as the Roman Republic (Ellis 2007), its modern manifestation comes from the American Civil War when the State of Wisconsin allowed its militias fighting in the South to exercise their vote (Alvarez et al. 2007). Nonetheless, the contemporary wave became evident during the 1960s and 1970s.

Virtually every conceptualization and index of democracy works primarily with citizens and does not take into consideration groups temporarily or permanently excluded from the most fundamental political rights that reside in a polity. I claim that the exclusion (or incorporation) of the typically marginalized—e.g., immigrants—may affect the overall democratic level of a regime. Concentrating on migrants does not mean that other categories of people temporarily excluded from the political game, such as the military, the clergy, and persons with cognitive disabilities, are not eventually crucial for assessing the democratic level of a regime. Nonetheless, as clearly explained elsewhere (e.g., López-Guerra 2014), their exclusion responds to different normative principles and political realities.

## 1.b. How should the demos be constituted?

Electoral rights are usually associated with citizenship and residential status. With the category of resident citizens, there is no problem whatsoever. No democrat would agree that citizens—understood as a state of full membership in a self-governed political community (Bauböck 2005: 683)—should not have electoral rights. Of course, there is an unresolved and loud normative discussion regarding to what degree citizens belonging to certain categories (e.g., the military, the clergy, inmates, ex-felons, and children) should enjoy these rights.

If the extension of electoral rights is a normative headache with some subgroups of society, the primary concern relates to non-citizen residents ("denizens") and non-resident citizens ("expats"). In general, the literature has justified the extension of electoral rights either to all those whose interests (potential or actual) are affected by political decisions or to all those who are subject to political coercion. Knowing that the claim for "affected interest" is a rather elastic concept, which "would mean giving virtually everyone everywhere a vote on virtually everything decided anywhere" (Goodin 2007: 68), its advocates tend to recur either to an ethnical relationship and/or to a material connection.

As Bauböck clearly states, affected interest justifies granting the voice mechanism but not necessarily political rights per se. "Taking interests into account does not entail turning all whose interests are affected into members of the demos who authorize a government in representative elections. Affected interests are sufficient to substantiate a claim to voice rather than vote" (Bauböck 2015: 823).[11]

Thus, explicitly following Robert Dahl's democratic theory, the adopted criterion for democratic inclusion entails being subject to the political coercion of the state. Dahl's theory strictly states that, except

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[11]     For a detailed critical view of the principle of affected interests (see López-Guerra 2014: Chapter 4).

for transients and persons with severe cognitive disabilities, "every adult subject to a government and its laws must be presumed to be qualified as, and has an unqualified right to be, a member of the demos" (Dahl 1989: 127). Likewise, Michael Walzer argues that "the process of self-determination through which a democratic state shapes its internal life, must be open, and equally open, to all those men and women who live within its territory, work in the local economy and are subject to the local law" (Walzer 1983: 60).[12]

In adopting the principle of being subject to the political coercion of the State as the source for the extension of electoral rights, I explicitly circumvent any material or ethnically based concept of voting rights. And this is precisely the point where the state enters the game. Given that I am particularly concerned with assessing the level of inclusion, which in turn affects the level of democracy in the context of the "state," this paper concentrates on how democratic a polity is, instead of how democratic a group of people is. In other words, this research is not interested in answering, for example, how democratic Argentineans are, but instead how democratic Argentina is. There is a subtle, but still crucial difference between both questions that, as we will see, has been overlooked by the comparative literature.

The confusion between the democratic nature of a particular group of people on the one hand and a polity on the other comes from an inertial association of citizenship, nationality, and voting rights; but the fact is that none are contingent on another.[13] The fact there are stable democracies where there is no need to be a citizen or national to have electoral rights helps to make the point. This is the case in Chile, New Zealand, and Uruguay, three strong democracies by virtually any standard.[14]

Nonetheless, there is a sine-qua-non link between democracy, voting rights, and residency, understood as a proxy for being subject to the laws and binding decisions of the polity. Strongly anchored in the literature and democratic theory, this research considers that both resident citizens and non-citizen

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[12] This point of view would most likely be endorsed by an eclectic group such as (Bryce 1921), (Schumpeter 1942), (Dahl 1989), (Huntington 1991), (Markoff 1999, 1996), to mention just a few.

[13] The literature is manifest in showing how they transit different avenues, even though they have been intermingled. This is not to neglect the intensive national or ethnic bond between an individual and a particular people or nation that may be, under certain circumstances, "more important for them than their role as non-citizen residents" (Collyer 2013: 56). On the contrary: we can accept that nations and peoples have the right to strengthen their cultural, national, and linguistic bond with those it considers members of their "family."

[14] In these countries, *permanent non-citizen residents* do not have to naturalize to have an electoral say, as any resident citizen. It is interesting to note that all countries that extended electoral rights to non-citizen residents belong to the global south (Uruguay the very first in 1934, then New Zealand in 1975, Chile in 1980, and Ecuador in 2008), strengthening Markoff's hypothesis that many of the great institutional innovations "have generally not taken place in the world's centers of wealth and power" (Markoff 1999: 663).

residents (provided they have lived in the place for some time) should have equal voting rights.[15] Likewise, *permanent* non-resident citizens should not have the right to change policies for those who suffer them.[16] Table 1 distributes the top 20 democracies in the year 2018 according to the Electoral Democracy Index of V-Dem (v.9) according to whether they grant non-resident citizens and non-citizen residents electoral rights. The cell names correspond to the typology of electorate elaborated by Caramani and Grotz (2015: 803). It must be said that this is an oversimplification of reality that hinders substantial normative discussions. For example, those who do not support the idea of denizens having electoral rights might be strong advocates for them to naturalize automatically in a relatively short period. Others, however, accept naturalization but only based on an ad-hoc, voluntary action (depending on specific personal attributes, such as speaking the local language, or have proficiency in history of the hosting country) and just after a relatively long time.

*Table 1. Top-20 democracies and extension of voting rights to non-residents and non-citizen residents*

| | | Denizens – Non-Citizen Residents voting rights | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | | Yes | No |
| Expatriates - Non-Resident Citizens voting rights | Yes | **[National and Resident Electorate]**<br><br>CHI, NZL | **[National Electorate]**<br><br>NOR, SWE, EST, CRI, CHE, GBR, LUX, PRT, ITA, BEL, AUS, ISL, NLD, FIN, CAN |
| | No | **[Resident Electorate]**<br><br>URY | **[National-resident Electorate]**<br><br>DNK, IRL |

## 1.c. The Elephant in the Room: Inclusiveness in Current Measures of Democracy

The study of inclusiveness lags far behind its theoretical and empirical importance. Despite the fact that it is accepted that "democracy without the inclusion of most of 'the people,' or without liberties that

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[15]    For different perspectives supporting the extension of the vote to denizens, see Munro (2008) and Song (2009).

[16]    By *permanent* non-resident citizens I refer to people without prospects of returning to their origin. Therefore, there are in some instances, such as students or members of diplomatic staff abroad might have this particular right. Also, as López-Guerra contends, there are "specific cases that it would be not only permissible but also required to enfranchise expatriates (e.g., in the first few national elections in a country that experienced a civil conflict leading to mass deportations)" (2014: 100). Nonetheless, I have to recognize that taking this position, I am challenging a significant literature that sees external voting as something intrinsically good, almost as a matter of political correctness. But, as explained above, I do not find any superior normative democratic theory why voting rights should be ethnically based.

make elections meaningful, is an oxymoron" (Teorell et al. 2019: 75), even the most sophisticated measures of democracy have not been to the gap between non-citizen residents, non-resident citizens, and residents of contemporary regimes.[17] The lack of sharpness, probably due to conceptual inheritances from times when migration was not as critical as is today, strongly distorts the image we have of contemporary democracies.

While most conceptualizations of democracy consider inhabitants as the subjects of political rights, at the stage of operationalization of their indicators, they only consider citizens. Moreover, several studies use "people," "inhabitants," or "citizens" as synonyms, without considering how substantially different concepts they are, mainly when speaking about electoral rights.

Until recent times, the exclusion of the poor and women in early democracies were typical historical examples of disenfranchisement. As pointed out by Ersson and Lane (2013), the starting point of the democratic government itself changes dramatically depending on whether or not we include women's suffrage as a necessary condition for democracy. Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán (2013) argue that the criteria of democratic government change over time, so universal suffrage for adult males can be considered sufficient to codify the level of democracy in a case at the end of the nineteenth century, but insufficient to the late twentieth century. These authors show that well-established democracies end up not granting full political rights to a significant part of their populations, and it can be added that such exclusion is biased against groups that are often not privileged.[18]

Przeworski and colleagues do not consider participation whatsoever. For them, a regime is democratic if (1) the chief executive is elected (directly or indirectly), (2) the lower house of the legislature is also elected (the upper house is not included), and (3) more than one party participates in the elections (Alvarez et al. 1996: 7-8). Likewise, Polity IV (Marshall 2014), the Political Regime Dataset (Gasiorowski 1996), and Bollen (1979) do not consider the scope of suffrage, leaving aside half of Dahl's dimensions to define polyarchy and making their concept quite narrow if they wanted to approximate democracy in the Dahlian sense.

Recognizing these limitations, Boix, Miller, and Rosato (BMR) made an *addendum* that limits democracies to those regimes that have adult male suffrage higher than 50% (2013). There is no question

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[17] On the gap between territory and political community, see Collyer (2013); on the extraterritorial vote, see Bauböck (2003), López-Guerra (2005, 2014), Rubio-Marín (1998); and on the existence of a clear double standard concerning dual citizenship, see Vink et al. (2019).

[18] Therefore, we have to be careful in adjusting the criteria for assessing whether a democracy existed in a given place and time using extra-temporal definitions. Actually, "a critical and yet under-theorized issue in classifying democracies is whether scholars should use international standards for a given period (we call this a retrospective standard) or today's international standards" (Mainwaring et al. 2001: 40-41). See also Paxton (2000).

that BMR are more in tune with Dahl's polyarchy, but not as much as recent works by Bernhard et al. (Bernhard et al. 2016; Bernhard et al. 2001), where for a regime to be considered democratic, more than 50% of the *entire* adult population must be included in the vote.[19] While a majority/minority democratic logic informs these thresholds, they still seem arbitrary, and the question is, why not consider 75% instead of 50% in the granting of political rights? Of course, discussions on what percentage best represents the democratic ideal and where to set the thresholds could be endless. Nonetheless, if we seriously follow Dahl's criteria for whom to label a regime as a "complete" polyarchy the inclusion of 90% of the adult population with basic political rights is a must (Dahl 1971: Table A-1), then virtually no Western European country could be considered a full democracy, regardless how extensive other rights are (civil or social, a-la-Marshall (1950) or Bendix (1964)).

It can be observed that whether participation is a constitutive part of the concept of democracy divides, in broad lines, the empirical literature. On the one hand, some explicitly focus on the competitive dimension of the regime and leave participation aside, such as Polity IV (Marshall 2014) and Przeworski et al. (2000), two of the most-used databases. On the other hand, there are those for whom participation is a constitutive aspect of democracy. This group is subdivided into those who measure participation relative to inhabitants and those who measure relative to citizens. Among the former, we find those that consider the percentage of votes over the total population (Vanhanen 1997) and those who estimate the portion of the vote on the voting-age population: The Economist Intelligence Unit (2008) and Bühlmann et al. (2012). However, these measures fail to capture the degree of inclusiveness, as it is conflated with the vote itself. Finally, there is a group of studies that, while acknowledging the importance of inclusion, either do not measure it (Freedom Since 1972) or, if they do it, their measures are based on those who are already citizens (Teorell et al. 2019).

Due to all these limitations, and unlike previous studies that set an arbitrary cutoff point between democratic categories (complete, hybrid, etc.), I propose a new measure—*electoral residential inclusiveness (ERI)*—that examines the ratio between resident citizens on the one hand and the percentage of non-citizen residents and non-resident citizens of a polity. The proposed measure is well-rooted in the literature as it introduces a dimension whereby adults may become the masters of their political fate while avoiding the inclusion of extraneous attributes that are not highlighted in democratic theory. Considering

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[19]     For this to occur, at least some women have to be enfranchised. Their idea is specifically written so a country would not be considered a democracy if it disenfranchised all women. Actually, there is only one country in their dataset that only partially disenfranchises women – UK which did so early in the interwar era by only letting women over 35 votes. Younger women were later enfranchised.

this correction would make current measures of democracy more attuned with the core democratic tradition and the messiness of contemporary societies.

# 2. Measuring the Index of Electoral Residential Inclusiveness (ERI)

This work seeks to update the current indices of democracy by unpacking the dimension of *inclusiveness* and fine-tuning it with the contemporary migration trends. Current measures of democracy have not tackled the so-called "democratic boundary problem," probably because migration was not such an evident problem when most of these procedures were designed. It is argued that, as explained above, an increasing gap between those who decide the norms of a given society and those who must abide by that legislation reduces the democratic soil of this particular territory.

## 2.a. Index

The index of *Electoral Residential Inclusiveness (ERI)* is the percentage of resident citizens over the whole electorate (which includes also non-resident citizens) by the percentage of resident citizens over all the adult population subject to the reach of the state and its laws. The maximum value this index can reach is one and the minimum zero (either because the whole demos is beyond the territory of a country or simply because there is no demos, or both). To understand how this index works, let us think on a hypothetical case represented in Figure 2.



**Figure 2. Electoral Residential Inclusiveness**

This imaginary country has a population of 10 million adult inhabitants (and for the sake of the explanation, let us forget about kids for the moment). About 85% of its adults are citizens and 15% non-citizen residents. The estimated diaspora is about 1,000,000, but in practical terms, just 850,000 individuals are registered to vote. The diaspora constitutes 10% of the whole citizenry. Thus, there are 8,500,000, of which, 7,650,000 are resident citizens. As we want to find the degree of congruence between those who make the law and those who suffer it, we discount from all those who abide by the law all those who do not have a say in the law making process and those who, having a say, do not suffer the consequences.

$$= \frac{Electoral\ Residential\ Inclusiveness}{Demos} = \frac{Resident\ Citizens}{Demos} * \frac{Resident\ Citizens}{Affected\ by\ decisions\ of\ the\ Demos} =$$

$$ERI = \frac{RC}{(RC + NR)} * \frac{RC}{(RC + NC)} =$$

$$ERI = \frac{90}{(90 + 10)} * \frac{85}{(85 + 15)} = 0.90 * 0.85 = 77\%$$

While this example was made just for the sake of explanation, the used numbers are not purely a coincidence. In fact, they are largely based on the average distribution among these groups of individuals (RC, NR, NC) at the top 25% of regimes sorted by Electoral Democracy Index. Actually, if we take the 45 countries with the highest level of democracy based on V-Dem v.9 for the year 2018, their diasporas represent an average of 11.2% and the non-citizen residents represent 8.4% the population (14% if we just take the top 10 democracies). I will return to these numbers in the next section.

## 2.b. Data

While there is excellent data on populations, data on electoral rights based on citizenship statuses are more difficult to find. This is an area where good data is lacking, and it is becoming more critical due to increasing migration flows. Data on national populations and their diasporas (by birth) comes from the

Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, of the United Nations. Two databases were consulted in particular: the migrant stock and the migrant stock by origin and destination.[20] Data of non-citizen residents comes from national statistics bureaus and institutes, the European Union (Eurostat), and estimations made by NGOs and scholars (the United States, and Uruguay). Although it is possible to know the overseas-born population that lives in a host country, these do not necessarily count as non-citizen residents because many of these might have naturalized. Not every person born in a given country should be automatically considered as a citizen, particularly if the hosting country is strongly based on a *jus sanguinis* criterion of citizenship.

As data of non-citizen residents is usually aggregated regarding its age distribution, one problem that arises is how to calculate how many of those could acquire electoral rights. For this research, I assume that this group of people has a similar age distribution than the overall population of the hosting country. Eventually, the ideal would be to compare the proportion of adults of this population to adults of the whole population. While it is possible to argue that the age distribution is different between both groups, and therefore, the percentage of adults should change accordingly, it is assumed that this difference is likely most significant in the context of refugees, which are excluded here.

Data on non-resident citizens comes from national electoral commissions, governments (usually interior ministries), and, in some cases, also from national statistics bureaus. Here, we also face similar problems to those described for non-citizen residents. For example, we may know how many Italian-born people live in Argentina, but this is hugely different from knowing how many Italian citizens live there as their descendants may also have Italian electoral rights and qualify as non-resident citizens.

For this research, it is essential to differentiate between diasporas and non-resident citizens of a country. The diaspora of a country is understood as the group of individuals who, having been born in a given country, live overseas. By non-resident citizens, I understand the group of individuals with electoral rights who live outside the limits of the country in question. Usually, non-resident citizens are a subset of the diaspora and consequently, both numbers differ substantially. In case a state does not allow overseas voting (e.g., Denmark, Uruguay), the group of non-resident citizens equals zero. This value of zero is maintained regardless of the fact that, in some instances, members of diplomatic staff abroad might have electoral rights (e.g., Armenia, Ireland, Israel).

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[20]    United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2019). International Migrant Stock 2019 (United Nations database, POP/DB/MIG/Stock/Rev.2019). https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/estimates19.asp

## 2.c. Measurement

I speculate that the level of democracy of contemporary regimes will be significantly altered if instead of considering the extent of suffrage among *citizens* we consider the *Electoral Residential Inclusiveness* proposed above. My intuition is that taking into consideration this index would re-order the highly consistent picture indices of democracy currently provide.[21] Thus, in order to test how significant the alternative I am proposing is, I substitute the suffrage measure of V-Dem with the territorial measure of inclusion. I opt to use V-Dem because it is the most transparent index available and the only large-N study spelling out the components of its polyarchy scores as well as the aggregation rules.

V-Dem is characterized by a "radical disaggregation," and its polyarchy scores are built on forty indicators, aggregated around five "lower level democracy and governance" indices, which are concomitantly aggregated into two mid-level indices, which at the end are combined to produce the overall polyarchy score. While each polyarchy component is a combination of multiple indicators (e.g. elected officials, clean elections), the suffrage component consist in only one indicator: "Inclusive Citizenship" [v2x_suffr] that captures the extension of the suffrage as the proportion of "adult *citizens* eligible to vote" (Teorell et al. 2019:79, italics are mine).

Table A.1 shows the V-Dem's Electoral Democracy Scores and its components (v.9) for the top 45 countries in 2018, which represent the top 25% polyarchies of all countries V-Dem covers. As seen, the indicator of suffrage is a constant, having its maximum value in each and every case. Actually, for the year 2018, with the exception of four countries (Somalia, Thailand, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia), all countries and polities in the world covered by V-Dem have a perfect v2x_suffr score, which makes us wonder about its statistical utility when used cross-sectionally in the present.

Based on the distribution of NC, NR, and RC, Table 2 spells out the ERI scores for the top 45 democracies in the world in the year 2018 based on V-Dem v.9. For this sample, ERI has an average of 0.89, with a maximum of 0.999 (Taiwan) and minimum of 0.412 (Luxembourg). Sorting Table 3 by ERI, the countries with a virtually complete score are Taiwan, Chile, Uruguay, Jamaica, and Japan. On the contrary, the countries with the lowest ERI are Portugal, Latvia, Estonia, Switzerland, and Luxembourg.[22]

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[21]  Most cross-national and longitudinal indices of democracy are strongly correlated at least in their aggregate scores, see Bernhard et al (2017: 953).

[22]  I hope future work will extend the data presented here in order to allow for longitudinal analysis. Nonetheless, I expect this cross-sectional analysis will serve as a platform for more ambitious and resourceful projects. Doubtless these data have errors, thus they must be taken with caution.

If Switzerland was a blunt case of political segmentation of people's rights (with an ERI of .722), Luxembourg is even a more extreme case with an ERI of 0.412, by far the lowest of the whole sample. By any standard, it is the wealthiest country in Europe (based on PPP), and it is located at the very heart of the European Union. Yet, about half of its permanent population has no electoral rights and possesses a significant diaspora deciding the rules of the game. This fact does not mean that people living in Luxembourg are unhappy, miserable, or exploited people without resources or any freedoms. But democracy is not about happiness and riches; it is about freedom, political equity, and rights.

*[Table 2 about here]*

Now let me proceed to check the hypothesis that taking into consideration the Electoral Residential Inclusiveness would significantly re-order the highly consistent picture indices of democracy currently provide. To do so, in Table 3, I substitute V-Dem's v2x_suffr with ERI to calculate the new polyarchic score for each country, maintaining the remaining sub-indices and indicators as they originally were.

Three columns are particularly interesting. The first is the ranking of democracies using the original $Rank_{v2x\_suffr}$ , then a new ranking is offered ($Rank_{ERI}$), which is the polyarchy score using $Rank_{ERI}$, and finally the difference between both. The polyarchy winners (based on ERI) are Taiwan, which makes a colossal jump of 25 places (from the 37th place to the 12th), Mauritius (+19, 28 → 9), Japan (+18, 34→ 16), Jamaica (+15, 35 → 20), and Lithuania (+14, 36 → 14). The polyarchy losers are Latvia (-14, 24 → 38), Italy (-18, 11 → 29), Estonia (-27, 3 → 30), Switzerland (-28, 7 → 35), and finally, Luxembourg (-36, 9 → 45).

Though the participation indicator represents only 12.5% of V–Dem's electoral democracy score, it exerts a strong enough power to significantly alter the more or less established sorting of countries. For example, if we use v2x_suffrage, European continental countries lead the world with (8 cases out of the top 10). Substituting v2x_suffrage by ERI, that proportion is reduced by half with only four coming from this region (DKN, SWE, NED, NOR). Moreover, doing this exercise, the democratic picture we obtain is much more geographically evenly distributed as the new top 10 list includes one country from Oceania (New Zealand), one from Asia (South Korea), one from Africa (Mauritius), and a second one from Latin America (Chile), as Uruguay was already included.

*[Table 3 about here]*

It could be argued that small countries, by their nature, will have more significant diasporas, and therefore, a larger ERI than large countries. This is because their population, for example, facing stressful situations in the context of small markets, will have higher incentives to find jobs overseas and emigrate.

Nonetheless, even assuming this is correct, larger countries will have more copious amounts of non-citizen residents, compensating for the migrants of the smaller societies. In other words, due to the architecture of ERI, I expect these migration waves to neutralize each other. To check for this potential neutralization between denizens and ex-pats, I control the correlation between population size and ERI. The results are crystal clear; there is no correlation between the variables whatsoever (r: 0.13, sig. .36).

*Table 2. Electoral Residential Inclusiveness (circa 2018)*

| Country (Sorted by IDE, V-Dem, v.9) | Total Population (UN data) | Diaspora / Pop. | Estimated diaspora (only by birth) | Non-Citizen Residents (NC) | NC / POP | Total citizens (NR + RC) | Resident Citizens (RC) | Non-Resident Citizens (NR) | % NR / Total Citizens | RC / Demos | RC / Affected | Electoral Residential Inclusiveness (ERI) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Norway | 5,378,857 | 3.8 | 205,377 | 567,611 | 10.6 | 3,765,245 | 3,726,245 | 39,000[23] | 1.04 | 0.990 | 0.894 | 0.885 |
| Sweden | 10,036,379 | 3.6 | 359,772 | 932,266 | 9.3 | 7,495,936 | 7,325,733 | 170,203 | 2.27 | 0.977 | 0.907 | 0.887 |
| Estonia | 1,325,648 | 15.7 | 208,270 | 199,158 | 15.0 | 887,420 | 809,539 | 77,881 | 8.78 | 0.912 | 0.850 | 0.775 |
| Costa Rica | 5,047,561 | 3.0 | 150,415 | 417,768* | 8.3 | 3,322,329 | 3,285,691 | 36,638 | 1.10 | 0.989 | 0.917 | 0.907 |
| Denmark | 5,771,876 | 4.4 | 255,665 | 531,278 | 9.2 | 4,219,537 | 4,219,537 | . | . | 1.000 | 0.908 | 0.908 |
| Uruguay | 3,461,734 | 10.7 | 371,169 | 50,727 | 1.5 | 2,699,980 | 2,699,980 | . | . | 0.997 | 1.000 | 0.997 |
| Switzerland | 8,586,550 | 8.1 | 699,650 | 2,165,289 | 25.2 | 5,460,268 | 5,275,175 | 185,093 | 3.39 | 0.966 | 0.748 | 0.722 |
| UK | 67,530,172 | 7.0 | 4,729,088 | 6,171,948 | 9.1 | 47,587,254 | 47,353,258 | 233,996 | 0.49 | 0.995 | 0.909 | 0.904 |
| Luxembourg | 615,729 | 12.3 | 75,472 | 288,009 | 46.8 | 259,887 | 201,019 | 58,868[24] | 22.65 | 0.773 | 0.532 | 0.412 |
| Portugal | 10,226,187 | 21.1 | 2,155,792 | 480,300 | 4.7 | 10,777,258 | 9,312,621 | 1,464,637 | 13.59 | 0.864 | 0.953 | 0.824 |
| Italy | 60,550,075 | 5.1 | 3,078,697 | 5,255,503 | 8.7 | 50,736,204 | 46,505,350 | 4,230,854 | 8.34 | 0.917 | 0.913 | 0.837 |
| New | 4,783,063 | 16.5 | 787,715 | 1,068,739 | 22.3 | 3,253,383 | 3,191,859 | 61,524 | 1.89 | 0.981 | 1.000 | 0.981 |
| South Korea | 51,225,308 | 4.5 | 2,307,369 | 136,334 | 0.3 | 42,479,710 | 42,185,077 | 294,633 | 0.69 | 0.993 | 0.997 | 0.990 |
| Belgium | 11,539,328 | 5.0 | 581,813 | 1,391,425 | 12.1 | 8,167,709 | 7,989,802 | 177,907 | 2.18 | 0.978 | 0.879 | 0.860 |
| Australia | 25,203,198 | 2.3 | 577,338 | 2,166,016 | 8.6 | 16,424,248 | 16,324,509 | 99,739 | 0.61 | 0.994 | 0.914 | 0.909 |
| Iceland | 339,031 | 12.4 | 42,188 | 34,460 | 10.2 | 248,485 | 235,024 | 13,461 | 5.42 | 0.946 | 0.898 | 0.850 |
| Netherlands | 17,097,130 | 5.7 | 981,097 | 914,997 | 5.4 | 12,893,466 | 12,812,806 | 80,660 | 0.63 | 0.994 | 0.946 | 0.941 |
| Finland | 5,532,156 | 5.2 | 290,042 | 257,572 | 4.7 | 4,510,040 | 4,255,466 | 254,574 | 5.64 | 0.944 | 0.953 | 0.900 |
| Chile | 18,952,038 | 3.4 | 650,255 | 835,197 | 4.4 | 14,347,288 | 14,308,151 | 39,137 | 0.27 | 0.997 | 1.000 | 0.997 |
| Canada | 37,411,047 | 3.5 | 1,323,087 | 2,425,480 | 6.5 | 27,126,166 | 27,076,166 | 50,000 | 0.18 | 0.998 | 0.935 | 0.933 |
| France | 65,129,728 | 3.5 | 2,296,944 | 4,605,669 | 7.1 | 47,582,183 | 46,316,953 | 1,265,230 | 2.66 | 0.973 | 0.929 | 0.905 |
| Cyprus | 1,198,575 | 17.9 | 214,664 | 139,606 | 11.6 | 550,876 | 539,193 | 11,683 | 2.12 | 0.979 | 0.884 | 0.865 |
| Ireland | 4,882,495 | 16.7 | 816,908 | 578,782 | 11.9 | 3,401,681 | 3,401,681 | . | . | 1.000 | 0.881 | 0.881 |
| Latvia | 1,906,743 | 17.4 | 332,243 | 272,531 | 14.3 | 1,548,673 | 1,413,867 | 134,806 | 8.70 | 0.913 | 0.857 | 0.782 |
| Germany | 83,517,045 | 4.8 | 4,014,770 | 10,624,000 | 12.7 | 61,688,485 | 61,575,496 | 112,989 | 0.18 | 0.998 | 0.873 | 0.871 |

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[23]    The 39,000 registered citizens is a guess made by the Norwegian statistical agency.

[24]    Based on the UN's data on diasporas (UN_MigrantStockByOriginAndDestination), I know that for the year 2019, there were 75,472 Luxembourgers overseas. Assuming that the age structure of the diaspora is somewhat similar to that of Luxembourgers in Luxembourg, that percentage would represent 58,868 citizens.

| Country (Sorted by IDE, V-Dem, v.9) | Total Population (UN data) | Diaspora / Pop. | Estimated diaspora (only by birth) | Non-Citizen Residents (NC) | NC / POP | Total citizens (NR + RC) | Resident Citizens (RC) | Non-Resident Citizens (NR) | % NR / Total Citizens | RC / Demos | RC / Affected | Electoral Residential Inclusiveness (ERI) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| USA | 329,064,91 | 1.7 | 5,500,000 | 24,316,000[25] | 7.4 | 250,056,00 | 247,056,00 | 3,000,000 | 1.20 | 0.988 | 0.926 | 0.915 |
| Greece | 10,473,455 | 9.9 | 1,039,501 | 831,692 | 7.9 | 9,984,934 | 9,984,934 | . | . | 1.000 | 0.921 | 0.921 |
| Mauritius | 1,269,668 | 14.8 | 188,406 | 28,849* | 2.3 | 941,719 | 941,719 | . | . | 1.000 | 0.977 | 0.977 |
| Slovakia | 5,457,013 | 6.6 | 357,799 | 65,840 | 1.2 | 4,432,419 | 4,428,303 | 4,116 | 0.09 | 0.999 | 0.988 | 0.987 |
| Slovenia | 2,078,654 | 6.9 | 143,805 | 121,875 | 5.9 | 1,712,676 | 1,615,907 | 96,769 | 5.65 | 0.943 | 0.941 | 0.888 |
| Czechia | 10,689,209 | 8.5 | 911,469 | 564,345 | 5.3 | 8,362,987 | 8,341,408 | 21,579 | 0.26 | 0.997 | 0.947 | 0.945 |
| Argentina | 44,780,677 | 2.3 | 1,013,489 | 2,212,879 | 4.9 | 33,858,733 | 33,473,075 | 385,658 | 1.14 | 0.989 | 0.951 | 0.940 |
| Spain | 46,736,776 | 3.0 | 1,408,947 | 5,025,264 | 10.8 | 37,001,219 | 34,870,482 | 2,130,737 | 5.76 | 0.942 | 0.892 | 0.841 |
| Japan | 126,860,30 | 0.7 | 838,957 | 1,079,013 | 0.9 | 106,091,22 | 105,991,13 | 100,090 | 0.09 | 0.999 | 0.991 | 0.991 |
| Jamaica | 2,948,279 | 37.7 | 1,111,559 | 23,468 | 0.8 | 1,824,412 | 1,824,412 | . | . | 1.000 | 0.992 | 0.992 |
| Lithuania | 2,759,627 | 22.1 | 610,242 | 47,186 | 1.7 | 2,486,915 | 2,426,275 | 60,640 | 2.44 | 0.976 | 0.983 | 0.959 |
| Taiwan | 23,773,876 | 8.3 | 1,981,000 | 17,947 | 0.1 | 19,311,105 | 19,311,105 | . | . | 1.000 | 0.999 | 0.999 |
| Austria | 8,955,102 | 6.4 | 576,011 | 1,427,105 | 15.9 | 6,396,812 | 6,334,859 | 61,953 | 0.97 | 0.990 | 0.841 | 0.832 |
| Panama | 4,246,439 | 3.8 | 162,258 | 185,072 | 4.4 | 2,757,823 | 2,750,149 | 7,674 | 0.28 | 0.997 | 0.956 | 0.954 |
| Trin. & To. | 1,394,973 | 28.7 | 400,014 | 59,249 | 4.2 | 1,099,279 | 1,099,279 | . | . | 1.000 | 0.958 | 0.958 |
| Suriname | 581,372 | 48.9 | 284,568 | 46,157 | 7.9 | 356,223 | 356,223 | . | . | 1.000 | 0.921 | 0.921 |
| Cape Verde | 549,935 | 33.9 | 186,372 | 15,664 | 2.8 | 347,622 | 302,942 | 44,680 | 12.85 | 0.871 | 0.972 | 0.847 |
| Barbados | 287,025 | 39.4 | 112,980 | 34,807 | 12.1 | 255,833 | 255,833 | . | . | 1.000 | 0.879 | 0.879 |
| Timor-Leste | 1,293,119 | 3.0 | 39,202 | 8,417 | 0.7 | 784,286 | 778,041 | 6,245 | 0.80 | 0.992 | 0.993 | 0.986 |
| Peru | 32,510,453 | 4.7 | 1,544,212 | 782,169 | 2.4 | 22,901,954 | 22,017,030 | 884,924 | 3.86 | 0.961 | 0.976 | 0.938 |

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[25] The United States is one of the most difficult countries regarding population statistics. Non-citizen residents are estimated by combining the 13,300,000 (lawful permanent residents, also known as "green card" holders) from https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics/population-estimates/LPR with the 11,016,000 illegal permanent immigrants from https://www.brookings.edu/research/a-dozen-facts-about-immigration/. The estimation for the diaspora size and the diaspora electorate comes from the Federal Voting Assistance Program (https://www.fvap.gov/info/reports-surveys/overseas-citizen-population-analysis).

*Table 3. Ranking differences between Electoral Democracy Index based on v2x_suff and Electoral Democracy Index based on ERI*

| Country | Electoral Democracy Index (EDI$_{v2x\_suffr}$) | Rank (EDI$_{v2x\_suffr}$) | Electoral Democracy Index (EDI$_{ERI}$) | Rank (EDI$_{ERI}$) | Differences between Rankings (Rank$_{v2x\_suffr}$ - Rank$_{ERI}$) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Norway | 0.913 | 1 | 0.845 | 10 | -9 |
| 2. Sweden | 0.903 | 2 | 0.855 | 5 | -3 |
| 3. Estonia | 0.901 | 3 | 0.795 | 30 | -27 |
| 4. Costa Rica | 0.896 | 4 | 0.854 | 6 | -2 |
| 5. Denmark | 0.888 | 5 | 0.864 | 3 | 2 |
| 6. Uruguay | 0.884 | 6 | 0.889 | 1 | 5 |
| 7. Switzerland | 0.881 | 7 | 0.767 | 35 | -28 |
| 8. United Kingdom | 0.875 | 8 | 0.827 | 15 | -7 |
| 9. Luxembourg | 0.874 | 9 | 0.607 | 45 | -36 |
| 10. Portugal | 0.874 | 10 | 0.804 | 23 | -13 |
| 11. Italy | 0.873 | 11 | 0.796 | 29 | -18 |
| 12. New Zealand | 0.873 | 12 | 0.874 | 2 | 10 |
| 13. South Korea | 0.867 | 13 | 0.861 | 4 | 9 |
| 14. Belgium | 0.866 | 14 | 0.810 | 19 | -5 |
| 15. Australia | 0.864 | 15 | 0.833 | 13 | 2 |
| 16. Iceland | 0.861 | 16 | 0.804 | 24 | -8 |
| 17. Netherlands | 0.861 | 17 | 0.848 | 8 | 9 |
| 18. Finland | 0.855 | 18 | 0.830 | 14 | 4 |
| 19. Chile | 0.852 | 19 | 0.852 | 7 | 12 |
| 20. Canada | 0.850 | 20 | 0.835 | 11 | 9 |
| 21. France | 0.850 | 21 | 0.821 | 17 | 4 |
| 22. Cyprus | 0.846 | 22 | 0.797 | 28 | -6 |
| 23. Ireland | 0.846 | 23 | 0.802 | 27 | -4 |
| 24. Latvia | 0.846 | 24 | 0.750 | 38 | -14 |
| 25. Germany | 0.838 | 25 | 0.795 | 31 | -6 |
| 26. United States | 0.834 | 26 | 0.802 | 26 | 0 |
| 27. Greece | 0.831 | 27 | 0.804 | 25 | 2 |
| 28. Mauritius | 0.825 | 28 | 0.845 | 9 | 19 |
| 29. Slovakia | 0.824 | 29 | 0.819 | 18 | 11 |
| 30. Slovenia | 0.824 | 30 | 0.782 | 33 | -3 |
| 31. Czech Republic | 0.822 | 31 | 0.807 | 21 | 10 |
| 32. Argentina | 0.819 | 32 | 0.789 | 32 | 0 |
| 33. Spain | 0.819 | 33 | 0.781 | 34 | -1 |
| 34. Japan | 0.808 | 34 | 0.823 | 16 | 18 |
| 35. Jamaica | 0.807 | 35 | 0.808 | 20 | 15 |
| 36. Lithuania | 0.803 | 36 | 0.804 | 22 | 14 |
| 37. Taiwan | 0.801 | 37 | 0.834 | 12 | 25 |
| 38. Austria | 0.790 | 38 | 0.734 | 43 | -5 |
| 39. Panama | 0.788 | 39 | 0.765 | 36 | 3 |
| 40. Trin. and Tobago | 0.786 | 40 | 0.764 | 37 | 3 |
| 41. Suriname | 0.772 | 41 | 0.746 | 39 | 2 |
| 42. Cape Verde | 0.769 | 42 | 0.724 | 44 | -2 |
| 43. Barbados | 0.768 | 43 | 0.738 | 42 | 1 |
| 44. Timor-Leste | 0.755 | 44 | 0.744 | 40 | 4 |
| 45. Peru | 0.753 | 45 | 0.740 | 41 | 4 |

# 3. Conclusions

The legitimacy of democracy is founded on the consent of the governed (Bobbio 1987). We abide by the democratic decisions of our communities because we have a chance to participate in making such decisions and, in case we dislike them, we have the opportunity to change them using pre-established ways to do so. Actually, "the core of democratic self-governance is the ideal of public autonomy, namely, the principle that those who are subject to the law should also be its authors" (Benhabib 2004: 217). As a member of a political community, the government we choose affects us, and only those who are comprehensively affected by a government should participate in electing that government democratically. Residence, as Carens (2002) justifies, should be the criterion for granting electoral rights.

Yet, most significant measures of democracy are not sensitive enough to the contemporary composition of societies, where individuals of different status coexist. This is particularly significant due to recent migration flows. Ignoring the problem has not resolved the issue; it is virtually inescapable. Whether explicitly or implicitly, all measures of democracy take sides in these matters. The mere fact that almost a third of the permanent population in a country does not have political rights and that this does not affect its level of democracy implies—necessarily—that this aspect does not play a significant role in measuring the democratic level of a country. Of course, each author or measurement has the freedom to define democracy as they see fit, but being insensitive to this dimension directly attacks the polyarchical conceptual minimum that has prevailed in the specialized literature. Participation should not be taken for granted.

The index of Electoral Residential Inclusiveness (ERI) is firmly anchored in the literature, particularly the canon of positive democratic theory. ERI forces us to be more transparent, coherent, and consistent in our efforts to measure democracy. Transparent in the sense of being clear about what we are measuring, coherent with democratic theory, and consistent along with each case. If the results are not convincing, and yet we are sure that ERI is better than what we had before, then we should reconsider which indicators constitute the core of our democracy indices and how they should be aggregated.

I am not contending that this research objective of measuring residential electoral democracy is necessarily better than measures based on ethnonational ideas of the demos, the people. I do argue, however, that this perspective is at least as valid as the national one. Therefore, one implication of this research is that measures of democracy need to be explicit about these complex normative decisions. The critical question we should ask ourselves when intending to measure the democratic level of nations: are we measuring how democratic Swiss are or are we measuring how democratic Switzerland is?

# Annex

*Table A.1. V-Dem's 2018 Polyarchy Scores and its components (v.9) for top 45 countries[26]*

| Rank | Country | Electoral Democracy Index[27] | Multiplicative polyarchy index | Additive polyarchy index | Elected officials index (v2x_elecoff) | Clean elections index (v2xel_frefair) | Freedom of association index (v2x_frassoc_thick) | Share of population with suffrage (v2x_suffr) | Freedom of expression and alt. sources of inf. index (v2x_freexp_altinf) |
|------|---------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| 1 | Norway | 0.913 | 0.863 | 0.964 | 1 | 0.956 | 0.914 | 1 | 0.964 |
| 2 | Sweden | 0.903 | 0.846 | 0.960 | 1 | 0.969 | 0.925 | 1 | 0.957 |
| 3 | Estonia | 0.901 | 0.843 | 0.959 | 1 | 0.971 | 0.902 | 1 | 0.969 |
| 4 | Costa Rica | 0.896 | 0.835 | 0.957 | 1 | 0.973 | 0.917 | 1 | 0.941 |
| 5 | Denmark | 0.888 | 0.823 | 0.953 | 1 | 0.951 | 0.927 | 1 | 0.971 |
| 6 | Uruguay | 0.884 | 0.816 | 0.951 | 1 | 0.969 | 0.884 | 1 | 0.964 |
| 7 | Switzerland | 0.881 | 0.811 | 0.950 | 1 | 0.948 | 0.914 | 1 | 0.975 |
| 8 | United | 0.875 | 0.802 | 0.947 | 1 | 0.940 | 0.893 | 1 | 0.949 |
| 9 | Luxembourg | 0.874 | 0.801 | 0.947 | 1 | 0.962 | 0.886 | 1 | 0.957 |
| 10 | Portugal | 0.874 | 0.802 | 0.947 | 1 | 0.975 | 0.892 | 1 | 0.946 |
| 11 | Italy | 0.873 | 0.800 | 0.947 | 1 | 0.938 | 0.904 | 1 | 0.939 |
| 12 | New Zealand | 0.873 | 0.800 | 0.947 | 1 | 0.955 | 0.910 | 1 | 0.938 |
| 13 | South Korea | 0.867 | 0.790 | 0.944 | 1 | 0.954 | 0.870 | 1 | 0.949 |
| 14 | Belgium | 0.866 | 0.789 | 0.944 | 1 | 0.964 | 0.869 | 1 | 0.958 |
| 15 | Australia | 0.864 | 0.786 | 0.943 | 1 | 0.965 | 0.908 | 1 | 0.917 |
| 16 | Iceland | 0.861 | 0.781 | 0.941 | 1 | 0.944 | 0.894 | 1 | 0.949 |
| 17 | Netherlands | 0.861 | 0.780 | 0.941 | 1 | 0.966 | 0.886 | 1 | 0.939 |
| 18 | Finland | 0.855 | 0.771 | 0.939 | 1 | 0.968 | 0.867 | 1 | 0.959 |
| 19 | Chile | 0.852 | 0.766 | 0.937 | 1 | 0.963 | 0.895 | 1 | 0.892 |
| 20 | Canada | 0.850 | 0.763 | 0.936 | 1 | 0.944 | 0.888 | 1 | 0.939 |
| 21 | France | 0.850 | 0.764 | 0.937 | 1 | 0.948 | 0.863 | 1 | 0.96 |
| 22 | Cyprus | 0.846 | 0.758 | 0.935 | 1 | 0.921 | 0.891 | 1 | 0.947 |
| 23 | Ireland | 0.846 | 0.757 | 0.935 | 1 | 0.913 | 0.879 | 1 | 0.961 |
| 24 | Latvia | 0.846 | 0.758 | 0.934 | 1 | 0.899 | 0.896 | 1 | 0.942 |

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[26] For a complete picture of the Structure of Aggregation of V-Dem's Electoral Democracy Index, see Coppedge et al. (2019a: 28 and 343), Pemstein et al. (2015).

[27] Aggregation: v2x_polyarchy = (0.5 * MPI + 0.5 * API) = (v2x_elecoff * v2xel_frefair * v2x_frassoc_thick * v2x_suffr * v2x_freexp_altinf) + (.125*v2x_elecoff + .25*v2xel_frefair + .25*v2x_frassoc_thick + .125*v2x_suffr + .25*v2x_freexp_altinf)

| Rank | Country | Electoral Democracy Index[27] | Multiplicative polyarchy index | Additive polyarchy index | Elected officials index (v2x_elecoff) | Clean elections index (v2xel_frefair) | Freedom of association index (v2x_frassoc_thick) | Share of population with suffrage (v2x_suffr) | Freedom of expression and alt. sources of inf. index (v2x_freexp_altinf) |
|------|---------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| 25 | Germany | 0.838 | 0.744 | 0.931 | 1 | 0.951 | 0.862 | 1 | 0.936 |
| 26 | USA | 0.834 | 0.739 | 0.929 | 1 | 0.877 | 0.933 | 1 | 0.916 |
| 27 | Greece | 0.831 | 0.735 | 0.928 | 1 | 0.949 | 0.897 | 1 | 0.876 |
| 28 | Mauritius | 0.825 | 0.726 | 0.925 | 1 | 0.944 | 0.890 | 1 | 0.919 |
| 29 | Slovakia | 0.824 | 0.725 | 0.924 | 1 | 0.945 | 0.868 | 1 | 0.883 |
| 30 | Slovenia | 0.824 | 0.724 | 0.924 | 1 | 0.926 | 0.903 | 1 | 0.878 |
| 31 | Czech Rep. | 0.822 | 0.722 | 0.923 | 1 | 0.923 | 0.872 | 1 | 0.913 |
| 32 | Argentina | 0.819 | 0.717 | 0.922 | 1 | 0.891 | 0.901 | 1 | 0.884 |
| 33 | Spain | 0.819 | 0.712 | 0.927 | 0.945 | 0.966 | 0.892 | 1 | 0.935 |
| 34 | Japan | 0.808 | 0.699 | 0.916 | 1 | 0.926 | 0.906 | 1 | 0.868 |
| 35 | Jamaica | 0.807 | 0.698 | 0.916 | 1 | 0.864 | 0.889 | 1 | 0.918 |
| 36 | Lithuania | 0.803 | 0.692 | 0.915 | 1 | 0.921 | 0.859 | 1 | 0.911 |
| 37 | Taiwan | 0.801 | 0.688 | 0.913 | 1 | 0.918 | 0.895 | 1 | 0.9 |
| 38 | Austria | 0.790 | 0.672 | 0.908 | 1 | 0.946 | 0.823 | 1 | 0.887 |
| 39 | Panama | 0.788 | 0.670 | 0.908 | 1 | 0.889 | 0.880 | 1 | 0.846 |
| 40 | Trin. and Tob. | 0.786 | 0.665 | 0.906 | 1 | 0.833 | 0.893 | 1 | 0.885 |
| 41 | Suriname | 0.772 | 0.645 | 0.899 | 1 | 0.891 | 0.841 | 1 | 0.872 |
| 42 | Cape Verde | 0.769 | 0.641 | 0.898 | 1 | 0.876 | 0.884 | 1 | 0.859 |
| 43 | Barbados | 0.768 | 0.638 | 0.897 | 1 | 0.813 | 0.879 | 1 | 0.931 |
| 44 | Timor-Leste | 0.755 | 0.620 | 0.891 | 1 | 0.872 | 0.830 | 1 | 0.845 |
| 45 | Peru | 0.753 | 0.616 | 0.890 | 1 | 0.854 | 0.832 | 1 | 0.89 |

Source: (Coppedge et al. 2019b).

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