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Multiple Measurements, Elusive Agreement, and Unstable Outcomes in the Study of Regime Change*

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Abstract

This comprehensive analysis of regime change indicators reveals that problems of conceptualization and measurement are major reasons why current research fails to draw compelling conclusions that foster cumulative knowledge. The paper first argues that even though the literature discusses the conceptualization of regime *types* at length, there is little attention to defining regime *change*. Furthermore, *quantitative* studies of regime change largely elide conceptual and measurement challenges. Second, although indicators of regime *type* are highly correlated, agreement between indicators of regime *change* is extremely low. Third, focal points such as elections and coups drive *agreement among these indicators*, suggesting that such measures often reflect notable events instead of regime change per se. Finally, a robustness check of nine articles on regime change published in top journals demonstrates that findings are often not robust to alternative indicators, implying that indicator choice influences the results of quantitative studies.

I. Introduction

A striking level of instability witnessed after the end of the Cold War has turned our attention to regime change. For instance, the Baltic states and more recently Tunisia witnessed democratization, while countries such as Hungary or Russia—which once experienced liberalization—are made increasingly authoritarian through "executive aggrandizement" (Bermeo 2016). This prompts renewed interest in regime change and spurs new studies in the large and intellectually vibrant literatures regarding the causes and consequences of democratic transitions, democratic breakdowns, and authoritarian resilience.

These studies are often methodologically sophisticated but yield few consistent findings. For instance, some claim that economic inequality inhibits democratization (Muller 1995; Boix 2003; Acemoglu and Robinson 2006), while others find no evidence for this relationship (Przeworski et al. 2000; Houle 2009). Presidentialism increases the likelihood of democratic breakdown according to some scholars (Przeworski et al. 2000; Maeda 2010), or has no effect (Power and Gasiorowski 1997; Cheibub 2007; Houle 2009). In short, an enormous literature has yielded few axiomatic findings.

This paper argues that the absence of rigorous, consistent conceptualization and measurement of regime change helps explain the lack of cumulative knowledge. It joins work by other scholars who have critiqued measurements of regime change, noting that they fail to reflect democratic ideals fully (Bogaards 2010; Paxton 2000) and yield inconsistent findings on outcomes from democratization to war (Casper and Tufis 2003; Bogaards 2010). However, it advances these studies by providing a more comprehensive review of existing measures and their implications for the study of regime change.

In this paper, we distinguish between regime *rupture*—large-scale changes between democracy and autocracy that fundamentally affect the logic of political rule—and *reform*—more fine-grained changes in a polity's institutional arrangements—and examine numerous indicators of regime change derived from 13 original datasets on regime type. We demonstrate that the problem of measurement is more worrisome than previous work suggests: indicators count vastly different numbers of regime change events over time, and agreement between these indicators is extraordinarily low. Moreover, we find that elections and coups increase agreement among indicators, suggesting that where agreement exists, it is driven by highly visible symbols of regime change. Finally, a robustness check of nine articles on regime change published in top journals reveals that findings are often not robust to the use of alternative measures.

Our goal is to raise awareness of the consequences of indicator choice on scholarly findings. The robustness checks of our colleagues' research are not intended as a critique of their work or the theories they put forth, but rather to underscore the lack of interchangeability of conventionally used indicators. We highlight the methodological problems that make it difficult to draw conclusions from current scholarship. We do not aim to explain regime change or to argue that a particular type of indicator is more appropriate than another. Rather, we point to the factors that scholars should more explicitly consider in testing hypotheses, and urge the research community to more rigorously conceptualize and measure regime change in future work.

The paper is structured as follows. Section II discusses challenges in the conceptualization and measurement of different forms of regime change. Section III reviews common measures of regime change. Section IV examines agreement between them. Section V analyzes the robustness of empirical studies to alternative indicators. Section VI suggests some improvements for empirical research. Section VII discusses our contributions and concludes.

II. Conceptualizing and Measuring Regime Change

1. Conceptual Challenges

Challenges in conceptualizing and measuring regime *change* derive from the debates over the conceptualization and measurement of regime *type,* particularly democracy. Scholars disagree about the definition of democracy. Specifically, they are at odds over whether to adopt a *binary* concept of democracy and dictatorship or to see democracy on a *continuum.* Those who advocate the binary definition argue that democracy, like pregnancy, reflects a fundamental, qualitative change in condition. A regime is either democratic or not. Typically, these scholars rely on a *procedural* definition of democracy emphasizing competitive elections for executive and legislative offices in which multiple parties compete and alternation in office between parties is observed (Alvarez et al. 1996; Cheibub et al. 2010). Those who advocate a continuum take the view that regimes exhibit democratic qualities to a greater or lesser extent (Dahl 1971; Bollen and Jackman 1989; Diamond 1999).

This debate reflects two very different ways in which political regime *change* is conceptualized. For those who conceive of regime types in binary terms and only distinguish between democracies and autocracies, any change from democracy to autocracy or vice versa constitutes a large-scale change in the logic of politics. We call this form of regime change *rupture*. On the other hand, a perspective that conceptualizes political regimes along a continuum between two ideal types or that distinguishes between various distinct forms of democracy,

autocracy, and hybrid regimes, allows for what we term *reform*: more fine-grained changes that may affect single political rights, civil liberties, or some institutional characteristics, but do not imply a complete overhaul of the system. Both rupture and reform come in two flavors. As to rupture, countries may change from a democratic to an autocratic political order (*breakdown*) or vice versa (*transition*). *Liberalization* is a reform that entails an increase in a country's democratic qualities. *Backsliding* decreases these qualities.

The *pace* and *magnitude* of institutional changes distinguish rupture and reform. Gradual institutional changes over a long period of time characterize *reform*, while large, abrupt changes classify as *rupture*. Contrast, for example, the political *rupture* in Peru under Alberto Fujimori with the *reform* in Russia under Vladimir Putin. On April 5, 1992, Alberto Fujimori responded to political deadlock by suspending the constitution, removing adversaries from the judiciary, and dissolving Congress. In the aftermath of this *autogolpe*, Fujimori established an autocratic regime that ensured his reelection in 1995 and 2000 (Cameron and Mauceri 2006; Seawright 2012). Thus, Peru saw abrupt and large-scale institutional changes that characterize this regime change event as rupture. Putin's process of regime change, by contrast, constitutes an example of reform. Putin gradually rolled back democratic freedoms by passing more restrictive media laws in 2005, cracking down on political opponents through an anti-terrorism law in 2006, and placing greater sanctions on public assemblies, NGOs, and the internet in 2011. In a move to de facto circumvent constitutional term limits, Putin installed his then prime minister, Dmitry Medvedev, as President from 2008-2012, while himself serving as prime minister, and then pushed for the extension of presidential term limits to six years before his return to the presidency in 2012 (Freedom House various years). It is hard to identify any specific moment that marked the transition from democracy to autocracy in this process of reform.

2. Measurement Challenges

Measurement issues have received a great deal of attention in the study of regimes, but there is little explicit attention given to measuring regime *change*. In our view, the challenge in studying regime change is to define and measure it in a way that allows us to detect both rupture and reform, and both minimalist and maximalist definitions of democracy present challenges in this regard. A minimalist focus on turnover through elections (or any other single aspect of democracy that signals regime change), often advocated by those who see democracy in binary terms, cannot detect fine-grained reforms because it only allows for changes between the democratic and autocratic ideal types. A maximalist view that requires highly informed citizens to engage in near-constant deliberation to produce policies that maximize social, economic, and

cultural equality, is equally problematic, because it makes it extremely unlikely that regimes pass the threshold to democracy and, thus, difficult to detect rupture.

A related challenge regards determining the relevant time period for measuring rupture and reform. Several authors designed their data on the premise that regime change is "marked by singular, characteristic events, such as free or fraudulent elections, constitutional changes, coups d'état, declarations of martial law, or arrests of prominent individuals" (Gasiorowski 1996: 472), yet the changes in the rules and informal procedures that shape political regimes take place over time, separated by months or even years. Moreover, not all crises, no matter how startling, denote regime change. Further, it is doubtful that such events should be seen as the "moment" of regime change. The relevant changes often begin long before troops leave the barracks or elections are called. Understanding which changes constitute reform or rupture is thus difficult.

Another measurement challenge is to avoid excessively including cases of political change and crises that fall short of significant changes in the democratic qualities of political regimes. For instance, tighter restrictions on press freedoms, including some prosecution of independent journalists, may be deeply unsettling, and they may also be early warning signs of more systemic efforts of backsliding. However, practices that are limited in scope may not be sufficient to characterize the event as backsliding. Similarly, the expansion of press freedoms or crackdowns on corruption may be a welcome change but they do not necessarily reflect liberalization or transition. Such changes can be the normal push and pull of politics; they are near ubiquitous and can be observed even in advanced and seemingly stable democracies.

Conversely, not all significant changes are immediately obvious. Sometimes regime changes result from dramatic political events—tanks rolling into the streets to oust a democratically elected president or the presidential suspension of an elected legislature, on the one hand; the election of a president through free and fair competition, on the other. Yet, often they come gradually—whether through piecemeal restrictions of political and civil liberties, diminished accountability or electoral fraud, in the case of backsliding and breakdown, or through the slow expansion of liberties, extension of accountability and increasingly competitive elections, in the case of liberalization and transition. This makes it hard to identify one specific year of regime change, and absent highly visible changes, can lead scholars to overlook change altogether. It also draws into question how we should think about the time period that constitutes a regime change event. Following the conventional country-year design of extant datasets of regime types and empirical studies of regime change, we would identify several distinct years and thus potential cases of rupture or reform. However, it seems more adequate to interpret them as one multi-year period of change.

III. Extant Indicators of Regime Change

Given these challenges, it is perhaps not surprising that published research on regime change often lacks a clear definition of the phenomenon under investigation. The literature on regime change relies on varied measures, often employing them out of convenience or for methodological reasons that have little to do with the underlying theory of political regime change. Even where scholars have carefully taken into account the underlying conceptions of regime *type* when choosing indicators, they often fail to consider explicitly the implications of using these measures as indicators of regime *change*.

Existing measurements create different challenges for studying rupture and reform. Dichotomous indicators cannot be used to analyze reform. Polychotomous or continuous indicators often do not identify qualitative thresholds between different forms of political rule, thus making it difficult to use them in analyses of rupture. They also combine factors that reflect different combinations of democratic features (e.g., accountability, electoral competition, and liberties), making it hard to isolate arenas of democratic or autocratic change.

1. Datasets on Regime Type: Conceptual Differences

Our review considers thirteen original datasets of regime type that are used to study regime change. We include twelve datasets that are used in published research on regime change. In addition, we consider the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) dataset (Coppedge et al. 2016a). This dataset was released in January 2016 and has not yet formed a basis of a body of published work. However, we include it because it is likely to become a leading basis for analysis in the field and because it explicitly recognizes and measures varied conceptions of democracy.

The indicators that we review differ with respect to their conceptualization of democracy. In particular, they disagree on whether to adopt a minimalist definition of democracy focusing on (electoral) contestation alone (Przeworski 1991), a notion of "polyarchy" involving both contestation and participation (Dahl 1971), or an even broader definition of democracy that adds civil and/or political liberties (Reich 2002; Freedom House 2015) to the concept of democracy.

These indicators can be grouped into one of three conceptualizations of democracy. Przeworski et al.'s (2000) dataset on regime type and its update by Cheibub et al. (2010) employs a minimalist concept of democracy, whereby democracy is "a regime in which some governmental offices are filled as a consequence of contested elections" (Alvarez et al. 1996). *Contestation*, thus, is central in this concept. Svolik (2012) adopts a similar approach.

The second conceptualization adds other criteria. Boix et al. (2013), Geddes et al. (2014), and Skaaning et al. (2015) introduce *participation* as second core dimension, requiring countries to meet a minimal suffrage requirement to qualify as democratic (Dahl 1971). Bernhard et al. (2001) add a *stateness* criterion to contestation and participation: democratic countries must have achieved full sovereignty. Conceptually, the Polity IV data (Marshall et al. 2014) focus on contestation and participation as well. However, their measurement puts a particularly strong emphasis on political institutions and executive constraints as third dimension of political rule. Magaloni et al. (2013) formulate four necessary conditions of democracy: contestation, participation, a civilian government, and executive constraints.

The V-Dem project recognizes that the notion of "democracy" entails up to seven different principles: the electoral, liberal, participatory, deliberative, egalitarian, majoritarian, and consensual principles (Coppedge et al. 2016b). Thus far, separate indicators of the first five principles are available. The electoral democracy score is the foundation of the other four indicators because elections are seen as necessary condition for democracy. Consequently, including all five indicators in this study would bias our findings. Therefore, we only consider the first score.[1] The project's definition of *electoral democracy* follows Dahl's (1998) concept of *polyarchy* and thus focuses on contestation and participation (Coppedge et al. 2015).

The remaining four datasets employ a broad concept of democracy. Reich (2002)[2] and Ulfelder (2012) examine a regime's level of contestation, participation, and civil and political liberties. Freedom House (2015) assesses a country's political rights (contestation and participation) and civil liberties (e.g., freedom of expression and belief; associational and organizational rights; rule of law; personal autonomy and individual rights). Wahman et al. (2013) use the imputed average Polity IV (Marshall et al. 2014) and Freedom in the World (Freedom House 2015) scores to measure political regimes. The authors derive the threshold between democratic and autocratic rule on their indicator empirically by estimating the mean cutoff point of five established democracy indicators (Bernhard et al. 2001; Cheibub et al. 2010; Boix et al. 2013; Freedom House's (2015) measure of "electoral democracy," and Polity IV). This identifies a cut-off point of 7 (out of 10).

[1] The findings remain unaffected when we include all five V-Dem indicators (see Appendix).
[2] Reich (2002) is an update of Gasiorowski (1996). As with Cheibub et al.'s (2010) update of the Przeworski et al. (2000) data, we include only the more comprehensive dataset in our analysis.

2. Measurements of Regime Change

In selecting the indicators for our analysis we aim to include the most commonly used indicators of regime change and to reflect the breadth of indicators employed in the literature. Several datasets on regime type—in particular, Freedom House (2015), Polity IV, Skaaning et al. (2015), and Wahman et al. (2013)—allow for variable cutpoints between democracy and autocracy and different magnitudes of change, and our literature review revealed that scholars employ different thresholds on the same regime type indicator to code instances of rupture and reform. Yet, adding more than one indicator based on the same dataset may bias our findings. What is why we include only one indicator per type of regime change in this paper. We replicated all the analyses reported below with an extended set of indicators of regime change and present the findings in the Appendix.[3]

Our analysis covers eleven indicators of breakdown, ten indicators of transition, and five indicators of reform, based on the aforementioned 13 original datasets of regime type.[4] As to rupture, six of the twelve indicators of regime type (Boix et al. 2013; Cheibub et al. 2010; Geddes et al. 2014; Magaloni et al. 2013; Svolik 2012; Ulfelder 2012) are dichotomous and identify clear qualitative thresholds between democratic and autocratic regimes. To these, we add Bernhard et al.'s (2001) original measure of democratic breakdown. Reich's (2002) data are trichotomous and distinguish between democracies, semidemocracies, and autocracies. Rupture is any move between democracy and autocracy. We use the commonly employed thresholds of +6 on the Polity IV score, 2.5 on the Freedom in the World index, and 7 on Wahman et al.'s (2013) indicator to derive three more indicators of rupture.

Regarding reform, the analysis includes five indicators. These are defined as any change on Freedom House's (2015) *Freedom in the World* index, the Polity IV indicator, Skaaning et al.'s (2015) *Lexical Index of Electoral Democracy*[5], and Wahman et al.'s (2013) combined Freedom House and Polity score. Identifying regime change events using the V-Dem indicators is particularly challenging because the data are continuous between 0 and 1. To distinguish trivial from meaningful changes, we define a reform as any change on V-Dem's electoral democracy scale by at least a standard deviation.[6]

[3] Note that our indicator selection is conservative—agreement is even lower when additional commonly used indicators of regime change are used.

[4] See Appendix for an overview of all measures of regime change, their definition, sources, coding rules, and exemplary studies that use them.

[5] As Skaaning et al. (2015) do not provide guidelines of how to use their index to distinguish between democracies and autocracies, we do not include it among the rupture measures.

[6] Lindberg (2015) presents a way to transform the continuous into a five-point ordinal scale, using cutoff points at 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, and 0.8. Such an ordinal indicator can then be used to study reform as any change between these

IV. Evaluating Extant Indicators of Regime Change

We turn now to an evaluation of these indicators. We begin by considering measurement issues in Freedom House and Polity IV, given their importance in the literature. We then examine the congruence in measures, finding extremely low agreement in the number of instances of rupture and reform they identify. Finally we model the *agreement* of these measures and show that they are more likely to agree when focal points such as coups or elections are present. The purpose of modeling the agreement of indicators (which, we emphasize, is distinct from modeling rupture and reform), is to determine whether we can expect that coding processes—and particularly the existence of highly visible events—affect the data collection process and (in)congruence of extant indicators.

1. Freedom House and Polity IV: Empirical Ambiguity

Polity IV provides annual measures of both autocratic and democratic features according to five dimensions of the exercise of authority: competitiveness of political participation, regulation of political participation, competiveness of executive recruitment, openness of executive recruitment, and constraints on the chief executive. Its aggregate score ranges from -10 to +10, with higher values corresponding to more "democratic quality" of the regime. Freedom House (2015) measures civil liberties and political rights. Both dimensions are coded on a seven-point scale with higher numbers corresponding to a higher number of restrictions imposed on the respective dimension.

Both indicators have been subject to several critiques. First, rules for coding individual elements and aggregating them into a single score are subjective and often opaque.[7] Freedom House's 7-point political rights and civil liberties indices aggregate information on 3 (4) dimensions, which are coded on 40- (60-) point scales. These dimensions, in turn, summarize multiple questions. Coding information is only available at the dimension-, not at the individual question-level. Moreover, this information is only available from 2005 onward. Polity sub-components, in contrast, are available for all countries and years.

Second, the various aggregation steps in the creation of the Freedom House indices imply a multitude of possible combinations of individual scores. At the question level, there are *9,765,625 logically possible combinations* of the subcategory questions to obtain a plausible score on

categories. In the appendix, replicate all our analyses using reform measures based on the ordinal instead of continuous scales.

[7] See Munck and Verkuilen (2002), Casper and Tufis (2003), and Cheibub et al. (2010) for overviews.

Freedom House's Political Rights scale. In turn, there are *30,517,578,125 combinations of the Civil Liberties questions*. At the subcategory level, there are 2,873 (63,869) different logically plausible combinations for the political rights (civil liberties) indices.

Of course, most of the possible combinations are not found empirically. Yet, over the period 2005-2015 alone, we find a striking number of combinations in the data. Usually, there are at least 5-10 combinations of subcategory scores that yield the same aggregate score. For the 7-point scales, we find more than 25 combinations of questions per score in the data. Polity's aggregation rules have similar effects. We count 2,100 logically possible combinations of the five Polity component indicators. Again, the majority of them are empirically implausible. However, we find, for instance, nine different combinations for a score of -6, and fourteen for -5.

This leads to a third critique: changes in scores do not necessarily reflect similar underlying changes in liberties or institutional arrangements. For example, a change from -6 to -5 on Polity (that is, a change from autocracy to anocracy) could be from any of the nine combinations that result in a -6 to any of the 14 combinations that yield a score of -5. That makes 84 different possible regime changes. Alternatively, a change from 2 (52 combinations in the data) to 3 (69 combinations in the data) on Freedom House's Political Rights scale could reflect any of 3,588 different movements. In short, any aggregate score on the Polity IV or Freedom in the World index represents a high number of underlying institutional characteristics, and movements between these categories provide only limited information.

Finally, the regime thresholds created on the basis of Polity IV or Freedom House are arbitrary. Freedom House takes the average of the Political Rights and Civil Liberties ratings to create a trichotomous Freedom Rating according to which countries can be Free (1.0 to 2.5), Partly Free (3.0 to 5.0) or Not Free (5.5 to 7.0). The addition of a third category appears to provide more information, but the majority of cases fall at the high or low ends—and they tend to remain there for longer periods of time. The middle category is where most regime changes take place, and this is where we need refined definitions and measures. Similarly, Polity IV's official cut-off points are -6 (autocracy) and +6 (democracy), with all countries in between defined as anocracies. Again, these thresholds are arbitrary, and given the high number of permutations of the component indicators that arrive at a specific score, movements across categories may represent very different institutional dynamics.

2. Coding Instances of Regime Change

It is perhaps not surprising that indicators differ widely in terms of the number of regime change events identified, as Table 1 shows. Some discrepancies may be due to the different time periods covered—the likelihood of specific forms of regime change varies over time (e.g., Huntington 1992; Doorenspleet 2000). Nevertheless, even when the period is restricted to 1946-2000, for which most (with the exception of Freedom House) data are available, we find that disagreement about the number of country-years experiencing regime change is large. For example, Reich (2002) identifies 106 instances of transition in the post-WWII period (1.79% of all observations), while Svolik (2012) codes only 89 observations (1.07%). Similarly, Magaloni et al.'s (2013) data allow for the coding of 49 breakdown events after 1945 (0.58% of all country-years), while according to Ulfelder (2012), breakdown happened almost three times as frequently in the same period (109 events; 1.45%).

These discrepancies become even larger when measuring reform. For example, according to Skaaning et al. (2015), liberalization (backsliding) occurred in 379 (261) country-years after World War II. According to Polity IV, 556 (341) country-years experienced liberalization (backsliding).

Naturally, these discrepancies are also due to differences in the range of values of both indicators. But they also suggest that the set of cases examined in an analysis of rupture or reform, and thus any inferences about the determinants of regime change or its consequences, crucially depend on the chosen indicator of regime change. This implies that we cannot even answer questions as simple as about the number of regime changes after World War II.

Table 1: Indicators of regime change

		full period		post-WWII		full period		post-WWII	
Indicator name	**Period available**	**# events**	**% obs**	**# events**	**% obs**	**# events**	**% obs**	**# events**	**% obs**
		TRANSITION				**BREAKDOWN**			
Bernhard et al. 2005	1913-2005	NA	NA	NA	NA	63	1.73%	54	1.69%
Boix et al. 2013	1801-2007	134	0.83%	108	1.23%	83	0.52%	65	0.74%
Cheibub et al. 2010	1947-2008	102	1.14%	102	1.14%	66	0.74%	66	0.74%
Freedom House (FIW: free)	1973-2015	91	1.19%	91	1.19%	72	0.94%	72	0.94%
Geddes et al. 2014	1946-2009	103	1.32%	103	1.32%	75	0.96%	75	0.96%
Magaloni et al. 2013	1951-2012	83	0.98%	83	0.98%	49	0.58%	49	0.58%
Polity IV (AN=AUT)	1801-2014	131	0.80%	106	1.17%	80	0.49%	64	0.71%
Reich 2002	1801-1998	131	1.22%	106	1.79%	92	0.86%	73	1.23%
Svolik 2012	1946-2007	89	1.07%	89	1.07%	57	0.69%	57	0.69%
Ulfelder 2012	1956-2010	113	1.51%	113	1.51%	109	1.45%	109	1.45%
Wahman et al. 2013	1973-2010	98	1.51%	98	1.51%	62	0.95%	62	0.95%
		LIBERALIZATION				**BACKSLIDING**			
Freedom House (FIW, any change)	1973-2015	919	12.04%	919	12.04%	738	9.67%	738	9.67%
Polity IV (any change)	1801-2014	811	4.94%	556	6.13%	511	3.11%	341	3.76%
Skaaning et al. 2015	1801-2015	657	3.80%	379	3.66%	483	2.79%	261	2.52%
V-Dem: Electoral Democracy	1901-2015	803	5.05%	669	6.50%	400	2.52	302	2.93%
Wahman et al. 2013 (any change)	1973-2010	1033	15.87%	1033	15.87%	730	11.21%	730	11.21%

3. Agreement between Measures of Regime Change

It is commonly assumed that measures of regime change are interchangeable because the indicators or regime type that they are based on correlate very highly. Table 2 refutes this conventional wisdom. It presents the average pairwise correlation coefficients for all indicators of rupture and reform and contrasts them with the average correlation among the corresponding democracy indicators.[8] While it is indeed the case that the average pairwise correlation between the regime type indicators is very high (between 0.85 and 0.86), we find strikingly low correlations among all indicators of regime change. In fact, the correlation ranges between a high 0.46 (transition) and a low 0.33 (backsliding).

This turns our attention to the study of agreement between the various indicators, which is defined as the number of indicators coding the respective regime change event, divided by the total number of indicators available. Thus, agreement ranges from 0 to 1. All cases coded as 0 are excluded from the analysis because they have plausibly not experienced the respective form of regime change.[9]

[8] For an overview of all pairwise correlations, see Tables A3 through A6 in Appendix II.

[9] All analyses were carried out with an alternative coding of agreement that looks at a period of three years (t +/- 1). This is a relatively generous coding because it codes agreement between indicators even when the change was

Table 2: Average Correlations among Indicators of Regime Change

	Democracy	**Transition**	**Breakdown**
Bernhard et al. 2005	NA	NA	0.56
Boix et al. 2013	0.86	0.49	0.47
Cheibub et al. 2010	0.85	0.50	0.51
Freedom House (FIW: free)	0.79	0.31	0.22
Geddes et al. 2014	0.87	0.49	0.48
Magaloni et al. 2013	0.87	0.53	0.50
Polity IV (AN=AUT)	0.83	0.40	0.39
Reich 2002	0.80	0.39	0.49
Svolik 2012	0.88	0.56	0.50
Ulfelder 2012	0.85	0.53	0.49
Wahman et al. 2013	0.86	0.40	0.23
Mean (SD)	*0.85 (0.03)*	*0.46 (0.08)*	*0.44 (0.11)*
	Democracy	**Liberalization**	**Backsliding**
Freedom House (FIW, any change)	0.86	0.45	0.39
Polity IV (any change)	0.85	0.37	0.33
Skaaning et al. 2015	0.86	0.32	0.26
V-Dem: Electoral Democracy	0.85	0.34	0.23
Wahman et al. 2013 (any change)	0.89	0.52	0.43
Mean (SD)	*0.86 (0.02)*	*0.40 (0.08)*	*0.33 (0.08)*

We measure agreement for each form of regime change as well as for backsliding and breakdown, and for liberalization and transition. Figure 1 depicts agreement rates over time, averaged over a period of five years.[10] It underscores that despite the considerable overlap in underlying data sources, average agreement is disturbingly low. On average, agreement between the rupture measures is slightly less than 20 percent, and roughly 40 to 50 percent for reform.

Furthermore, only a handful of cases are unequivocally identified as regime change events by all indicators available. We find 100 percent agreement at time t for 145 backsliding events (out of a total of 1,699; equaling 8.53 percent), 20 instances of breakdown (out of 352; 5.68 percent), 357 liberalizations (out of 2,335; 15.29 percent), and 14 transitions (out of 457; 3.06 percent). Agreement is no more than 50 percent in 76.87 percent of the backsliding, 80.11 percent of the breakdown, 66.77 percent of the liberalization, and 80.74 percent of the transition cases.

recorded in one source a full two years before another indicator picked it up. All results reported here remain robust to this more generous measure (see Appendix).

[10] See Appendix for similar figures on agreement by year, using the extended set of indicators, and expanding the window to a three-year period.

Figure 1: Average Agreement

4. Explaining Variation in Agreement

What explains variation in agreement across regime change events? We argue that focal points—that is, the presence of elections in the case of transition and liberalization, or coups in the case of breakdown and backsliding—play an important role in explaining agreement.

To understand why focal points have a significant impact on the *agreement* of indicators, we need to recognize the crucial role of coders in producing regime type ratings (Bollen and Paxton 2000). Usually, the majority of country-years are coded retrospectively, and information about specific countries becomes sparser as we move back in time. As information becomes less available, coders increasingly build their ratings around notable political events such as coups or elections that unequivocally characterize political changes and thus facilitate the identification of regime change events and justify a particular rating.

Additionally, coding rules often explicitly call for coups or elections to precede a change in a country's rating. For example, Gasiorowski (1996: 472) admits that gradual change is possible, but his rating changes mostly in the aftermath of an election or a coup. We find a similar focus on focal points in the coding rules of the *Freedom in the World* data:

> "A score is typically changed *only* (italics authors) if there has been a real-world development during the year that warrants a decline or improvement (e.g., a crackdown on the media, the country's first free and fair elections), though gradual changes in conditions, in the absence of a signal event, are occasionally registered in the scores" (Freedom House 2016).

Naturally, regime changes do not exclusively take place in the context of "signal events." Indeed, there is reason to believe that regime change in terms of fewer or greater restrictions on civil and political liberties may take place long before elections are held or coups are staged. But elections or coups provide *focal points* around which researchers and policymakers may *become aware* of changing democratic practices, facilitating the identification of ruptures or reforms. Therefore, we expect *agreement* between different indicators of rupture or reform to be higher for regime change cases that coincide with focal points—and in particular elections and coups.

Importantly, finding positive effects of coups and elections on agreement does *not* suggest that coups and elections increase the probability of rupture or reform, but rather they increase the likelihood that multiple indicators code a specific regime change event in the same year. This would suggest that regime changes accompanied by such events are more likely to be picked up than those that are not. This, in turn, would imply that we can only identify with certainty a—plausibly unrepresentative—set of actual regime change events.

We test this argument using data from the *National Elections Across Democracy and Autocracy* (NELDA) dataset (Hyde and Marinov 2012). We rely on the dataset's sample to code years with and without *Election*.[11] Our *Coup* variable codes country-years that experienced at least one successful (military or civilian) coup in year *t* (data from Powell and Thyne 2011). Our agreement measures for the various forms of regime change are defined as above. Due to data availability, the following analysis is restricted to the period 1950-2010. The universe of cases examined here is all those country-years for which at least one indicator coded a regime change.

Table 3 depicts average agreement across the backsliding, breakdown, liberalization, and transition measures. It confirms previous findings and shows that agreement is generally higher for reform (44 to 52 percent) than for rupture (28 to 30 percent). More importantly, it points to strong differences in agreement rates between backsliding and breakdown cases that did and did not experience coups. Coups are associated with an increase in agreement by up to 33 percentage points (breakdown). In contrast, they are associated with marginal increases in agreement among the liberalization and transition indicators only. The reverse is true for elections, which increase agreement of the liberalization and transition measures by up to 17 percentage points (transition), but affect agreement on changes toward greater autocratic qualities only marginally.

[11] Note that some microstates as well as countries without national elections (e.g., China, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates) were excluded from NELDA and thus are missing in our dataset.

Table 3: Average agreement around focal points, 1950-2010

	Mean	No coups	Coups	No Elections	Elections
Breakdown	28.28%	17.53%	50.47%	29.05%	25.68%
Backsliding	43.92%	41.00%	57.49%	43.04%	43.78%
Backsliding & Breakdown	18.82%	15.67%	33.64%	17.87%	19.96%
Transition	29.87%	29.32%	35.53%	17.94%	35.01%
Liberalization	51.48%	51.43%	52.16%	42.94%	55.96%
Liberalization & Transition	21.73%	21.53%	24.49%	16.51%	27.27%

We employ OLS regression analysis to test this argument further, regressing agreement on the coup and election dummy variables. Apart from these focal points, other factors may contribute to average agreement rates. Agreement may be affected by the importance of a country in the world community; larger or politically and economically more powerful countries are under increased international scrutiny, affecting the attention paid by researchers and non-governmental organizations. This may also increase the availability of information about these countries. Consequently, we employ *GDP*, *Population size*, and *GDP per capita* as control variables (source: World Bank 2015). All three measures are logged. We further add *Trade openness* (sum of exports and imports divided by GDP; World Bank 2015) and *GATT/WTO membership* (source: Ulfelder 2012). Moreover, more aid-dependent countries may be subject to more international scrutiny. We use log *Aid per capita* (source: World Bank 2015). Finally, we control for the *Number of measures available* (log) for the respective form of regime change examined; agreement may be lower if more measures are available. *Elections* and *Coups* are measured in t, membership in GATT/WTO is measured in t-1, and the remainder is averaged across the three years preceding the year of analysis. All models include country- and time-fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by country.

Table 4 summarizes our findings. We examine the effect of coups and elections on agreement among the breakdown (Model 1), backsliding (Model 2), breakdown and backsliding (Model 3), transition (Model 4), liberalization (Model 5), and transition and liberalization indicators (Model 6).

Overall, the results suggest that agreement of the breakdown and backsliding indicators is statistically significantly higher around coups, while elections increase agreement rates of the transition and liberalization measures. Successful coups increase agreement for breakdown (backsliding) by about 27.6 (18.9) percentage points, while elections are associated with an increase in agreement for transition (liberalization) by 14.1 (16.5) percentage points. All these estimates are statistically significant at the 1% level. Elections are generally not statistically

significantly related to agreement of the backsliding and breakdown measures, while coups lack predictive power with respect to the agreement between transition and liberalization indicators.[12]

Coups and elections increase agreement between indicators of backsliding and breakdown, while elections increase agreement of the liberalization and transition measures, all else equal. Yet, coups and elections are closely related to *agreement* over indicators, but they are *not* determinative of regime *change*. These focal events shape societal expectations of change, but as Schedler (2001) notes, "even transitions ignited by focal events often unfold within a larger framework of oscillation or incremental transformation." Moreover, they accompany only a minority of regime changes. Our dataset counts only 402 country-years with at least one successful coup (3.2% of all country-years for which coup-data are available). Similarly, elections took place in only about 26 percent of our country-year observations.

Table 4: Agreement between regime change indicators

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Breakdown	***Backsliding***	***Breakdown & Backsliding***	***Transition***	***Liberalization***	***Transition & Liberalization***
Successful coup in t	0.276***	0.189***	0.187***	-0.013	0.028	0.022
	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.10)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Election in t	0.006	0.022	0.026*	0.141***	0.165***	0.131***
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Population, ln (Ø t-3 to t-1)	-3.818	0.553	-2.337**	-7.547	0.262	-0.686
	(4.32)	(2.45)	(1.09)	(4.77)	(1.43)	(0.73)
GDP p.c., ln (Ø t-3 to t-1)	-4.117	0.552	-2.368**	-7.384	0.247	-0.698
	(4.31)	(2.46)	(1.10)	(4.69)	(1.46)	(0.75)
GDP, ln (Ø t-3 to t-1)	4.086	-0.515	2.377**	7.455	-0.317	0.656
	(4.32)	(2.46)	(1.09)	(4.75)	(1.46)	(0.75)
Trade (Ø t-3 to t-1)	-0.001	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.001	-0.000
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Aid p.c., ln (Ø t-3 to t-1)	0.000	0.012	0.007	0.019	-0.012	-0.011
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Member of GATT/WTO, t-1	-0.021	0.005	-0.003	0.065	-0.016	0.011
	(0.07)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.02)
# measures available, ln	0.393		0.780***	0.431	-0.997*	-0.267
	(0.47)		(0.22)	(0.74)	(0.56)	(0.20)
N	223	800	822	276	1003	1024
Adj. R2	0.456	0.195	0.239	0.163	0.163	0.148

Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. All models include country- and time-fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by country.

[12] Our results remain robust when agreement is measured over a period of three instead of one year (see Appendix).

V. Indicators of Regime Change and Accumulation of Knowledge

The low agreement between indicators of regime change has important ramifications for empirical analysis. Conclusions drawn on one set of dependent variables are often not supported by analyses employing alternative measures of regime change. This draws the validity of studies of regime change into question, and suggests that the lack of cumulative knowledge about regime change is in part due to the ambiguity and unreliability of currently used measurements.

To illustrate the dependence of findings on the specific measure of regime change employed, we examined the robustness of empirical models of rupture and reform to alternative indicators of regime change. The studies considered here investigate the effect of a broad set of independent (i.e., socioeconomic, institutional, international) variables and use different methodological approaches to the study of regime change. They are classified into one of the four types of regime change according to the coding of their dependent variable[13]:

On *liberalization*, we include Burke and Leigh's (2010) study on the impact of economic growth on regime changes toward democracy and autocracy. They argue that economic growth reduces the likelihood of both liberalization and backsliding. We further include Cornell (2013), who finds that democracy aid has the most positive effect on the likelihood of liberalization in one-party regimes. Third, we include Ansell and Samuels' (2010) work on the effects of land and income inequality on liberalization. They posit that autocracies with more equal land and less equal income distributions are more likely to democratize.

As to backsliding, we again include Burke and Leigh (2010) again because they study both liberalization and backsliding. Further, we add Gibler and Randazzo (2011), who find that established independent judiciaries reduce the likelihood of democratic backsliding, while newly formed judiciaries have no such effect. Third, we examine the robustness of Goldstone et al.'s (2010) finding that it is political regime types, not socioeconomic variables that explain the onset of adverse political change.

Regarding *transition*, we add Pevehouse (2002), who posits that membership in international organizations is positively linked to the likelihood of democratization. Next, Donno (2013) examines the effects of pre-electoral opposition coalitions and international conditionality on election outcomes in electoral autocracies and finds that competitive autocracies are more

[13] We thank all the authors of these studies for kindly sharing their data with us and are grateful for their comments and feedback on our findings and this paper.

likely to democratize after elections. Moreover, both opposition coalitions and international conditionality increase the likelihood of post-electoral transition.

We consider two studies of *breakdown*. Andersen et al. (2014) argue that state capacity in the form of administrative effectiveness stabilizes democratic rule and thus lowers the risk of breakdown. Finally Houle (2009) contends that inequality has no effect on transition to democracy, but increases the likelihood of democratic breakdown.[14]

We leave the sample definition of the original model unchanged. Yet, as indicators cover different time periods and countries, the number of observations in our models differs at times from the original studies. We never added observations to the analysis, but observations were dropped if they could not experience the respective form of regime change as defined by the dependent variable.[15] We ran all *reform* models on both a full set of country-years that can potentially experience the regime change event of interest[16], and on a sample restricted to democracies (backsliding) or autocracies (liberalization).[17]

Table 5: Testing the robustness of extant studies on rupture using alternative measures of regime change

	TRANSITION					BREAKDOWN			
Coding DV	**scope**	**Pevehouse 2002b**		**Donno 2013**		**scope**	**Andersen et al. 2014**		**Houle 2009**
		T2. M1	***T2.***	***T1.***	***T1.***		***T1.***	***T1.***	***T4. M1***
Bernhard et al. 2001	AUT	NA	NA	NA	NA	DEM			
Boix et al. 2013	AUT					DEM			
Cheibub et al. 2010	AUT					DEM			
Freedom House (FIW: free)	AUT					DEM			
Geddes et al. 2014	AUT					DEM			
Magaloni et al. 2013	AUT					DEM			
Polity IV (AN=AUT)	AUT					DEM			
Reich 2002	AUT					DEM			
Svolik 2012	AUT					DEM			
Ulfelder 2012	AUT					DEM			
Wahman et al. 2013	AUT					DEM			
	% *(partial)*	***80.0%***	***40.0%***	***0.0%*** *(100%)*	***0.0%*** *(70%)*	***%***	***72.7%***	***27.3%***	***27.3%***

[14] Note that estimates dynamic probit models of regime change. We depart from his original model specification, however, and estimate simple probit models of the determinants of breakdown. Thus, strictly speaking, our robustness checks of Houle (2009) are somewhat less than robustness checks.

[15] For example, all country-years scoring -8 and below on the Polity score were dropped if the dependent variable measured backsliding as decrease on Polity by at least 3 points.

[16] That is, for example, a country scoring a 9 on the Polity IV scale was excluded when the three-point increase on the scale indicates.

[17] We use the indicators' own thresholds of democracy / autocracy, as employed in the analysis of rupture. As neither the *Lexical Index of Democracy* (Skaaning et al. 2015) nor the V-Dem data (Coppedge et al. 2016a) suggest thresholds to distinguish between democracies and autocracies, these indicators are excluded in this second part of the reform robustness checks.

Table 6: Testing the robustness of extant studies on reform using alternative measures of regime change

	LIBERALIZATION						BACKSLIDING				
Coding DV	**scope**	**Burke and Leigh 2010**		**Cornell 2013**	**Ansell and Samuels 2010**		**scope**	**Burke and Leigh 2010**		**Gibler and Randazzo 2011**	**Goldstone et al. 2010**
		T3, M1	***T3, M2***	***T1, M3***	***T3, MC***	***T3, ME***		***T3, M3***	***T3, M4***	***T2***	***T1, M3***
Freedom House (FIW, any change)	all						all				
Polity IV (any change)	all						all				
Skaaning et al. 2015	all						all				
V-Dem: Electoral Democracy	all						all				
Wahman et al. 2013 (any change)	all						all				
Freedom House (FIW, any change)	AUT only						DEM only				
Polity IV (any change)	AUT only						DEM only				
Skaaning et al. 2015	AUT only	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	DEM only	NA	NA	NA	NA
V-Dem: Electoral Democracy	AUT only	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	DEM only	NA	NA	NA	NA
Wahman et al. 2013 (any change)	AUT only						DEM only				
	% success	***100%***	***100%***	***62.50%***	***0.00%***	***0.00%***	***% success***	***25.00 %***	***25.00 %***	***62.50%***	***25.00%***
				75.00%	***12.50%***	***25.00%***					***62.50%***

Notes: White cells mean that the results from the original model were obtained successfully. To count as success, the coefficients of the main independent variable(s) of interest must point in the hypothesized direction and the effect must be statistically significant at the 10% level or better. Light grey indicates partial success in cases where the authors were interested in the effects of more than one variable, but not all of the coefficients were as hypothesized in our robustness checks. The bottom % counts partial success as well. *all* refers to all country-years that can potentially undergo the regime change event of interest.

The robustness checks employ all of the indicators identified previously, even though some of the papers analyzed (e.g., Goldstone et al. 2010) restrict their theoretical predictions to major regime changes only. We do so in order to examine the interchangeability of as broad a set of indicators as possible. Further, by ex ante excluding certain indicators, we would have been required to make theoretical assumptions about the causal mechanism at work, which is not the purpose of this study. As a consequence, a disregard of scope conditions may explain some of our results. However, our goal is not to draw into question extant findings, but rather to examine the validity and interchangeability of extant measurements of regime change. Thus, finding that only a few of the robustness checks yielded the same results should not be understood as invalidating the original study's conclusions.

Tables 5 and 6 summarize our results. White cells denote that we obtained the same results as in the original model using the specified dependent variable and scope condition. Dark gray represents failure to do so. Light gray means that we obtained similar results not for all but at least one of the coefficients of interest. To count as success, the coefficient(s) of interest must point in the expected direction and must be statistically significant at the 10% level or above.

Our results suggest that published findings in the study of regime change depend to a large extent on indicator choice. For the majority of models analyzed here, we failed to obtain the same results for more than 50 percent of the indicators. Success rates are even lower when the extended set of indicators is used (See Appendix). This shows that indicators commonly assumed to tap into similar concepts are generally not interchangeable, and published findings appear to depend on the indicator chosen. Taken together, the robustness checks suggest that we know very little about the factors driving regime change.

VI. Improving Research on Political Regime Change

Examining measurements of regime change reveals a number of problems. Agreement between them is extremely low, which suggests that they measure different phenomena and that results depend on the choice of indicator. This leads to the conclusion that the lack of accumulated knowledge in the study of regime change is due, at least in part, to imprecise measurements. Unless we develop more comprehensive and reliable measurements of regime change, it is hard to draw empirically sound and valid conclusions about the determinants of regime change and the consequences thereof.

The preceding discussion suggests a number of guidelines and desiderata for future, more rigorous research on regime change across subfields in political science. First is to develop

a clear consensus over how to conceptualize regime change. Currently, there is a lack of agreement on the definitions of backsliding, breakdown, liberalization, and transition, as well as the underlying characterization of democracy. A distinction between rupture and reform is useful as it is likely that rupture and reform have different causes and plausibly different consequences.

Second is to employ indicators that clearly map onto these regime changes. In our review of the literature, we rarely found that scholars justified their indicator choices. Often, it seems that researchers assume interchangeability between indicators. It is true that the correlation between the various indicators of regime *type* is high. Yet, this does not translate into a high correlation between the indicators of regime *change*. Indicators of regime change are *not* interchangeable, and the choice of indicator is consequential for the empirical analysis, as this paper shows. This calls researchers to be conscious of the choices they make when picking indicators, and consumers of the literature to take into account the different measurement choices when considering lessons learned and adjudicating between findings.

Third is to go beyond conventionally used datasets in the country-year format. Rather, a regime change dataset should code regime change events instead of having one observation for each country and year. The latter may lead scholars to mistakenly treat one long period of regime change as several distinct and shorter regime change events. Consider, for example, V-Dem's indicator of *Electoral Democracy* in Mexico and Zimbabwe (Figure 2). A standard country-year format masks important regime change patterns in both countries: we identify regime change events in Mexico in 1918, 2000, and 2013, and in Zimbabwe in 1923 and 1978. However, our coding scheme is unable to pick up the gradual backsliding process in Zimbabwe between the end of World War II and the country's formal independence in 1980. Any annual change in electoral democracy was too small to be coded as regime change event, yet the accumulated change was substantial. Similarly, the conventional coding scheme does not tell us when the Mexican liberalization process was initiated. A country-year-based scheme would suggest that liberalization happened between 1999 and 2000. However, as Figure 2 underscores, Mexico had embarked on a gradual liberalization process already around 1970, which accelerated markedly in the late-1980s.

Moreover, no extant measure qualitatively identifies both rupture and reform. Consequently, the creation of an indicator of regime change that picks up both regime rupture and reform, but does not impose arbitrary thresholds between different forms of political rule, is an important task for future researchers. Such an indicator would not only greatly improve research, but may also be used to identify early warning signs of an ensuing large-scale rupture.

Figure 2: Identifying Years of Regime Change



VII. Conclusion

Despite centuries of thinking, too little is known about the factors driving transition, breakdown, liberalization, and backsliding. Debates over the role of economic conditions, political institutions, cultural characteristics, and other potentially facilitating factors can only be resolved when scholars consciously consider the measures they use and seek to develop research methods that promote cumulative knowledge building. So, too, questions over sequencing and the relationship between rupture and reform can only be answered when these changes are defined carefully and analyses match them. Recognizing the problems with extant measures is the first step in spurring the community to address existing problems, allowing us to engage in a collective conversation over these critical issues.

Moreover, a lack of attention to the conceptualization and measurement of regime change hampers the accumulation of knowledge in other areas of research, such as international security, international political economy, and comparative politics more broadly: does democratization increase trade openness (e.g., Milner and Kubota 2005; Milner and Mukherjee 2009)? Is democratization associated with increased inflows of Foreign Direct Investment (e.g., Li 2009; Pandya 2014)? Are democratized countries less likely to fight one another (e.g., Maoz and Russett 1993; Ward and Gleditsch 1998; Sunde and Cervellati 2013)?

The findings in this paper demonstrate that regime type and regime change indicators are heavily influenced by focal points, which explains some of the variation in agreement between

regime change indicators. It may well be plausible that most rupture and reform events are preceded by media crackdowns, or visible improvements in the degree of freedom. Yet, because the indicators are so influenced by the easily detected focal points, and the analyses that draw on these indicators are so as well, we are ill-positioned to pick up gradual reforms below the intensity of "signal events," or for our analyses to shed light on such change. This may make scholars and the international community blind for early warning signs of beginning processes of backsliding, and it hinders our ability to study carefully the factors that spur such changes. Ultimately, this delays learning necessary to guide appropriate, early policy responses.

This is especially crucial in the case of backsliding and breakdown. The inability of the international community to recognize such events, and for the scholarly community to help pinpoint factors that make them more likely, potentially grants national leaders more leeway in cutting back political or civil rights. The recent cutbacks on the constitutional court's powers and increases in the government control over the media in Poland, as well as similar movements toward greater authoritarian qualities in Hungary, Russia, and Turkey only underscore the need to further discuss fine-grained measurements of reform and backsliding in particular.

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Appendix I: Additional Figures

Figure A1: Average agreement by year—1-year window

a) core indicators



b) extended set of indicators



Figure A2: Average agreement by five-year period—1-year window

b) extended set of indicators



Figure A3: Average agreement by year—3-year window

a) core indicators



b) extended set of indicators



Figure A4: Average agreement by five-year period—3-year window

a) core indicators



b) extended set of indicators



Appendix II: Additional Tables

Table A1: Indicators of regime change: coding rules and literature examples

	Indicator name	Definition of regime types	Definition of Breakdown/ Backsliding	Definition of Transition/ Liberalization	Data source	Breakdown/ Backsliding literature examples	Transition/ Liberalization literature examples
Rupture	***Bernhard et al. 2005***	authors' coding of backsliding	as defined by authors	NA	Bernhard et al. 2005	Reenock et al. 2007; Bernhard et al. 2003; Bernhard et al. 2004	
	Boix et al. 2013	authors' coding of DEM and AUT	regime change from DEM to AUT	regime change from AUT to DEM	Boix et al. 2013	Boix 2003; Svolik 2008; Brambor and Lindvall 2014	Boix 2003
	Cheibub et al. 2010	authors' coding of DEM and AUT	regime change from DEM to AUT	regime change from AUT to DEM	Cheibub et al. 2010	Cheibub 2006	
	Freedom House (FIW: free)	DEM: free; AUT: partly free + not free - FH Status	regime change from DEM to AUT	regime change from AUT to DEM	Freedom House 2015		
	Freedom House (FIW: partly free)	DEM: free + partly free; AUT: not free - FH Status	regime change from DEM to AUT	regime change from AUT to DEM	Freedom House 2015		
	Freedom House (PR: free)	DEM: free; AUT: partly free + not free - Political Rights only	regime change from DEM to AUT	regime change from AUT to DEM	Freedom House 2015		
	Freedom House (PR: partly free)	DEM: free + partly free; AUT: not free - Political Rights only	regime change from DEM to AUT	regime change from AUT to DEM	Freedom House 2015		
	Freedom House (FIW: hybrid)	DEM: free; HYB:partly free; AUT: not free - Status	regime change from DEM to AUT	regime change from AUT to DEM	Freedom House 2015	Starr and Lindborg 2003	
	Freedom House (PR: hybrid)	DEM: 1 to 2.5; HYB: 3 to 5; AUT: 5.5 to 7 - Political Rights only	regime change from DEM to AUT	regime change from AUT to DEM	Freedom House 2015		
	Gasiorowski 1996	DEM: democracy and semidemocracy; AUT: autocracy; regime change with transitions--> change takes place in the middle of a transition period; if odd number of transition years: regime change after ((1/2)n+1)/n) years	regime change from DEM to AUT	regime change from AUT to DEM	Gasiorowski 1996	Power and Gasiorowski 1997; Gasiorowski and Power 1998; Lai and Melkonian-Hoover 2005	Lai and Melkonian-Hoover 2005
	Gasiorowski 1996 (hybrid)	DEM: democracy; HYB: semidemocracy; AUT: autocracy; regime change with transitions--> change takes place in the middle of a transition period; if odd number of transition years: regime change after ((1/2)n+1)/n) years	any change from DEM to HYB or HYB to AUT	regime change from AUT to HYB or HYB to DEM	Gasiorowski 1996		
	Gates 2006	DEM: 0.6 to 1; AUT < 0.6	regime change from DEM to AUT	regime change from AUT to DEM	Gates et al. 2006	Gates et al. 2006; Strand et al. 2013	Gates et al. 2006; Strand et al. 2013

Geddes et al. 2014	authors' coding of DEM and AUT	regime change from DEM to AUT	regime change from AUT to DEM	Geddes et al. 2014	Wright and Escriba-Folch 2012	
Magaloni et al. 2013	authors' coding of DEM and AUT	regime change from DEM to AUT	regime change from AUT to DEM	Magaloni et al. 2013		
Polity IV (AN=AUT)	DEM: 6 to 10; AUT: 5 to -10 (anocracies = AUT)	regime change from DEM to AUT	regime change from AUT to DEM	Marshall et al. 2013	Maeda 2010	
Polity IV (AN=DEM)	DEM: 10 to -5; AUT: -6 to -10 (anocracies = DEM)	regime change from DEM to AUT	regime change from AUT to DEM	Marshall et al. 2013		
Polity IV (threshold: 7)	DEM: 7 to 10; AUT: 6 to -10	regime change from DEM to AUT	regime change from AUT to DEM	Marshall et al. 2013	Lai and Melkonian-Hoover 2005; Kadera et al. 2003	Epstein et al. 2006; Lai and Melkonian-Hoover 2005
Polity IV (threshold: 1)	DEM: 1 to 10; AUT: 0 to -10	regime change from DEM to AUT	regime change from AUT to DEM	Marshall et al. 2013	Kapstein and Converse 2008	
Polity IV (exrec & parcomp)	DEM: exrec >=6 and parcomp >=3; AUT otherwise	regime change from DEM to AUT	regime change from AUT to DEM	Marshall et al. 2013	Ulfelder and Lustik 2007	Ulfelder and Lustik 2007
Polity IV (hybrid: 6 & -6)	DEM: 6 to 10; HYB: 5 to -5; AUT: -5 to -10	regime change from DEM to AUT	regime change from AUT to DEM	Marshall et al. 2013	Pevehouse 2002	Pevehouse 2002
Polity IV (hybrid: 8 & 1)	DEM: 8 to 10; HYB: 1 to 7; AUT: 0 to -10	regime change from DEM to AUT	regime change from AUT to DEM	Marshall et al. 2013		
Przeworski et al. 2000	authors' coding of DEM and AUT	regime change from DEM to AUT	regime change from AUT to DEM	Przeworski et al. 2000	Przeworski et al. 2000; Houle 2009; Shirah 2013; Lai and Melkonian-Hoover 2005	Houle 2009; Lai and Melkonian-Hoover 2005
Reich 2002	DEM: democracy and semidemocracy; AUT: autocracy; regime change with transitions--> change takes place in the middle of a transition period; if odd number of transition years: regime change after ((1/2)n+1)/n) years	regime change from DEM to AUT	regime change from AUT to DEM	Reich 2002		
Reich 2002 (hybrid)	DEM: democracy; HYB: semidemocracy; AUT: autocracy; regime change with transitions--> change takes place in the middle of a transition period; if odd number of transition years: regime change after ((1/2)n+1)/n) years	regime change from DEM to AUT	regime change from AUT to DEM	Reich 2002	Reich 2002	Reich 2002
Svolik 2012	author's coding of DEM and AUT	regime change from DEM to AUT	regime change from AUT to DEM	Svolik 2012	Svolik 2012	Svolik 2012
Ulfelder 2012	author's coding of DEM and AUT	regime change from DEM to AUT	regime change from AUT to DEM	Ulfelder 2012		
Wahman et al. 2013	authors' coding of DEM and AUT	regime change from DEM to AUT	regime change from AUT to DEM	Hadenius et al. 2013		

Reform	***Freedom House (FIW, any change)***	*no definition of regime types applied*	any positive change on FIW score	any positive change on FIW score	Freedom House 2015	Brinks and Coppedge 2005; Levitz and Pop-Eleches 2010; Shirah 2013	Brinks and Coppedge 2005
	Freedom House (PR, any change)	*no definition of regime types applied*	any positive change on Political Rights scale	any negative change on Political Rights scale	Freedom House 2015		
	Freedom House (FIW, 1+ points)	*no definition of regime types applied*	a positive change of at least 1 point on FIW score	a negative change of at least 1 point on FIW score	Freedom House 2015		
	Freedom House (PR, 1+ points)	*no definition of regime types applied*	a positive change of at least 1 point on Political Rights scale	a negative change of at least 1 point on Political Rights scale	Freedom House 2015	Erdmann 2011	
	Gasiorowski (hybrid)	DEM: democracy; HYB: semidemocracy; AUT: autocracy; regime change with transitions--> change takes place in the middle of a transition period; if odd number of transition years: regime change after ((1/2)n+1)/n) years	regime change from DEM to AUT	regime change from AUT to DEM	Gasiorowski 1996	Pevehouse 2002	Pevehouse 2002
	Gates et al. 2006 (any change)	*no definition of regime types applied*	a positive change of at least 0.03 on SIP	a positive change of at least 0.03 on SIP	Gates et al. 2006	Fjelde and Hegre 2006; Gates et al. 2006	Fjelde and Hegre 2006; Gates et al. 2006
	Polity IV (any change)	*no definition of regime types applied*	any negative change on polity2 variable	any positive change on polity2 variable	Marshall et al. 2013	Gibler and Randazzo 2011	
	Polity IV (3+ points)	*no definition of regime types applied*	a negative change of at least 3 points on the polity2 variable	a positive change of at least 3 points on the polity2 variable	Marshall et al. 2013	Alemán and Yang 2011; Burke and Leigh 2010; Gibler and Randazzo 2011	Alemán and Yang 2011; Burke and Leigh 2010
	Polity IV (5+ points)	*no definition of regime types applied*	a negative change of at least 5 points on the polity2 variable	a positive change of at least 5 points on the polity2 variable	Marshall et al. 2013	Goldstone et al. 2010	
	Reich 2002 (hybrid)	DEM: democracy; HYB: semidemocracy; AUT: autocracy; regime change with transitions--> change takes place in the middle of a transition period; if odd number of transition years: regime change after ((1/2)n+1)/n) years	any change from DEM to HYB or HYB to AUT	regime change from AUT to HYB or HYB to DEM	Reich 2002		
	Skaaning et al. 2015	*0: no elections; 6: minimally competitive, multiparty elections with universal suffrage for legislature and executive*	any negative change on the Lexical Index of Democracy	any positive change on the Lexical Index of Democracy	Skaaning et al. 2015		
	V-Dem: Electoral Democracy	*no definition of regime types applied*	any negative change by at least a standard deviation	any positive change by at least a standard deviation	Coppedge et al. 2016		
	V-Dem: Liberal Democracy	*no definition of regime types applied*	any negative change by at least a standard deviation	any positive change by at least a standard deviation	Coppedge et al. 2016		

V-Dem: Participatory Democracy	*no definition of regime types applied*	any negative change by at least a standard deviation	any positive change by at least a standard deviation	Coppedge et al. 2016	
V-Dem: Deliberative Democracy	*no definition of regime types applied*	any negative change by at least a standard deviation	any positive change by at least a standard deviation	Coppedge et al. 2016	
V-Dem: Egalitarian Democracy	*no definition of regime types applied*	any negative change by at least a standard deviation	any positive change by at least a standard deviation	Coppedge et al. 2016	
V-Dem: Electoral Democracy (ordinal)	*no definition of regime types applied; 5 categories based on continuous V-Dem indicators, following Lindberg 2015*	any decrease on the ordinal scale	any increase on the ordinal scale	Coppedge et al. 2016	
V-Dem: Liberal Democracy (ordinal)	*no definition of regime types applied; 5 categories based on continuous V-Dem indicators, following Lindberg 2015*	any decrease on the ordinal scale	any increase on the ordinal scale	Coppedge et al. 2016	
V-Dem: Participatory Democracy (ordinal)	*no definition of regime types applied; 5 categories based on continuous V-Dem indicators, following Lindberg 2015*	any decrease on the ordinal scale	any increase on the ordinal scale	Coppedge et al. 2016	
V-Dem: Deliberative Democracy (ordinal)	*no definition of regime types applied; 5 categories based on continuous V-Dem indicators, following Lindberg 2015*	any decrease on the ordinal scale	any increase on the ordinal scale	Coppedge et al. 2016	
V-Dem: Egalitarian Democracy (ordinal)	*no definition of regime types applied; 5 categories based on continuous V-Dem indicators, following Lindberg 2015*	any decrease on the ordinal scale	any increase on the ordinal scale	Coppedge et al. 2016	
Wahman et al. 2013 (any change)	*no definition of regime types applied*	any negative change on ifhpol variable (imputed averaged FH and Polity score)	any positive change on ifhpol variable (imputed averaged FH and Polity score)	Hadenius et al. 2013	
Wahman et al. 2013 (1.5+ points)	*no definition of regime types applied*	a negative change of at least 1.5 points on ifhpol variable	a positive change of at least 1.5 points on ifhpol variable	Hadenius et al. 2013	

Table A2: Indicators of Regime Change – Extended Set

		full period		post-WWII		full period		post-WWII	
Indicator name	**Period available**	**# events**	**% obs**	**# events**	**% obs**	**# events**	**% obs**	**# events**	**% obs**
		TRANSITION				**BREAKDOWN**			
Bernhard et al. 2005	1913-2005	NA	NA	NA	NA	63	1.73%	54	1.69%
Boix et al. 2013	1801-2007	134	0.83%	108	1.23%	83	0.52%	65	0.74%
Cheibub et al. 2010	1947-2008	102	1.14%	102	1.14%	66	0.74%	66	0.74%
Freedom House (FIW: free)	1973-2015	91	1.19%	91	1.19%	72	0.94%	72	0.94%
Freedom House (FIW: partly free)	1973-2015	150	1.97%	150	1.97%	129	1.69%	129	1.69%
Freedom House (PR: free)	1973-2015	99	1.30%	99	1.30%	79	1.04%	79	1.04%
Freedom House (PR: partly free)	1973-2015	164	2.15%	164	2.15%	138	1.81%	138	1.81%
Freedom House (FIW: hybrid)	1973-2015	3	0.04%	3	0.04%	7	0.09%	7	0.09%
Freedom House (PR: hybrid)	1973-2015	7	0.09%	7	0.09%	13	0.17%	13	0.17%
Gasiorowski 1996	1801-1992	84	1.27%	73	1.98%	72	1.09%	67	1.81%
Gasiorowski 1996 (hybrid)	1801-1992	36	0.54%	33	0.89%	32	0.48%	31	0.84%
Gates 2006	1801-2000	93	0.72%	71	1.09%	80	0.62%	60	0.92%
Geddes et al. 2014	1946-2009	103	1.32%	103	1.32%	75	0.96%	75	0.96%
Magaloni et al. 2013	1951-2012	83	0.98%	83	0.98%	49	0.58%	49	0.58%
Polity IV (AN=AUT)	1801-2014	131	0.80%	106	1.17%	80	0.49%	64	0.71%
Polity IV (AN=DEM)	1801-2014	188	1.15%	135	1.49%	159	0.97%	109	1.20%
Polity IV (threshold: 7)	1801-2014	110	0.67%	88	0.97%	62	0.38%	49	0.54%
Polity IV (threshold: 1)	1801-2014	183	1.12%	134	1.48%	137	0.83%	97	1.07%
Polity IV (exrec & parcomp)	1801-2014	112	0.72%	83	0.96%	86	0.55%	67	0.77%
Polity IV (hybrid: 6 & -6)	1801-2014	18	0.11%	17	0.19%	26	0.16%	20	0.22%
Polity IV (hybrid: 8 & 1)	1801-2014	24	0.15%	18	0.20%	24	0.15%	19	0.21%
Przeworski et al. 2000	1947-2002	93	1.21%	93	1.21%	58	0.76%	58	0.76%
Reich 2002	1801-1998	131	1.22%	106	1.79%	92	0.86%	73	1.23%
Reich 2002 (hybrid)	1801-1998	52	0.48%	44	0.74%	40	0.37%	33	0.56%
Svolik 2012	1946-2007	89	1.07%	89	1.07%	57	0.69%	57	0.69%
Ulfelder 2012	1956-2010	113	1.51%	113	1.51%	109	1.45%	109	1.45%
Wahman et al. 2013	1973-2010	98	1.51%	98	1.51%	62	0.95%	62	0.95%
		LIBERALIZATION				**BACKSLIDING**			
Freedom House (FIW, any change)	1973-2015	919	12.04%	919	12.04 %	738	9.67%	738	9.67%
Freedom House (PR, any change)	1973-2015	581	7.61%	581	7.61%	469	6.15%	469	6.15%
Freedom House (FIW, 1+ points)	1973-2015	247	3.24%	247	3.24%	175	2.29%	175	2.29%
Freedom House (PR, 1+ points)	1973-2015	561	7.35%	561	7.35%	451	5.91%	451	5.91%
Gasiorowski (hybrid)	1801-1992	56	0.84%	47	1.27%	42	0.65%	39	1.06%
Gates et al. 2006 (any change)	1801-2000	418	3.25%	245	3.76%	302	2.35%	192	2.95%
Polity IV (any change)	1801-2014	811	4.94%	556	6.13%	511	3.11%	341	3.76%
Polity IV (3+ points)	1801-2014	368	2.24%	264	2.91%	266	1.62%	176	1.94%
Polity IV (5+ points)	1801-2014	218	1.33%	162	1.79%	156	0.95%	112	1.24%
Reich 2002 (hybrid)	1801-1998	104	0.97%	77	1.30%	60	0.56%	47	0.79%
Skaaning et al. 2015	1801-2015	657	3.80%	379	3.66%	483	2.79%	261	2.52%
V-Dem: Electoral Democracy	1901-2015	803	5.05%	669	6.50%	400	2.52%	302	2.93%
V-Dem: Liberal Democracy	1901-2015	702	4.42%	596	5.79%	371	2.33%	294	2.85%
V-Dem: Participatory Democracy	1901-2015	849	5.34%	748	7.27%	409	2.57%	328	3.19%
V-Dem: Deliberative Democracy	1901-2015	737	4.67%	637	6.23%	398	2.52%	326	3.19%
V-Dem: Egalitarian Democracy	1901-2015	729	4.59%	634	6.16%	323	2.03%	265	2.57%
V-Dem: Electoral Democracy (ordinal)	1901-2015	586	3.68%	503	4.88%	350	2.20%	273	2.65%
V-Dem: Liberal Democracy (ordinal)	1901-2015	381	2.40%	323	3.14%	198	1.25%	153	1.49%
V-Dem: Participatory Democracy	1901-2015	330	2.08%	288	2.80%	155	0.98%	121	1.18%

(ordinal)									
V-Dem: Deliberative Democracy (ordinal)	1901-2015	416	2.63%	359	3.51%	234	1.48%	191	1.87%
V-Dem: Egalitarian Democracy (ordinal)	1901-2015	381	2.40%	331	3.21%	187	1.18%	150	1.46%
Wahman et al. 2013 (any change)	1973-2010	1033	15.87%	1033	15.87 %	730	11.21 %	730	11.21 %
Wahman et al. 2013 (1.5+ points)	1973-2010	173	2.66%	173	2.66%	89	1.37%	89	1.37%

Table A3: Pairwise correlation coefficients between indicators of regime type

a) core indicators: V-Dem continuous

	Boix et al. 2013	Cheibub et al. 2010	Freedom House (FIW: free)	Geddes et al. 2014	Magaloni et al. 2013	Polity IV	Reich 2002	Skaaning et al. 2015	Svolik 2012	Ulfelder 2012	Wahman et al. 2013	Freedom House FIW	Polity IV polity 2 score	V-Dem: Electoral Democracy	Wahman et al. 2013 ifhpol
Boix et al. 2013	1.00														
Cheibub et al. 2010	0.92	1.00													
Freedom House (FIW: free)	0.81	0.74	1.00												
Geddes et al. 2014	0.89	0.92	0.76	1.00											
Magaloni et al. 2013	0.91	0.92	0.76	0.94	1.00										
Polity IV	0.84	0.79	0.78	0.85	0.86	1.00									
Reich 2002	0.75	0.82	0.72	0.84	0.83	0.70	1.00								
Skaaning et al. 2015	0.89	0.88	0.76	0.89	0.90	0.83	0.78	1.00							
Svolik 2012	0.91	0.92	0.77	0.93	0.93	0.84	0.85	0.91	1.00						
Ulfelder 2012	0.87	0.84	0.76	0.87	0.86	0.84	0.86	0.89	0.90	1.00					
Wahman et al. 2013	0.87	0.81	0.89	0.85	0.86	0.91	0.78	0.87	0.85	0.84	1.00				
Freedom House FIW	0.86	0.83	0.86	0.83	0.83	0.84	0.83	0.85	0.85	0.84	0.88	1.00			
Polity IV polity 2 score	0.82	0.84	0.75	0.87	0.86	0.85	0.75	0.83	0.88	0.87	0.85	0.89	1.00		
V-Dem: Electoral Democracy	0.84	0.83	0.81	0.85	0.84	0.84	0.81	0.83	0.85	0.84	0.85	0.91	0.87	1.00	
Wahman et al. 2013 ifhpol	0.88	0.85	0.84	0.87	0.87	0.88	0.88	0.90	0.89	0.88	0.89	0.97	0.97	0.93	1.00
average	0.86	0.85	0.79	0.87	0.87	0.83	0.80	0.86	0.88	0.85	0.86	0.86	0.85	0.85	0.89

b) core indicators: V-Dem ordinal

	Boix et al. 2013	Cheibub et al. 2010	Freedom House (FIW: free)	Geddes et al. 2014	Magaloni et al. 2013	Polity IV	Reich 2002	Skaaning et al. 2015	Svolik 2012	Ulfelder 2012	Wahman et al. 2013	Freedom House FIW	Polity IV polity 2 score	V-Dem: Electoral Democracy	Wahman et al. 2013 ifhpol
Boix et al. 2013	1.00														
Cheibub et al. 2010	0.92	1.00													
Freedom House (FIW: free)	0.81	0.74	1.00												
Geddes et al. 2014	0.89	0.92	0.76	1.00											
Magaloni et al. 2013	0.91	0.92	0.76	0.94	1.00										
Polity IV	0.84	0.79	0.78	0.85	0.86	1.00									
Reich 2002	0.75	0.82	0.72	0.84	0.83	0.70	1.00								
Skaaning et al. 2015	0.89	0.88	0.76	0.89	0.90	0.83	0.78	1.00							
Svolik 2012	0.91	0.92	0.77	0.93	0.93	0.84	0.85	0.91	1.00						
Ulfelder 2012	0.87	0.84	0.76	0.87	0.86	0.84	0.86	0.89	0.90	1.00					
Wahman et al. 2013	0.87	0.81	0.89	0.85	0.86	0.91	0.78	0.87	0.85	0.84	1.00				
Freedom House FIW	0.86	0.83	0.86	0.83	0.83	0.84	0.83	0.85	0.85	0.84	0.88	1.00			
Polity IV polity 2 score	0.82	0.84	0.75	0.87	0.86	0.85	0.75	0.83	0.88	0.87	0.85	0.89	1.00		
V-Dem: Electoral Democracy (ordinal)	0.83	0.82	0.80	0.84	0.83	0.82	0.80	0.83	0.84	0.83	0.84	0.90	0.85	1.00	
Wahman et al. 2013 ifhpol	0.88	0.85	0.84	0.87	0.87	0.88	0.88	0.90	0.89	0.88	0.89	0.97	0.97	0.92	1.00
average	0.86	0.85	0.79	0.87	0.87	0.83	0.80	0.86	0.88	0.85	0.86	0.86	0.85	0.84	0.89

c) extended set of indicators—V-Dem continuous

	Boix et al. 2013	Cheibub et al. 2010	Freedom House (PR: free)	Freedom House (PR: partly free)	Freedom House (FIW: free)	Freedom House (FIW: partly free)	Gasiorowski 1996	Gates et al. 2006	Geddes et al. 2014	Magaloni et al. 2013	Polity IV (AN=AUT)	Polity IV (AN=DEM)	Polity IV (threshold 7)	Polity IV (threshold 1)	Polity IV (exrec & parcomp)	Przeworski et al. 2000	Reich 2002	Skaaning et al. 2015	Svolik 2012	Ulfelder 2012	Wahman et al. 2013	Freedom House FIW	Freedom House PR	Polity IV polity 2 score	V-Dem: Electoral Democracy	V-Dem: Liberal Democracy	V-Dem: Participatory Democracy	V-Dem: Deliberative Democracy	V-Dem: Egalitarian Democracy	Wahman et al. 2013 ifhpol
Boix et al. 2013	1.00																													
Cheibub et al. 2010	0.92	1.00																												
Freedom House (PR: free)	0.82	0.75	1.00																											
Freedom House (PR: partly free)	0.66	0.65	0.56	1.00																										
Freedom House (FIW: free)	0.81	0.74	0.97	0.56	1.00																									
Freedom House (FIW: partly free)	0.61	0.60	0.53	0.91	0.52	1.00																								
Gasiorowski 1996	0.67	0.75	0.73	0.56	0.71	0.50	1.00																							
Gates et al. 2006	0.85	0.83	0.81	0.68	0.78	0.62	0.63	1.00																						
Geddes et al. 2014	0.89	0.92	0.76	0.65	0.76	0.60	0.77	0.86	1.00																					
Magaloni et al. 2013	0.91	0.92	0.77	0.64	0.76	0.59	0.77	0.86	0.94	1.00																				
Polity IV (AN=AUT)	0.84	0.79	0.78	0.65	0.78	0.60	0.58	0.85	0.85	0.86	1.00																			
Polity IV (AN=DEM)	0.51	0.66	0.51	0.64	0.51	0.61	0.39	0.55	0.65	0.63	0.48	1.00																		
Polity IV (threshold 7)	0.82	0.76	0.78	0.58	0.78	0.54	0.54	0.82	0.81	0.82	0.93	0.45	1.00																	
Polity IV (threshold 1)	0.76	0.82	0.68	0.71	0.68	0.66	0.60	0.85	0.84	0.83	0.76	0.63	0.71	1.00																
Polity IV (exrec & parcomp)	0.79	0.82	0.70	0.71	0.70	0.66	0.64	0.83	0.85	0.84	0.84	0.58	0.78	0.86	1.00															
Przeworski et al. 2000	0.92	0.96	0.80	0.65	0.78	0.59	0.75	0.84	0.92	0.92	0.80	0.67	0.76	0.83	0.82	1.00														
Reich 2002	0.75	0.82	0.73	0.70	0.72	0.64	0.99	0.73	0.84	0.83	0.70	0.52	0.66	0.70	*0.71*	*0.83*	*1.00*													
Skaaning et al. 2015	0.89	0.88	0.76	0.69	0.76	0.64	0.68	0.85	0.89	0.90	0.83	0.54	0.78	0.79	0.79	0.89	0.78	1.00												
Svolik 2012	0.91	0.92	0.78	0.68	0.77	0.62	0.77	0.87	0.93	0.93	0.84	0.68	0.79	0.86	0.85	0.94	0.85	0.91	1.00											
Ulfelder 2012	0.87	0.84	0.77	0.66	0.76	0.61	0.83	0.89	0.87	0.86	0.84	0.68	0.78	0.85	0.85	0.87	0.86	0.89	0.90	1.00										
Wahman et al. 2013	0.87	0.81	0.89	0.62	0.89	0.58	0.77	0.86	0.85	0.86	0.91	0.60	0.88	0.80	0.81	0.82	0.78	0.87	0.85	0.84	1.00									
Freedom House FIW	0.87	0.84	0.87	0.83	0.86	0.78	0.78	0.87	0.84	0.84	0.85	0.69	0.81	0.83	0.84	0.85	0.84	0.87	0.86	0.85	0.88	1.00								
Freedom House PR	0.86	0.83	0.86	0.81	0.86	0.79	0.77	0.86	0.83	0.83	0.84	0.70	0.81	0.82	0.83	0.83	0.83	0.85	0.85	0.84	0.88	0.98	1.00							
Polity IV polity 2 score	0.82	0.84	0.76	0.73	0.75	0.69	0.64	0.87	0.87	0.86	0.85	0.78	0.81	0.91	0.87	0.85	0.75	0.83	0.88	0.87	0.85	0.89	0.89	1.00						
V-Dem: Electoral D.	0.84	0.83	0.81	0.70	0.81	0.66	0.74	0.82	0.85	0.84	0.84	0.63	0.81	0.77	0.79	0.84	0.81	0.83	0.85	0.84	0.85	0.90	0.91	0.87	1.00					
V-Dem: Liberal D.	0.83	0.81	0.83	0.65	0.84	0.62	0.73	0.80	0.83	0.83	0.83	0.58	0.83	0.74	0.76	0.81	0.79	0.82	0.83	0.81	0.85	0.89	0.91	0.84	0.97	1.00				
V-Dem: Participatory D.	0.82	0.80	0.80	0.65	0.81	0.62	0.69	0.78	0.82	0.82	0.82	0.58	0.81	0.73	0.76	0.81	0.77	0.81	0.82	0.79	0.83	0.88	0.89	0.83	0.97	0.97	1.00			
V-Dem: Deliberative D.	0.83	0.81	0.82	0.66	0.82	0.62	0.72	0.79	0.82	0.82	0.82	0.58	0.81	0.74	0.77	0.81	0.79	0.81	0.83	0.81	0.84	0.88	0.89	0.84	0.97	0.98	0.98	1.00		
V-Dem: Egalitarian D.	0.78	0.75	0.81	0.59	0.82	0.56	0.63	0.73	0.77	0.77	0.79	0.49	0.79	0.67	0.70	0.76	0.73	0.75	0.77	0.74	0.80	0.84	0.86	0.76	0.95	0.97	0.96	0.96	1.00	
Wahman et al. 2013 ifhpol	0.88	0.85	0.84	0.79	0.84	0.76	0.84	0.92	0.87	0.87	0.88	0.80	0.84	0.91	0.90	0.86	0.88	0.90	0.89	0.88	0.89	0.97	0.97	0.97	0.93	0.90	0.89	0.90	0.85	1.00
average	0.81	0.81	0.77	0.67	0.76	0.63	0.70	0.80	0.83	0.83	0.79	0.60	0.76	0.77	0.78	0.82	0.77	0.81	0.84	0.82	0.82	0.86	0.85	0.83	0.84	0.82	0.81	0.82	0.77	0.88

d) extended set of indicators—V-Dem ordinal

	Boix et al. 2013	Cheibub et al. 2010	Freedom House (PR: free)	Freedom House (PR: partly free)	Freedom House (FIW: free)	Freedom House (FIW: partly free)	Gasiorowski 1996	Gates et al. 2006	Geddes et al. 2014	Magaloni et al. 2013	Polity IV (AN=AUT)	Polity IV (AN=DEM)	Polity IV (threshold 7)	Polity IV (threshold 1)	Polity IV (exrec & parcomp)	Przeworski et al. 2000	Reich 2002	Skaaning et al. 2015	Svolik 2012	Ulfelder 2012	Wahman et al. 2013	Freedom House FIW	Freedom House PR	Polity IV polity 2 score	V-Dem: Electoral Democracy	V-Dem: Liberal Democracy	V-Dem: Participatory Democracy	V-Dem: Deliberative Democracy	V-Dem: Egalitarian Democracy	Wahman et al. 2013 ifhpol
Boix et al. 2013	1.00																													
Cheibub et al. 2010	0.92	1.00																												
Freedom House (PR: free)	0.82	0.75	1.00																											
Freedom House (PR: partly free)	0.66	0.65	0.56	1.00																										
Freedom House (FIW: free)	0.81	0.74	0.97	0.56	1.00																									
Freedom House (FIW: partly free)	0.61	0.60	0.53	0.91	0.52	1.00																								
Gasiorowski 1996	0.67	0.75	0.73	0.56	0.71	0.50	1.00																							
Gates et al. 2006	0.85	0.83	0.81	0.68	0.78	0.62	0.63	1.00																						
Geddes et al. 2014	0.89	0.92	0.76	0.65	0.76	0.60	0.77	0.86	1.00																					
Magaloni et al. 2013	0.91	0.92	0.77	0.64	0.76	0.59	0.77	0.86	0.94	1.00																				
Polity IV (AN=AUT)	0.84	0.79	0.78	0.65	0.78	0.60	0.58	0.85	0.85	0.86	1.00																			
Polity IV (AN=DEM)	0.51	0.66	0.51	0.64	0.51	0.61	0.39	0.55	0.65	0.63	0.48	1.00																		
Polity IV (threshold 7)	0.82	0.76	0.78	0.58	0.78	0.54	0.54	0.82	0.81	0.82	0.93	0.45	1.00																	
Polity IV (threshold 1)	0.76	0.82	0.68	0.71	0.68	0.66	0.60	0.85	0.84	0.83	0.76	0.63	0.71	1.00																
Polity IV (exrec & parcomp)	0.79	0.82	0.70	0.71	0.70	0.66	0.64	0.83	0.85	0.84	0.84	0.58	0.78	0.86	1.00															
Przeworski et al. 2000	0.92	0.96	0.80	0.65	0.78	0.59	0.75	0.84	0.92	0.92	0.80	0.67	0.76	0.83	0.82	1.00														
Reich 2002	0.75	0.82	0.73	0.70	0.72	0.64	0.99	0.73	0.84	0.83	0.70	0.52	0.66	0.70	0.71	0.83	1.00													
Skaaning et al. 2015	0.89	0.88	0.76	0.69	0.76	0.64	0.68	0.85	0.89	0.90	0.83	0.54	0.78	0.79	0.79	0.89	0.78	1.00												
Svolik 2012	0.91	0.92	0.78	0.68	0.77	0.62	0.77	0.87	0.93	0.93	0.84	0.68	0.79	0.86	0.85	0.94	0.85	0.91	1.00											
Ulfelder 2012	0.87	0.84	0.77	0.66	0.76	0.61	0.83	0.89	0.87	0.86	0.84	0.68	0.78	0.85	0.85	0.87	0.86	0.89	0.90	1.00										
Wahman et al. 2013	0.87	0.81	0.89	0.62	0.89	0.58	0.77	0.86	0.85	0.86	0.91	0.60	0.88	0.80	0.81	0.82	0.78	0.87	0.85	0.84	1.00									
Freedom House FIW	0.87	0.84	0.87	0.83	0.86	0.78	0.78	0.87	0.84	0.84	0.85	0.69	0.81	0.83	0.84	0.85	0.84	0.87	0.86	0.85	0.88	1.00								
Freedom House PR	0.86	0.83	0.86	0.81	0.86	0.79	0.77	0.86	0.83	0.83	0.84	0.70	0.81	0.82	0.83	0.83	0.83	0.85	0.85	0.84	0.88	0.98	1.00							
Polity IV polity 2 score	0.82	0.84	0.76	0.73	0.75	0.69	0.64	0.87	0.87	0.86	0.85	0.78	0.81	0.91	0.87	0.85	0.75	0.83	0.88	0.87	0.85	0.89	0.89	1.00						
V-Dem: Electoral D. (ordinal)	0.83	0.82	0.80	0.69	0.80	0.65	0.72	0.81	0.84	0.83	0.82	0.62	0.80	0.76	0.78	0.83	0.80	0.83	0.84	0.83	0.84	0.89	0.90	0.85	1.00					
V-Dem: Liberal D. (ordinal)	0.82	0.80	0.83	0.63	0.83	0.59	0.73	0.78	0.82	0.82	0.82	0.55	0.82	0.72	0.75	0.81	0.78	0.81	0.82	0.80	0.84	0.87	0.89	0.82	0.94	1.00				
V-Dem: Participatory D. (ordinal)	0.81	0.78	0.80	0.62	0.80	0.58	0.64	0.75	0.80	0.80	0.79	0.53	0.79	0.69	0.73	0.78	0.74	0.78	0.79	0.77	0.82	0.85	0.86	0.79	0.93	0.94	1.00			
V-Dem: Deliberative D. (ordinal)	0.80	0.78	0.81	0.62	0.82	0.58	0.65	0.75	0.80	0.81	0.81	0.53	0.80	0.70	0.74	0.79	0.74	0.78	0.80	0.78	0.83	0.86	0.87	0.80	0.93	0.95	0.95	1.00		
V-Dem: Egalitarian D. (ordinal)	0.75	0.73	0.78	0.58	0.79	0.54	0.59	0.71	0.75	0.75	0.76	0.48	0.77	0.65	0.68	0.73	0.70	0.73	0.75	0.72	0.78	0.82	0.84	0.75	0.91	0.94	0.93	0.94	1.00	
Wahman et al. 2013 ifhpol	0.88	0.85	0.84	0.79	0.84	0.76	0.84	0.92	0.87	0.87	0.88	0.80	0.84	0.91	0.90	0.86	0.88	0.90	0.89	0.88	0.89	0.97	0.97	0.97	0.92	0.88	0.86	0.87	0.83	1.00
average	0.81	0.81	0.77	0.67	0.76	0.63	0.69	0.80	0.82	0.82	0.79	0.59	0.76	0.77	0.78	0.82	0.77	0.81	0.83	0.82	0.82	0.85	0.85	0.82	0.82	0.81	0.78	0.79	0.75	0.88

Table A4: Pairwise correlation between measures of Breakdown

a) core indicators

	Bernhard et al. 2005	Boix et al. 2013	Cheibub et al. 2010	Freedom House (FIW: free)	Geddes et al. 2014	Magaloni et al. 2013	Polity IV (AN=AUT)	Reich 2002	Svolik 2012	Ulfelder 2012	Wahman et al. 2013
Bernhard et al. 2005	1.00										
Boix et al. 2013	0.56	1.00									
Cheibub et al. 2010	0.53	0.77	1.00								
Freedom House (FIW: free)	0.24	0.23	0.21	1.00							
Geddes et al. 2014	0.64	0.54	0.64	0.12	1.00						
Magaloni et al. 2013	0.57	0.59	0.66	0.24	0.58	1.00					
Polity IV (AN=AUT)	0.57	0.40	0.33	0.19	0.39	0.54	1.00				
Reich 2002	0.82	0.43	0.59	0.24	0.57	0.54	0.37	1.00			
Svolik 2012	0.82	0.43	0.59	0.24	0.57	0.54	0.37	0.55	1.00		
Ulfelder 2012	0.60	0.55	0.58	0.17	0.60	0.52	0.44	0.63	0.60	1.00	
Wahman et al. 2013	0.28	0.22	0.20	0.29	0.14	0.26	0.32	0.17	0.24	0.16	1.00
average	*0.56*	*0.47*	*0.51*	*0.22*	*0.48*	*0.50*	*0.39*	*0.49*	*0.50*	*0.49*	*0.23*

b) extended set of indicators

	Bernhard et al. 2005	Boix et al. 2013	Cheibub et al. 2010	Freedom House (FIW: free)	Freedom House (FIW: partly free)	Freedom House (PR: free)	Freedom House (PR: partly free)	Freedom House (FIW: hybrid)	Freedom House (PR: hybrid)	Gasiorowski 1996	Gasiorowski 1996 (hybrid)	Gates 2006	Geddes et al. 2014	Magaloni et al. 2013	Polity IV (AN=AUT)	Polity IV (AN=DEM)	Polity IV (threshold: 7)	Polity IV (threshold: 1)	Polity IV (exrec & parcomp)	Polity IV (hybrid: 6 & -6)	Polity IV (hybrid: 8 & 1)	Przeworski et al. 2000	Reich 2002	Reich 2002 (hybrid)	Svolik 2012	Ulfelder 2012	Wahman et al. 2013
Bernhard et al. 2005	1.00																										
Boix et al. 2013	0.56	1.00																									
Cheibub et al. 2010	0.53	0.77	1.00																								
Freedom House (FIW: free)	0.24	0.23	0.21	1.00																							
Freedom House (FIW: partly free)	0.33	0.18	0.22	0.06	1.00																						
Freedom House (PR: free)	0.19	0.26	0.24	0.66	0.07	1.00																					
Freedom House (PR: partly free)	0.42	0.24	0.30	0.11	0.56	0.11	1.00																				
Freedom House (FIW: hybrid)	0.21	0.34	0.28	0.31	0.23	0.30	0.22	1.00																			
Freedom House (PR: hybrid)	0.33	0.39	0.35	0.39	0.19	0.40	0.30	0.73	1.00																		
Gasiorowski 1996	0.92	0.45	0.58	0.33	0.15	0.31	0.34	0.22	0.42	1.00																	
Gasiorowski 1996 (hybrid)	0.82	0.35	0.38	0.37	0.09	0.28	0.17	0.35	0.40	0.66	1.00																
Gates 2006	0.59	0.54	0.52	0.22	0.20	0.27	0.32	0.32	0.49	0.48	0.34	1.00															
Geddes et al. 2014	0.64	0.54	0.64	0.12	0.24	0.13	0.29	0.24	0.31	0.56	0.43	0.51	1.00														
Magaloni et al. 2013	0.57	0.59	0.66	0.24	0.22	0.27	0.29	0.44	0.44	0.53	0.43	0.58	0.58	1.00													
Polity IV (AN=AUT)	0.57	0.40	0.33	0.19	0.17	0.17	0.25	0.29	0.35	0.40	0.29	0.50	0.39	0.54	1.00												
Polity IV (AN=DEM)	0.54	0.30	0.36	0.10	0.23	0.11	0.27	0.27	0.29	0.31	0.21	0.42	0.34	0.32	0.23	1.00											
Polity IV (threshold: 7)	0.46	0.35	0.25	0.18	0.15	0.17	0.20	0.21	0.21	0.38	0.25	0.43	0.33	0.49	0.75	0.18	1.00										
Polity IV (threshold: 1)	0.63	0.43	0.51	0.23	0.25	0.23	0.35	0.36	0.43	0.47	0.37	0.66	0.53	0.57	0.46	0.38	0.41	1.00									
Polity IV (exrec & parcomp)	0.61	0.46	0.50	0.22	0.25	0.22	0.38	0.38	0.49	0.47	0.33	0.60	0.51	0.63	0.57	0.48	0.49	0.82	1.00								
Polity IV (hybrid: 6 & -6)	0.44	0.43	0.44	0.14	0.23	0.17	0.25	0.44	0.42	0.37	0.23	0.51	0.41	0.51	0.57	0.40	0.45	0.43	0.51	1.00							
Polity IV (hybrid: 8 & 1)	0.44	0.31	0.22	0.16	0.08	0.14	0.16	0.12	0.18	0.33	0.25	0.41	0.26	0.39	0.55	0.16	0.62	0.42	0.47	0.40	1.00						
Przeworski et al. 2000	0.50	0.80	0.96	0.22	0.20	0.26	0.26	0.31	0.33	0.55	0.36	0.52	0.64	0.65	0.30	0.35	0.24	0.46	0.45	0.42	0.18	1.00					
Reich 2002	0.82	0.43	0.59	0.24	0.15	0.22	0.33	0.20	0.38	1.00	0.66	0.47	0.57	0.54	0.37	0.33	0.33	0.45	0.46	0.41	0.31	0.57	1.00				
Reich 2002 (hybrid)	0.72	0.33	0.38	0.28	0.11	0.21	0.19	0.33	0.38	0.66	1.00	0.34	0.43	0.45	0.28	0.25	0.24	0.36	0.35	0.31	0.26	0.36	0.66	1.00			
Svolik 2012	0.52	0.63	0.71	0.25	0.23	0.26	0.34	0.32	0.45	0.54	0.40	0.56	0.60	0.66	0.38	0.34	0.34	0.53	0.55	0.38	0.29	0.69	0.55	0.43	1.00		
Ulfelder 2012	0.60	0.55	0.58	0.17	0.14	0.15	0.26	0.16	0.31	0.67	0.49	0.66	0.60	0.52	0.44	0.36	0.36	0.60	0.61	0.36	0.28	0.55	0.63	0.46	0.60	1.00	
Wahman et al. 2013	0.28	0.22	0.20	0.29	0.07	0.35	0.12	0.26	0.36	0.28	0.27	0.23	0.14	0.26	0.32	0.11	0.28	0.24	0.23	0.19	0.21	0.18	0.17	0.17	0.24	0.16	1.00
average	*0.52*	*0.43*	*0.45*	*0.24*	*0.19*	*0.24*	*0.27*	*0.30*	*0.37*	*0.48*	*0.39*	*0.45*	*0.42*	*0.48*	*0.39*	*0.29*	*0.34*	*0.45*	*0.46*	*0.38*	*0.29*	*0.44*	*0.46*	*0.38*	*0.47*	*0.43*	*0.23*

Table A5: Pairwise correlation between measures of Backsliding

a) core indicators—V-Dem continuous

	Freedom House (FIW: free)	Polity IV	Skaaning et al. 2015	V-Dem: Electoral Democracy	Wahman et al. 2013
Freedom House (FIW: free)	1.00				
Polity IV	0.27	1.00			
Skaaning et al. 2015	0.22	0.31	1.00		
V-Dem: Electoral Democracy	0.19	0.28	0.29	1.00	
Wahman et al. 2013	0.87	0.46	0.23	0.18	1.00
average	*0.39*	*0.33*	*0.26*	*0.23*	*0.43*

b) core indicators—V-Dem ordinal

	Freedom House (FIW: free)	Polity IV	Skaaning et al. 2015	V-Dem: Electoral Democracy	Wahman et al. 2013
Freedom House (FIW: free)	1.00				
Polity IV	0.27	1.00			
Skaaning et al. 2015	0.22	0.31	1.00		
V-Dem: Electoral Democracy (ordinal)	0.12	0.23	0.26	1.00	
Wahman et al. 2013	0.87	0.46	0.23	0.12	1.00
average	*0.37*	*0.32*	*0.26*	*0.18*	*0.42*

c) extended set of indicators—V-Dem continuous

	Freedom House (FIW, any change)	Freedom House (PR, any change)	Freedom House (FIW, 1+ points)	Freedom House (PR, 1+ points)	Gasiorowski (hybrid)	Gates et al. 2006 (any change)	Polity IV (any change)	Polity IV (3+ points)	Polity IV (5+ points)	Reich 2002 (hybrid)	Skaaning et al. 2015	V-Dem: Electoral Democracy	V-Dem: Liberal Democracy	V-Dem: Participatory Democracy	V-Dem: Deliberative Democracy	V-Dem: Egalitarian Democracy	Wahman et al. 2013 (any change)	Wahman et al. 2013 (1.5+ points)
Freedom House (FIW, any change)	1.00																	
Freedom House (PR, any change)	0.73	1.00																
Freedom House (FIW, 1+ points)	0.47	0.57	1.00															
Freedom House (PR, 1+ points)	0.71	0.98	0.58	1.00														
Gasiorowski (hybrid)	0.15	0.20	0.22	0.16	1.00													
Gates et al. 2006 (any change)	0.25	0.31	0.32	0.30	0.25	1.00												
Polity IV (any change)	0.27	0.30	0.35	0.30	0.22	0.53	1.00											
Polity IV (3+ points)	0.27	0.32	0.37	0.32	0.27	0.56	0.72	1.00										
Polity IV (5+ points)	0.24	0.29	0.36	0.30	0.30	0.52	0.55	0.76	1.00									
Reich 2002 (hybrid)	0.14	0.19	0.20	0.16	0.99	0.23	0.21	0.26	0.29	1.00								
Skaaning et al. 2015	0.22	0.30	0.33	0.30	0.25	0.40	0.31	0.35	0.35	0.24	1.00							
V-Dem: Electoral Democracy	0.19	0.20	0.21	0.20	0.16	0.24	0.28	0.30	0.29	0.16	0.29	1.00						
V-Dem: Liberal Democracy	0.18	0.19	0.21	0.19	0.18	0.26	0.28	0.31	0.30	0.17	0.24	0.68	1.00					
V-Dem: Participatory Democracy	0.14	0.17	0.20	0.17	0.21	0.25	0.27	0.31	0.29	0.19	0.25	0.61	0.66	1.00				
V-Dem: Deliberative Democracy	0.14	0.16	0.19	0.16	0.17	0.22	0.24	0.26	0.26	0.15	0.25	0.65	0.66	0.59	1.00			
V-Dem: Egalitarian Democracy	0.17	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.18	0.25	0.25	0.29	0.29	0.17	0.25	0.70	0.76	0.67	0.69	1.00		
Wahman et al. 2013 (any change)	0.87	0.65	0.44	0.65	0.17	0.27	0.46	0.31	0.27	0.16	0.23	0.18	0.18	0.15	0.16	0.17	1.00	
Wahman et al. 2013 (1.5+ points)	0.30	0.37	0.50	0.38	0.34	0.50	0.57	0.79	0.81	0.29	0.43	0.31	0.32	0.30	0.27	0.33	0.33	1.00
average	*0.32*	*0.36*	*0.34*	*0.36*	*0.26*	*0.33*	*0.36*	*0.40*	*0.38*	*0.25*	*0.29*	*0.33*	*0.34*	0.32	0.31	0.34	0.33	0.42

d) extended set of indicators—V-Dem ordinal

	Freedom House (FIW, any change)	Freedom House (PR, any change)	Freedom House (FIW, 1+ points)	Freedom House (PR, 1+ points)	Gasiorowski (hybrid)	Gates et al. 2006 (any change)	Polity IV (any change)	Polity IV (3+ points)	Polity IV (5+ points)	Reich 2002 (hybrid)	Skaaning et al. 2015	V-Dem: Electoral Democracy	V-Dem: Liberal Democracy	V-Dem: Participatory Democracy	V-Dem: Deliberative Democracy	V-Dem: Egalitarian Democracy	Wahman et al. 2013 (any change)	Wahman et al. 2013 (1.5+ points)
Freedom House (FIW, any change)	1.00																	
Freedom House (PR, any change)	0.73	1.00																
Freedom House (FIW, 1+ points)	0.47	0.57	1.00															
Freedom House (PR, 1+ points)	0.71	0.98	0.58	1.00														
Gasiorowski (hybrid)	0.15	0.20	0.22	0.16	1.00													
Gates et al. 2006 (any change)	0.25	0.31	0.32	0.30	0.25	1.00												
Polity IV (any change)	0.27	0.30	0.35	0.30	0.22	0.53	1.00											
Polity IV (3+ points)	0.27	0.32	0.37	0.32	0.27	0.56	0.72	1.00										
Polity IV (5+ points)	0.24	0.29	0.36	0.30	0.30	0.52	0.55	0.76	1.00									
Reich 2002 (hybrid)	0.14	0.19	0.20	0.16	0.99	0.23	0.21	0.26	0.29	1.00								
Skaaning et al. 2015	0.22	0.30	0.33	0.30	0.25	0.40	0.31	0.35	0.35	0.24	1.00							
V-Dem: Electoral D. (ordinal)	0.12	0.16	0.20	0.16	0.14	0.21	0.23	0.25	0.24	0.14	0.26	1.00						
V-Dem: Liberal D. (ordinal)	0.12	0.15	0.19	0.15	0.21	0.27	0.24	0.30	0.33	0.19	0.25	0.38	1.00					
V-Dem: Participatory D. (ordinal)	0.10	0.10	0.15	0.11	0.16	0.17	0.19	0.21	0.22	0.15	0.17	0.29	0.41	1.00				
V-Dem: Deliberative D. (ordinal)	0.09	0.12	0.15	0.12	0.16	0.16	0.17	0.21	0.24	0.12	0.18	0.34	0.38	0.36	1.00			
V-Dem: Egalitarian D. (ordinal)	0.08	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.16	0.14	0.14	0.17	0.18	0.13	0.15	0.27	0.33	0.28	0.29	1.00		
Wahman et al. 2013 (any change)	0.87	0.65	0.44	0.65	0.17	0.27	0.46	0.31	0.27	0.16	0.23	0.12	0.14	0.13	0.11	0.10	1.00	
Wahman et al. 2013 (1.5+ points)	0.30	0.37	0.50	0.38	0.34	0.50	0.57	0.79	0.81	0.29	0.43	0.25	0.33	0.28	0.27	0.16	0.33	1.00
average	*0.30*	*0.34*	*0.32*	*0.34*	*0.26*	*0.32*	*0.34*	*0.38*	*0.37*	*0.24*	*0.28*	*0.22*	*0.26*	0.20	0.20	0.17	0.32	0.41

Table A6: Pairwise correlation between measures of Transition

a) core indicators

	Boix et al. 2013	Cheibub et al. 2010	Freedom House (FIW: free)	Geddes et al. 2014	Magaloni et al. 2013	Polity IV (AN=AUT)	Reich 2002	Svolik 2012	Ulfelder 2012	Wahman et al. 2013
Boix et al. 2013	1.00									
Cheibub et al. 2010	0.66	1.00								
Freedom House (FIW: free)	0.33	0.24	1.00							
Geddes et al. 2014	0.47	0.60	0.28	1.00						
Magaloni et al. 2013	0.60	0.63	0.32	0.59	1.00					
Polity IV (AN=AUT)	0.37	0.33	0.25	0.40	0.54	1.00				
Reich 2002	0.34	0.41	0.26	0.42	0.43	0.29	1.00			
Svolik 2012	0.62	0.70	0.33	0.65	0.67	0.46	0.49	1.00		
Ulfelder 2012	0.63	0.63	0.31	0.63	0.57	0.42	0.51	0.70	1.00	
Wahman et al. 2013	0.38	0.28	0.42	0.34	0.44	0.55	0.34	0.42	0.40	1.00
average	*0.49*	*0.50*	*0.31*	*0.49*	*0.53*	*0.40*	*0.39*	*0.56*	*0.53*	*0.40*

b) extended set of indicators

	Boix et al. 2013	Cheibub et al. 2010	Freedom House (FIW: free)	Freedom House (FIW: partly free)	Freedom House (PR: free)	Freedom House (PR: partly free)	Freedom House (FIW: hybrid)	Freedom House (PR: hybrid)	Gasiorowski 1996	Gasiorowski 1996 (hybrid)	Gates 2006	Geddes et al. 2014	Magaloni et al. 2013	Polity IV (AN=AUT)	Polity IV (AN=DEM)	Polity IV (threshold: 7)	Polity IV (threshold: 1)	Polity IV (exrec & parcomp)	Polity IV (hybrid: 6 & -6)	Polity IV (hybrid: 8 & 1)	Przeworski et al. 2000	Reich 2002	Reich 2002 (hybrid)	Svolik 2012	Ulfelder 2012	Wahman et al. 2013
Boix et al. 2013	1.00																									
Cheibub et al. 2010	0.66	1.00																								
Freedom House (FIW: free)	0.33	0.24	1.00																							
Freedom House (FIW: partly free)	0.10	0.14	0.01	1.00																						
Freedom House (PR: free)	0.31	0.22	0.74	0.01	1.00																					
Freedom House (PR: partly free)	0.20	0.26	0.04	0.53	0.04	1.00																				
Freedom House (FIW: hybrid)	0.20	0.13	0.18	0.14	0.17	0.13	1.00																			
Freedom House (PR: hybrid)	0.26	0.21	0.28	0.09	0.26	0.20	0.65	1.00																		
Gasiorowski 1996	0.36	0.43	0.30	0.08	0.25	0.21	.	0.29	1.00																	
Gasiorowski 1996 (hybrid)	0.33	0.33	0.39	-0.02	0.33	0.13	.	0.31	0.65	1.00																
Gates 2006	0.41	0.42	0.21	0.11	0.21	0.25	0.20	0.29	0.35	0.30	1.00															
Geddes et al. 2014	0.47	0.60	0.28	0.15	0.27	0.25	0.13	0.26	0.46	0.42	0.50	1.00														
Magaloni et al. 2013	0.60	0.63	0.32	0.06	0.31	0.15	0.13	0.22	0.47	0.42	0.57	0.59	1.00													
Polity IV (AN=AUT)	0.37	0.33	0.25	0.07	0.24	0.14	0.12	0.24	0.32	0.32	0.50	0.40	0.54	1.00												
Polity IV (AN=DEM)	0.12	0.16	0.05	0.25	0.04	0.20	0.16	0.18	0.13	0.07	0.26	0.17	0.13	0.11	1.00											
Polity IV (threshold: 7)	0.31	0.24	0.22	0.05	0.20	0.09	0.07	0.09	0.21	0.18	0.40	0.31	0.35	0.66	0.08	1.00										
Polity IV (threshold: 1)	0.29	0.38	0.14	0.17	0.13	0.30	0.17	0.26	0.33	0.30	0.53	0.46	0.39	0.34	0.27	0.27	1.00									
Polity IV (exrec & parcomp)	0.33	0.38	0.14	0.18	0.13	0.28	0.17	0.24	0.30	0.25	0.54	0.53	0.56	0.53	0.33	0.40	0.77	1.00								
Polity IV (hybrid: 6 & -6)	0.19	0.18	0.14	0.13	0.13	0.21	0.31	0.40	0.18	0.16	0.40	0.31	0.28	0.37	0.31	0.29	0.31	0.38	1.00							
Polity IV (hybrid: 8 & 1)	0.26	0.24	0.11	0.06	0.13	0.12	0.15	0.10	0.21	0.23	0.41	0.31	0.36	0.43	0.12	0.47	0.36	0.43	0.38	1.00						
Przeworski et al. 2000	0.73	0.85	0.34	0.10	0.33	0.24	0.20	0.31	0.47	0.41	0.53	0.63	0.70	0.41	0.19	0.31	0.43	0.48	0.34	0.32	1.00					
Reich 2002	0.34	0.41	0.26	0.16	0.23	0.27	0.20	0.30	0.93	0.60	0.31	0.42	0.43	0.29	0.15	0.20	0.31	0.26	0.25	0.21	0.45	1.00				
Reich 2002 (hybrid)	0.37	0.38	0.37	0.07	0.33	0.22	0.30	0.39	0.61	0.90	0.27	0.38	0.43	0.28	0.12	0.17	0.30	0.23	0.21	0.24	0.42	0.63	1.00			
Svolik 2012	0.62	0.70	0.33	0.12	0.34	0.26	0.20	0.30	0.49	0.46	0.51	0.65	0.67	0.46	0.20	0.30	0.42	0.48	0.35	0.33	0.75	0.49	0.49	1.00		
Ulfelder 2012	0.63	0.63	0.31	0.15	0.29	0.28	0.18	0.27	0.56	0.50	0.57	0.63	0.57	0.42	0.20	0.30	0.48	0.51	0.30	0.33	0.69	0.51	0.48	0.70	1.00	
Wahman et al. 2013	0.38	0.28	0.42	0.02	0.38	0.08	0.11	0.23	0.42	0.49	0.46	0.34	0.44	0.55	0.09	0.53	0.26	0.37	0.28	0.35	0.43	0.34	0.42	0.42	0.40	1.00
average	*0.37*	*0.38*	*0.26*	*0.12*	*0.24*	*0.20*	*0.19*	*0.27*	*0.38*	*0.35*	*0.38*	*0.40*	*0.41*	*0.35*	*0.16*	*0.27*	*0.34*	*0.37*	*0.27*	*0.27*	*0.44*	*0.36*	*0.36*	*0.44*	*0.44*	*0.34*

Table A7: Pairwise correlation between measures of Liberalization

a) core indicators—V-Dem continuous

	Freedom House (FIW: free)	Polity IV	Skaaning et al. 2015	V-Dem: Electoral Democracy	Wahman et al. 2013
Freedom House (FIW: free)	1.00				
Polity IV	0.33	1.00			
Skaaning et al. 2015	0.30	0.28	1.00		
V-Dem: Electoral Democracy	0.33	0.30	0.40	1.00	
Wahman et al. 2013	0.86	0.57	0.31	0.33	1.00
average	*0.45*	*0.37*	*0.32*	*0.34*	*0.52*

b) core indicators—V-Dem ordinal

	Freedom House (FIW: free)	Polity IV	Skaaning et al. 2015	V-Dem: Electoral Democracy	Wahman et al. 2013
Freedom House (FIW: free)	1.00				
Polity IV	0.33	1.00			
Skaaning et al. 2015	0.30	0.28	1.00		
V-Dem: Electoral Democracy (ordinal)	0.27	0.24	0.30	1.00	
Wahman et al. 2013	0.86	0.57	0.31	0.27	1.00
average	*0.44*	*0.36*	*0.30*	*0.27*	*0.50*

c) extended set of indicators—V-Dem continuous

	Freedom House (FIW, any change)	Freedom House (PR, any change)	Freedom House (FIW, 1+ points)	Freedom House (PR, 1+ points)	Gasiorowski (hybrid)	Gates et al. 2006 (any change)	Polity IV (any change)	Polity IV (3+ points)	Polity IV (5+ points)	Reich 2002 (hybrid)	Skaaning et al. 2015	V-Dem: Electoral Democracy	V-Dem: Liberal Democracy	V-Dem: Participatory Democracy	V-Dem: Deliberative Democracy	V-Dem: Egalitarian Democracy	Wahman et al. 2013 (any change)	Wahman et al. 2013 (1.5+ points)
Freedom House (FIW, any change)	1.00																	
Freedom House (PR, any change)	0.74	1.00																
Freedom House (FIW, 1+ points)	0.49	0.60	1.00															
Freedom House (PR, 1+ points)	0.73	0.98	0.61	1.00														
Gasiorowski (hybrid)	0.16	0.15	0.16	0.14	1.00													
Gates et al. 2006 (any change)	0.24	0.27	0.31	0.27	0.13	1.00												
Polity IV (any change)	0.33	0.33	0.34	0.33	0.15	0.46	1.00											
Polity IV (3+ points)	0.30	0.33	0.40	0.33	0.15	0.50	0.66	1.00										
Polity IV (5+ points)	0.26	0.28	0.37	0.28	0.14	0.43	0.51	0.77	1.00									
Reich 2002 (hybrid)	0.15	0.16	0.18	0.16	0.90	0.15	0.18	0.15	0.15	1.00								
Skaaning et al. 2015	0.30	0.36	0.39	0.37	0.18	0.31	0.28	0.29	0.24	0.18	1.00							
V-Dem: Electoral Democracy	0.33	0.36	0.38	0.36	0.16	0.28	0.30	0.31	0.27	0.16	0.40	1.00						
V-Dem: Liberal Democracy	0.31	0.32	0.38	0.33	0.20	0.24	0.28	0.30	0.27	0.18	0.32	0.71	1.00					
V-Dem: Participatory Democracy	0.31	0.32	0.37	0.32	0.16	0.24	0.29	0.31	0.28	0.16	0.29	0.67	0.71	1.00				
V-Dem: Deliberative Democracy	0.27	0.28	0.31	0.28	0.17	0.21	0.26	0.25	0.23	0.17	0.29	0.66	0.71	0.65	1.00			
V-Dem: Egalitarian Democracy	0.28	0.30	0.34	0.30	0.17	0.23	0.27	0.28	0.26	0.16	0.29	0.70	0.77	0.69	0.68	1.00		
Wahman et al. 2013 (any change)	0.86	0.63	0.44	0.64	0.18	0.32	0.57	0.40	0.33	0.17	0.31	0.33	0.32	0.32	0.29	0.30	1.00	
Wahman et al. 2013 (1.5+ points)	0.36	0.41	0.59	0.42	0.18	0.50	0.54	0.77	0.80	0.17	0.39	0.41	0.41	0.42	0.34	0.37	0.38	1.00
average	0.38	0.40	0.39	0.40	0.21	0.30	0.36	0.38	0.34	0.21	0.31	0.40	0.40	0.38	0.36	0.38	0.40	0.44

d) extended set of indicators—V-Dem ordinal

	Freedom House (FIW, any change)	Freedom House (PR, any change)	Freedom House (FIW, 1+ points)	Freedom House (PR, 1+ points)	Gasiorowski (hybrid)	Gates et al. 2006 (any change)	Polity IV (any change)	Polity IV (3+ points)	Polity IV (5+ points)	Reich 2002 (hybrid)	Skaaning et al. 2015	V-Dem: Electoral Democracy	V-Dem: Liberal Democracy	V-Dem: Participatory Democracy	V-Dem: Deliberative Democracy	V-Dem: Egalitarian Democracy	Wahman et al. 2013 (any change)	Wahman et al. 2013 (1.5+ points)
Freedom House (FIW, any change)	1.00																	
Freedom House (PR, any change)	0.74	1.00																
Freedom House (FIW, 1+ points)	0.49	0.60	1.00															
Freedom House (PR, 1+ points)	0.73	0.98	0.61	1.00														
Gasiorowski (hybrid)	0.16	0.15	0.16	0.14	1.00													
Gates et al. 2006 (any change)	0.24	0.27	0.31	0.27	0.13	1.00												
Polity IV (any change)	0.33	0.33	0.34	0.33	0.15	0.46	1.00											
Polity IV (3+ points)	0.30	0.33	0.40	0.33	0.15	0.50	0.66	1.00										
Polity IV (5+ points)	0.26	0.28	0.37	0.28	0.14	0.43	0.51	0.77	1.00									
Reich 2002 (hybrid)	0.15	0.16	0.18	0.16	0.90	0.15	0.18	0.15	0.15	1.00								
Skaaning et al. 2015	0.30	0.36	0.39	0.37	0.18	0.31	0.28	0.29	0.24	0.18	1.00							
V-Dem: Electoral D. (ordinal)	0.27	0.29	0.31	0.29	0.15	0.21	0.24	0.25	0.23	0.16	0.30	1.00						
V-Dem: Liberal D. (ordinal)	0.24	0.25	0.30	0.25	0.17	0.15	0.19	0.22	0.22	0.12	0.22	0.40	1.00					
V-Dem: Participatory D. (ordinal)	0.21	0.23	0.27	0.24	0.06	0.14	0.17	0.18	0.18	0.11	0.20	0.38	0.43	1.00				
V-Dem: Deliberative D. (ordinal)	0.19	0.23	0.27	0.23	0.16	0.13	0.18	0.18	0.17	0.15	0.22	0.40	0.39	0.42	1.00			
V-Dem: Egalitarian D. (ordinal)	0.21	0.23	0.26	0.23	0.08	0.13	0.17	0.19	0.19	0.09	0.22	0.37	0.39	0.38	0.37	1.00		
Wahman et al. 2013 (any change)	0.86	0.63	0.44	0.64	0.18	0.32	0.57	0.40	0.33	0.17	0.31	0.27	0.22	0.23	0.21	0.19	1.00	
Wahman et al. 2013 (1.5+ points)	0.36	0.41	0.59	0.42	0.18	0.50	0.54	0.77	0.80	0.17	0.39	0.34	0.33	0.30	0.28	0.29	0.38	1.00
average	0.36	0.38	0.37	0.38	0.19	0.27	0.33	0.36	0.33	0.19	0.28	0.29	0.27	0.24	0.25	0.23	0.37	0.41

Table A8: Agreement around focal points

b) core indicators—V-Dem ordinal

	Mean	No coups	Coups	No Elections	Elections
Breakdown	28.28%	17.53%	50.47%	29.05%	25.68%
Backsliding	42.96%	40.12%	56.68%	42.43%	42.38%
Backsliding & Breakdown	18.50%	15.36%	34.06%	17.71%	19.29%
Transition	29.87%	29.32%	35.53%	17.94%	35.01%
Liberalization	48.86%	48.67%	51.67%	42.16%	53.45%
Liberalization & Transition	21.73%	21.53%	24.49%	16.51%	27.27%

c) extended set of indicators—V-Dem continuous

	Mean	No coups	Coups	No Elections	Elections
Breakdown	15.03%	9.17%	33.36%	14.64%	15.27%
Backsliding	23.91%	20.79%	40.88%	23.75%	22.59%
Backsliding & Breakdown	12.70%	9.97%	27.62%	12.42%	12.68%
Transition	14.65%	14.37%	17.38%	8.75%	18.92%
Liberalization	28.65%	28.55%	30.32%	22.62%	33.15%
Liberalization & Transition	15.25%	15.08%	17.84%	11.58%	19.21%

d) extended set of indicators—V-Dem ordinal

	Mean	No coups	Coups	No Elections	Elections
Breakdown	15.03%	9.17%	33.36%	14.64%	15.27%
Backsliding	21.06%	18.40%	36.07%	20.67%	20.21%
Backsliding & Breakdown	11.55%	9.01%	26.17%	11.18%	11.71%
Transition	14.65%	14.37%	17.38%	8.75%	18.92%
Liberalization	23.37%	23.25%	25.20%	18.45%	27.51%
Liberalization & Transition	12.79%	12.61%	15.53%	9.36%	16.44%

Table A9: Agreement between regime change indicators, one-year period

b) core indicators—V-Dem ordinal

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Breakdown	***Backsliding***	***Breakdown & Backsliding***	***Transition***	***Liberalization***	***Transition & Liberalization***
Successful coup in t	0.276***	0.177***	0.190***	-0.013	0.037	0.022
	(0.06)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.10)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Election in t	0.006	0.009	0.015	0.141***	0.140***	0.131***
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Population, ln (Ø t-3 to t-1)	-3.818	0.561	-1.320	-7.547	1.223	-0.686
	(4.32)	(2.27)	(1.11)	(4.77)	(1.27)	(0.73)
GDP p.c., ln (Ø t-3 to t-1)	-4.117	0.578	-1.354	-7.384	1.182	-0.698
	(4.31)	(2.28)	(1.12)	(4.69)	(1.29)	(0.75)
GDP, ln (Ø t-3 to t-1)	4.086	-0.544	1.364	7.455	-1.271	0.656
	(4.32)	(2.28)	(1.11)	(4.75)	(1.29)	(0.75)
Trade (Ø t-3 to t-1)	-0.001	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.001	-0.000
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Aid p.c., ln (Ø t-3 to t-1)	0.000	0.008	0.006	0.019	-0.016	-0.011
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Member of GATT/WTO, t-1	-0.021	0.021	0.007	0.065	-0.001	0.011
	(0.07)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.02)
# measures available, ln	0.393		0.685***	0.431	-0.950	*-0.267*
	(0.47)		(0.23)	(0.74)	(0.82)	(0.20)
N	223	810	833	276	1011	1024
Adj. R2	0.456	0.182	0.229	0.163	0.133	0.148

Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. All models include country- and time-fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by country.

c) extended set of indicators—V-Dem continuous

	(1')	(2')	(3')	(4')	(5')	(6')
	Breakdown	***Backsliding***	***Breakdown & Backsliding***	***Transition***	***Liberalization***	***Transition & Liberalization***
Successful coup in t	0.194***	0.217***	0.185***	-0.008	0.013	0.018
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Election in t	0.002	0.017	0.021*	0.110***	0.155***	0.111***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Population, ln (Ø t-3 to t-1)	0.029	2.210	0.423	-0.333	-0.892	-0.816
	(4.01)	(3.22)	(1.63)	(0.77)	(1.22)	(0.79)
GDP p.c., ln (Ø t-3 to t-1)	-0.191	2.156	0.366	-0.331	-0.903	-0.844
	(4.01)	(3.23)	(1.63)	(0.84)	(1.23)	(0.80)
GDP, ln (Ø t-3 to t-1)	0.207	-2.134	-0.362	0.325	0.826	0.793
	(4.01)	(3.23)	(1.63)	(0.86)	(1.23)	(0.80)
Trade (Ø t-3 to t-1)	-0.001	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Aid p.c., ln (Ø t-3 to t-1)	0.016	0.010	0.007	-0.002	-0.020**	-0.013**
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Member of GATT/WTO, t-1	-0.041	0.018	0.006	0.034	0.013	0.012
	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
# measures available, ln	0.920**	-0.558***	-0.027	*-0.127*	-1.317***	-0.534***
	(0.37)	(0.20)	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.30)	*(0.15)*
N	381	940	969	491	1215	1233
Adj. R2	0.333	0.168	0.201	0.121	0.190	0.170

Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. All models include country- and time-fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by country.

d) extended set of indicators—V-Dem ordinal

	(1')	(2')	(3')	(4')	(5')	(6')
	Breakdown	***Backsliding***	***Breakdown & Backsliding***	***Transition***	***Liberalization***	***Transition & Liberalization***
Successful coup in t	0.194***	0.197***	0.178***	-0.008	-0.003	0.007
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Election in t	0.002	0.016	0.018	0.110***	0.135***	0.102***
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Population, ln (Ø t-3 to t-1)	0.029	0.763	-0.011	-0.333	-0.197	-0.564
	(4.01)	(2.51)	(1.54)	(0.77)	(1.30)	(0.98)
GDP p.c., ln (Ø t-3 to t-1)	-0.191	0.748	-0.053	-0.331	-0.250	-0.603
	(4.01)	(2.51)	(1.54)	(0.84)	(1.31)	(0.99)
GDP, ln (Ø t-3 to t-1)	0.207	-0.727	0.056	0.325	0.167	0.548
	(4.01)	(2.51)	(1.54)	(0.86)	(1.31)	(0.99)
Trade (Ø t-3 to t-1)	-0.001	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.000
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Aid p.c., ln (Ø t-3 to t-1)	0.016	0.002	0.003	-0.002	-0.025***	-0.018***
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Member of GATT/WTO, t-1	-0.041	0.016	0.004	0.034	0.017	0.014
	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
# measures available, ln	0.920**	-0.516***	0.005	-0.127	-1.256***	-0.529***
	(0.37)	(0.14)	(0.16)	(0.19)	(0.26)	(0.14)
N	381	960	988	491	1232	1251
Adj. R2	0.333	0.174	0.203	0.121	0.180	0.152

Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. All models include country- and time-fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by country.

Table A10: Agreement between regime change indicators, three-year period

a) core indicators—V-Dem continuous

	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
	Breakdown	***Backsliding***	***Breakdown & Backsliding***	***Transition***	***Liberalization***	***Transition & Liberalization***
Successful coup in t	0.096***	0.155***	0.132***	0.082*	0.041*	0.063***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Election in t	0.006	0.008	0.004	0.036**	0.071***	0.056***
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Population, ln (Ø t-3 to t-1)	0.315	0.567	-2.748**	-5.544*	-1.376	-2.126**
	(2.15)	(1.17)	(1.10)	(2.81)	(1.36)	(0.97)
GDP p.c., ln (Ø t-3 to t-1)	0.009	0.426	-2.941***	-5.374*	-1.497	-2.207**
	(2.17)	(1.19)	(1.11)	(2.87)	(1.38)	(0.98)
GDP, ln (Ø t-3 to t-1)	-0.109	-0.421	2.925***	5.373*	1.406	2.137**
	(2.17)	(1.18)	(1.11)	(2.86)	(1.38)	(0.98)
Trade (Ø t-3 to t-1)	-0.001	0.000	-0.000	-0.001	-0.001	-0.000
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Aid p.c., ln (Ø t-3 to t-1)	-0.012	-0.007	-0.002	-0.008	-0.006	-0.010
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Member of GATT/WTO, t-1	-0.036	0.005	0.010	-0.012	-0.040	-0.007
	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)
# measures available, ln	0.031	-0.983***	0.742**	0.272	0.042	0.019
	(0.38)	(0.24)	(0.32)	(0.59)	(0.58)	(0.28)
N	572	1782	1805	681	2072	2096
Adj. R2	0.206	0.087	0.101	0.111	0.084	0.070

Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. All models include country- and time-fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by country.

b) core indicators—V-Dem ordinal

	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
	Breakdown	***Backsliding***	***Breakdown & Backsliding***	***Transition***	***Liberalization***	***Transition & Liberalization***
Successful coup in t	0.096***	0.171***	0.143***	0.082*	0.027	0.054***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Election in t	0.006	-0.002	-0.000	0.036**	0.065***	0.054***
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Population, ln (Ø t-3 to t-1)	0.315	0.968	-1.381	-5.544*	-1.065	-2.052**
	(2.15)	(1.43)	(1.01)	(2.81)	(1.07)	(0.90)
GDP p.c., ln (Ø t-3 to t-1)	0.009	0.815	-1.586	-5.374*	-1.211	-2.157**
	(2.17)	(1.45)	(1.01)	(2.87)	(1.10)	(0.92)
GDP, ln (Ø t-3 to t-1)	-0.109	-0.807	1.570	5.373*	1.097	2.074**
	(2.17)	(1.44)	(1.01)	(2.86)	(1.10)	(0.92)
Trade (Ø t-3 to t-1)	-0.001	0.000	-0.000	-0.001	-0.001*	-0.000
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Aid p.c., ln (Ø t-3 to t-1)	-0.012	0.001	0.001	-0.008	-0.011	-0.011
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Member of GATT/WTO, t-1	-0.036	0.043*	0.027	-0.012	-0.005	0.008
	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)
# measures available, ln	0.031	-0.886***	0.697**	0.272	-0.054	0.020
	(0.38)	(0.25)	(0.33)	(0.59)	(0.70)	(0.28)
N	572	1831	1852	681	2111	2141
Adj. R2	0.206	0.098	0.107	0.111	0.075	0.064

Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. All models include country- and time-fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by country.

c) extended set of indicators—V-Dem continuous

	(7')	(8')	(9')	(10')	(11')	(12')
	Breakdown	***Backsliding***	***Breakdown & Backsliding***	***Transition***	***Liberalization***	***Transition & Liberalization***
Successful coup in t	0.085***	0.174***	0.138***	0.064**	0.043	0.009
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.01)
Election in t	-0.002	0.011	0.008	0.044***	0.061***	0.103***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Population, ln (Ø t-3 to t-1)	1.302	1.014	-0.590	-1.612**	-2.026	-0.552
	(1.60)	(1.36)	(0.82)	(0.76)	(1.28)	(0.38)
GDP p.c., ln (Ø t-3 to t-1)	0.989	0.875	-0.745	-1.577*	-2.138*	-0.593
	(1.61)	(1.38)	(0.84)	(0.82)	(1.29)	(0.39)
GDP, ln (Ø t-3 to t-1)	-0.988	-0.875	0.731	1.520*	2.021	0.555
	(1.61)	(1.38)	(0.84)	(0.81)	(1.29)	(0.39)
Trade (Ø t-3 to t-1)	-0.001	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.000
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Aid p.c., ln (Ø t-3 to t-1)	0.002	-0.001	-0.001	-0.014	-0.020**	-0.009**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)
Member of GATT/WTO, t-1	-0.023	0.035	0.021	0.022	-0.002	0.004
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.01)
# measures available, ln	1.004***	-0.581*	0.030	-0.043	-0.252	0.006
	(0.36)	(0.31)	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.37)	(0.09)
N	966	2032	2067	1145	2401	2423
Adj. R2	0.162	0.077	0.083	0.084	0.070	0.158
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. All models include country- and time-fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by country.						

d) extended set of indicators—V-Dem ordinal

	(7')	(8')	(9')	(10')	(11')	(12')
	Breakdown	***Backsliding***	***Breakdown & Backsliding***	***Transition***	***Liberalization***	***Transition & Liberalization***
Successful coup in t	0.085***	0.157***	0.131***	0.064**	0.044*	0.008
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Election in t	-0.002	0.007	0.006	0.044***	0.063***	0.096***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Population, ln (Ø t-3 to t-1)	1.302	1.066	0.039	-1.612**	-1.548	-0.423
	(1.60)	(1.46)	(1.08)	(0.76)	(1.24)	(0.34)
GDP p.c., ln (Ø t-3 to t-1)	0.989	0.922	-0.109	-1.577*	-1.711	-0.461
	(1.61)	(1.47)	(1.09)	(0.82)	(1.25)	(0.34)
GDP, ln (Ø t-3 to t-1)	-0.988	-0.925	0.092	1.520*	1.588	0.424
	(1.61)	(1.47)	(1.09)	(0.81)	(1.26)	(0.34)
Trade (Ø t-3 to t-1)	-0.001	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.000
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Aid p.c., ln (Ø t-3 to t-1)	0.002	-0.009	-0.006	-0.014	-0.024***	-0.010***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)
Member of GATT/WTO, t-1	-0.023	0.033	0.018	0.022	0.003	0.006
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.01)
# measures available, ln	1.004***	-0.506*	0.059	-0.043	-0.236	-0.020
	(0.36)	(0.27)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.34)	(0.07)
N	966	2100	2130	1145	2443	2467
Adj. R2	0.162	0.066	0.075	0.084	0.073	0.158
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. All models include country- and time-fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by country.						

Appendix III: Results of the Robustness Checks—Extended Set of Indicators

a) Rupture

	TRANSITION					BREAKDOWN			
Indicator name	scope	**Pevehouse 2002b**		**Donno 2013**		scope	**Andersen et al. 2014**		**Houle 2009**
		T2, M1	***T2, M3***	***T1, M3***	***T1, M5***		***T1, M3***	***T1, M6***	***T4, M1***
Bernhard et al. 2001	AUT only	NA	NA	NA	NA	DEM only			
Boix et al. 2013	AUT only					DEM only			
Cheibub et al. 2010	AUT only					DEM only			
Freedom House (FIW: free)	AUT only					DEM only			
Freedom House (FIW: partly free)	AUT only					DEM only			
Freedom House (PR: free)	AUT only					DEM only			
Freedom House (PR: partly free)	AUT only					DEM only			
Freedom House (FIW: hybrid)	AUT only					DEM only			
Freedom House (PR: hybrid)	AUT only					DEM only			
Gasiorowski 1996	AUT only					DEM only			
Gasiorowski 1996 (hybrid)	AUT only					DEM only			
Gates 2006	AUT only					DEM only			
Geddes et al. 2014	AUT only					DEM only			
Magaloni et al. 2013	AUT only					DEM only			
Polity IV (AN=AUT)	AUT only					DEM only			
Polity IV (AN=DEM)	AUT only					DEM only			
Polity IV (threshold: 7)	AUT only					DEM only			
Polity IV (threshold: 1)	AUT only					DEM only			
Polity IV (exrec & parcomp)	AUT only					DEM only			
Polity IV (hybrid: 6 & -6)	AUT only					DEM only			
Polity IV (hybrid: 8 & 1)	AUT only					DEM only			
Przeworski et al. 2000	AUT only					DEM only			
Reich 2002	AUT only					DEM only			
Reich 2002 (hybrid)	AUT only					DEM only			
Svolik 2012	AUT only					DEM only			
Ulfelder 2012	AUT only					DEM only			
Wahman et al. 2013	AUT only					DEM only			
	% success	***61.5%***	***46.2%***	***0.0%*** *61.5%*	***0.0%*** *42.3%*	***% success***	***55.6%***	***18.5%***	***25.9%***

b) Reform

	LIBERALIZATION						BACKSLIDING				
Coding DV	**scope**	**Burke and Leigh 2010**		**Cornell 2013**	**Ansell and Samuels 2010**		**scope**	**Burke and Leigh 2010**		**Gibler and Randazzo 2011**	**Goldstone et al. 2010**
		T3, M1	***T3, M2***	***T1, M3***	***T3, MC***	***T3, ME***		***T3, M3***	***T3, M4***	***T2***	***T1, M3***
Freedom House (FIW, any change)	all						all				
Freedom House (PR, any change)	all						all				
Freedom House (FIW, 1+ points)	all						all				
Freedom House (PR, 1+ points)	all						all				
Gasiorowski (hybrid)	all						all				
Gates et al. 2006 (any change)	all						all				
Polity IV (any change)	all						all				
Polity IV (3+ points)	all						all				
Polity IV (5+ points)	all						all				
Reich 2002 (hybrid)	all						all				
Skaaning et al. 2015	all						all				
Wahman et al. 2013 (any change)	all						all				
Wahman et al. 2013 (1.5+ points)	all						all				
Freedom House (FIW, any change)	AUT only						AUT only				
Freedom House (PR, any change)	AUT only						AUT only				
Freedom House (FIW, 1+ points)	AUT only						AUT only				
Freedom House (PR, 1+ points)	AUT only						AUT only				
Gasiorowski (hybrid)	AUT only						AUT only				
Gates et al. 2006 (any change)	AUT only						AUT only				
Polity IV (any change)	AUT only						AUT only				
Polity IV (3+ points)	AUT only						AUT only				
Polity IV (5+ points)	AUT only						AUT only				
Reich 2002 (hybrid)	AUT only						AUT only				
Skaaning et al. 2015	AUT only	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	AUT only	NA	NA	NA	NA
Wahman et al. 2013 (any change)	AUT only						AUT only				
Wahman et al. 2013 (1.5+ points)	AUT only						AUT only				
	% success	***80%***	***72%***	***36%***	***0%***	***4%***	***% success***	***36%***	***36%***	***56%***	***8%***
				60%	*16%*	*20%*					*40%*

Appendix IV: Robustness Checks: Pevehouse 2002

Boix et al. 2013		
	Model 1	***Model 3***
$IOScore_{it-1}$	0.058**	0.033
	(0.03)	(0.04)
$\Delta IOScore_{it-1}$	0.044	0.023
	(0.06)	(0.16)
$pcGDP_{it-1}$	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.00)	(0.00)
$\Delta pcGDP_{it-1}$	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.00)	(0.00)
$Contagion_{it}$	0.023	0.025
	(0.04)	(0.04)
$PastDem_{it}$	1.579***	1.705***
	(0.45)	(0.44)
$RegConflict_{it}$	-0.316*	-0.328*
	(0.19)	(0.18)
$IntViolence_{it-1}$	2.109***	2.109***
	(0.47)	(0.47)
$MilReg_{it}$	-2.214***	-2.293***
	(0.68)	(0.71)
$Indep_{it}$	0.011**	0.012***
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Constant	-6.293***	-6.273***
	(0.61)	(0.68)
N	2554	2555
Log Likelihood	-196.384	-198.709
X^2	60.960	56.982
Prob>X^2	0.000	0.000
Pseudo-R^2	0.189	0.180
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Model 3: including non-regional organizations and IFIs		

Cheibub et al. 2010		
	Model 1	***Model 3***
$IOScore_{it-1}$	0.071***	0.040
	(0.03)	(0.04)
$\Delta IOScore_{it-1}$	0.032	-0.023
	(0.07)	(0.20)
$pcGDP_{it-1}$	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.00)	(0.00)
$\Delta pcGDP_{it-1}$	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.00)	(0.00)
$Contagion_{it}$	0.024	0.026
	(0.04)	(0.04)
$PastDem_{it}$	1.409***	1.545***
	(0.45)	(0.45)
$RegConflict_{it}$	-0.324*	-0.332**
	(0.17)	(0.17)
$IntViolence_{it-1}$	2.184***	2.174***
	(0.51)	(0.50)
$MilReg_{it}$	-2.244***	-2.326***
	(0.76)	(0.79)
$Indep_{it}$	0.011**	0.012***
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Constant	-6.365***	-6.326***
	(0.60)	(0.70)
N	2541	2542
Log Likelihood	-200.496	-203.797
X^2	71.620	60.991
Prob>X^2	0.000	0.000
Pseudo-R^2	0.197	0.184
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Model 3: including non-regional organizations and IFIs		

FH: free, FIW		
	Model 1	***Model 3***
$IOScore_{it-1}$	-0.019	-0.074
	(0.04)	(0.05)
$\Delta IOScore_{it-1}$	0.172**	-0.068
	(0.08)	(0.42)
$pcGDP_{it-1}$	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.00)	(0.00)
$\Delta pcGDP_{it-1}$	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.00)	(0.00)
$Contagion_{it}$	0.049	0.049
	(0.04)	(0.04)
$PastDem_{it}$	1.815***	1.832***
	(0.68)	(0.68)
$RegConflict_{it}$	-0.453	-0.454
	(0.36)	(0.35)
$IntViolence_{it-1}$	2.248***	2.103***
	(0.78)	(0.68)
$MilReg_{it}$	0.000	0.000
	(.)	(.)
$Indep_{it}$	0.010*	0.012**
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	-5.883***	-5.054***
	(0.81)	(0.86)
N	1120	1120
Log Likelihood	-91.830	-92.291
X^2	37.959	41.048
Prob>X^2	0.000	0.000
Pseudo-R^2	0.181	0.177
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Model 3: including non-regional organizations and IFIs		

FH: partly free, FIW		
	Model 1	***Model 3***
$IOScore_{it-1}$	0.066**	0.120***
	(0.03)	(0.05)
$\Delta IOScore_{it-1}$	-0.030	-0.044
	(0.06)	(0.11)
$pcGDP_{it-1}$	0.000**	0.000**
	(0.00)	(0.00)
$\Delta pcGDP_{it-1}$	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.00)	(0.00)
$Contagion_{it}$	-0.010	-0.003
	(0.02)	(0.02)
$PastDem_{it}$	0.778*	0.749
	(0.47)	(0.50)
$RegConflict_{it}$	-0.167	-0.163
	(0.20)	(0.21)
$IntViolence_{it-1}$	0.888***	0.911***
	(0.30)	(0.30)
$MilReg_{it}$	-0.284	-0.259
	(0.36)	(0.37)
$Indep_{it}$	0.001	0.000
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Constant	-3.468***	-4.419***
	(0.37)	(0.59)
N	867	867
Log Likelihood	-237.705	-235.826
X^2	28.047	32.269
Prob>X^2	0.002	0.000
Pseudo-R^2	0.069	0.076
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Model 3: including non-regional organizations and IFIs		

FH: free, PR		
	Model 1	***Model 3***
$IOScore_{it-1}$	0.002	-0.054
	(0.04)	(0.05)
$\Delta IOScore_{it-1}$	0.152*	-0.106
	(0.08)	(0.42)
$pcGDP_{it-1}$	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.00)	(0.00)
$\Delta pcGDP_{it-1}$	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.00)	(0.00)
$Contagion_{it}$	0.033	0.037
	(0.05)	(0.04)
$PastDem_{it}$	1.680***	1.707***
	(0.62)	(0.62)
$RegConflict_{it}$	-0.446	-0.445
	(0.35)	(0.34)
$IntViolence_{it-1}$	2.165***	2.047***
	(0.77)	(0.70)
$MilReg_{it}$	0.000	0.000
	(.)	(.)
$Indep_{it}$	0.010*	0.013**
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	-5.886***	-5.186***
	(0.79)	(0.87)
N	1121	1121
Log Likelihood	-92.547	-93.089
X^2	34.300	37.633
Prob>X^2	0.000	0.000
Pseudo-R^2	0.175	0.170
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Model 3: including non-regional organizations and IFIs		

FH: partly free, PR		
	Model 1	***Model 3***
$IOScore_{it-1}$	0.086***	0.146***
	(0.03)	(0.04)
$\Delta IOScore_{it-1}$	-0.027	-0.219
	(0.06)	(0.24)
$pcGDP_{it-1}$	0.000**	0.000**
	(0.00)	(0.00)
$\Delta pcGDP_{it-1}$	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.00)	(0.00)
$Contagion_{it}$	-0.025	-0.016
	(0.02)	(0.02)
$PastDem_{it}$	0.542	0.514
	(0.49)	(0.50)
$RegConflict_{it}$	-0.148	-0.146
	(0.20)	(0.21)
$IntViolence_{it-1}$	0.806***	0.821***
	(0.25)	(0.25)
$MilReg_{it}$	-0.462	-0.410
	(0.33)	(0.34)
$Indep_{it}$	0.000	0.001
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Constant	-3.552***	-4.685***
	(0.34)	(0.53)
N	998	998
Log Likelihood	-246.239	-244.027
X^2	33.894	38.791
Prob>X^2	0.000	0.000
Pseudo-R^2	0.066	0.075
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Model 3: including non-regional organizations and IFIs		

FH: HYB, FIW

convergence not achieved

FH: HYB, PR		
	Model 1	***Model 3***
$IOScore_{it-1}$	-0.221***	-0.272***
	(0.07)	(0.05)
$\Delta IOScore_{it-1}$	0.341	-0.411
	(0.23)	(0.37)
$pcGDP_{it-1}$	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.00)	(0.00)
$\Delta pcGDP_{it-1}$	0.000	0.001
	(0.00)	(0.00)
$Contagion_{it}$	0.157*	0.104
	(0.09)	(0.10)
$PastDem_{it}$	0.000	0.000
	(.)	(.)
$RegConflict_{it}$	-0.942*	-1.005*
	(0.55)	(0.53)
$IntViolence_{it-1}$	0.000	0.000
	(.)	(.)
$MilReg_{it}$	0.000	0.000
	(.)	(.)
$Indep_{it}$	0.007	0.011
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	-3.423***	-1.706**
	(1.00)	(0.72)
N	446	446
Log Likelihood	-22.472	-21.022
X^2	55.149	87.105
$Prob>X^2$	0.000	0.000
Pseudo-R^2	0.181	0.234
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Model 3: including non-regional organizations and IFIs		

Gasiorowski 1996		
	Model 1	***Model 3***
$IOScore_{it-1}$	0.054	0.108**
	(0.04)	(0.05)
$\Delta IOScore_{it-1}$	0.009	-0.278
	(0.05)	(0.28)
$pcGDP_{it-1}$	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.00)	(0.00)
$\Delta pcGDP_{it-1}$	0.000	0.000
	(0.00)	(0.00)
$Contagion_{it}$	0.218***	0.223***
	(0.07)	(0.07)
$PastDem_{it}$	1.227***	1.279***
	(0.38)	(0.40)
$RegConflict_{it}$	-0.247	-0.257
	(0.17)	(0.17)
$IntViolence_{it-1}$	1.056***	1.031***
	(0.39)	(0.39)
$MilReg_{it}$	-1.338***	-1.317***
	(0.45)	(0.46)
$Indep_{it}$	0.002	0.002
	(0.01)	(0.00)
Constant	-5.351***	-6.255***
	(0.46)	(0.70)
N	1957	1958
Log Likelihood	-202.393	-200.460
X^2	63.143	55.670
$Prob>X^2$	0.000	0.000
Pseudo-R^2	0.116	0.125
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Model 3: including non-regional organizations and IFIs		

Gasiorowski 1996: HYB		
	Model 1	***Model 3***
$IOScore_{it-1}$	-0.002	0.022
	(0.06)	(0.07)
$\Delta IOScore_{it-1}$	0.111**	-0.473*
	(0.05)	(0.29)
$pcGDP_{it-1}$	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.00)	(0.00)
$\Delta pcGDP_{it-1}$	-0.000	0.000
	(0.00)	(0.00)
$Contagion_{it}$	0.243***	0.258***
	(0.09)	(0.10)
$PastDem_{it}$	2.460***	2.534***
	(0.55)	(0.51)
$RegConflict_{it}$	-0.267	-0.240
	(0.28)	(0.29)
$IntViolence_{it-1}$	0.747	0.608
	(0.59)	(0.62)
$MilReg_{it}$	-1.999***	-1.961***
	(0.55)	(0.52)
$Indep_{it}$	0.004	0.004
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	-6.150***	-6.440***
	(0.62)	(0.89)
N	2159	2160
Log Likelihood	-95.583	-94.582
X^2	49.489	50.160
Prob>X^2	0.000	0.000
Pseudo-R^2	0.158	0.167
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Model 3: including non-regional organizations and IFIs		

Gates et al. 2006		
	Model 1	***Model 3***
$IOScore_{it-1}$	0.096***	0.103**
	(0.03)	(0.05)
$\Delta IOScore_{it-1}$	0.038	0.014
	(0.06)	(0.09)
$pcGDP_{it-1}$	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.00)	(0.00)
$\Delta pcGDP_{it-1}$	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.00)	(0.00)
$Contagion_{it}$	-0.025	-0.022
	(0.05)	(0.05)
$PastDem_{it}$	1.111***	1.212***
	(0.41)	(0.39)
$RegConflict_{it}$	-0.187	-0.209
	(0.14)	(0.14)
$IntViolence_{it-1}$	1.804***	1.832***
	(0.49)	(0.48)
$MilReg_{it}$	-1.565***	-1.605***
	(0.58)	(0.58)
$Indep_{it}$	0.009*	0.010**
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Constant	-6.421***	-6.878***
	(0.54)	(0.73)
N	2435	2436
Log Likelihood	-170.519	-173.305
X^2	69.625	48.448
Prob>X^2	0.000	0.000
Pseudo-R^2	0.164	0.151
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Model 3: including non-regional organizations and IFIs		

Geddes et al. 2014		
	Model 1	***Model 3***
$IOScore_{it-1}$	0.078***	0.069*
	(0.03)	(0.04)
$\Delta IOScore_{it-1}$	0.073	0.017
	(0.05)	(0.18)
$pcGDP_{it-1}$	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.00)	(0.00)
$\Delta pcGDP_{it-1}$	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.00)	(0.00)
$Contagion_{it}$	0.040	0.043
	(0.04)	(0.04)
$PastDem_{it}$	1.641***	1.762***
	(0.48)	(0.48)
$RegConflict_{it}$	-0.399**	-0.399**
	(0.19)	(0.18)
$IntViolence_{it-1}$	1.959***	1.946***
	(0.50)	(0.49)
$MilReg_{it}$	-1.732***	-1.819***
	(0.61)	(0.62)
$Indep_{it}$	0.007	0.009*
	(0.01)	(0.00)
Constant	-6.478***	-6.696***
	(0.62)	(0.78)
N	2544	2544
Log Likelihood	-180.224	-183.228
X^2	64.090	40.547
Prob>X^2	0.000	0.000
Pseudo-R^2	0.174	0.160
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Model 3: including non-regional organizations and IFIs		

Magaloni et al. 2013		
	Model 1	***Model 3***
$IOScore_{it-1}$	0.098***	0.100***
	(0.03)	(0.04)
$\Delta IOScore_{it-1}$	0.011	-0.227
	(0.05)	(0.27)
$pcGDP_{it-1}$	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.00)	(0.00)
$\Delta pcGDP_{it-1}$	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.00)	(0.00)
$Contagion_{it}$	0.043	0.049
	(0.04)	(0.04)
$PastDem_{it}$	1.845***	2.020***
	(0.40)	(0.40)
$RegConflict_{it}$	-0.431**	-0.430**
	(0.18)	(0.17)
$IntViolence_{it-1}$	2.025***	1.992***
	(0.53)	(0.51)
$MilReg_{it}$	-2.383***	-2.474***
	(0.80)	(0.82)
$Indep_{it}$	0.008*	0.009**
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Constant	-6.827***	-7.240***
	(0.56)	(0.64)
N	2646	2646
Log Likelihood	-181.012	-183.333
X^2	81.225	67.147
Prob>X^2	0.000	0.000
Pseudo-R^2	0.220	0.210
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Model 3: including non-regional organizations and IFIs		

Polity IV: AN=AUT		
	Model 1	***Model 3***
$IOScore_{it-1}$	0.089***	0.102***
	(0.03)	(0.04)
$\Delta IOScore_{it-1}$	0.093	-0.320
	(0.06)	(0.36)
$pcGDP_{it-1}$	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.00)	(0.00)
$\Delta pcGDP_{it-1}$	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.00)	(0.00)
$Contagion_{it}$	0.058*	0.068**
	(0.03)	(0.03)
$PastDem_{it}$	1.821***	1.937***
	(0.33)	(0.33)
$RegConflict_{it}$	-0.476***	-0.475***
	(0.17)	(0.17)
$IntViolence_{it-1}$	2.334***	2.260***
	(0.60)	(0.57)
$MilReg_{it}$	-1.591***	-1.611***
	(0.57)	(0.58)
$Indep_{it}$	0.004	0.005
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Constant	-7.075***	-7.541***
	(0.57)	(0.66)
N	2736	2737
Log Likelihood	-188.289	-190.298
X^2	108.376	105.408
Prob>X^2	0.000	0.000
Pseudo-R^2	0.208	0.199
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Model 3: including non-regional organizations and IFIs		

Polity IV: AN=DEM		
	Model 1	***Model 3***
$IOScore_{it-1}$	0.093***	0.133***
	(0.02)	(0.04)
$\Delta IOScore_{it-1}$	-0.093	-0.117
	(0.06)	(0.12)
$pcGDP_{it-1}$	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.00)	(0.00)
$\Delta pcGDP_{it-1}$	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.00)	(0.00)
$Contagion_{it}$	0.039	0.043
	(0.03)	(0.03)
$PastDem_{it}$	1.147**	1.175**
	(0.48)	(0.49)
$RegConflict_{it}$	-0.521***	-0.524***
	(0.19)	(0.18)
$IntViolence_{it-1}$	1.093***	1.108***
	(0.38)	(0.38)
$MilReg_{it}$	-0.090	-0.057
	(0.40)	(0.40)
$Indep_{it}$	0.000	0.001
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Constant	-5.084***	-6.011***
	(0.38)	(0.54)
N	2009	2009
Log Likelihood	-215.090	-215.367
X^2	63.576	58.590
Prob>X^2	0.000	0.000
Pseudo-R^2	0.095	0.094
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Model 3: including non-regional organizations and IFIs		

Polity IV: threshold 7		
	Model 1	***Model 3***
$IOScore_{it-1}$	0.123***	0.133**
	(0.04)	(0.06)
$\Delta IOScore_{it-1}$	0.109	-0.098
	(0.08)	(0.35)
$pcGDP_{it-1}$	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.00)	(0.00)
$\Delta pcGDP_{it-1}$	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.00)	(0.00)
$Contagion_{it}$	0.064*	0.074*
	(0.04)	(0.04)
$PastDem_{it}$	2.013***	2.087***
	(0.47)	(0.47)
$RegConflict_{it}$	-0.450**	-0.433**
	(0.19)	(0.18)
$IntViolence_{it-1}$	2.623***	2.536***
	(0.84)	(0.79)
$MilReg_{it}$	-1.465**	-1.524**
	(0.64)	(0.64)
$Indep_{it}$	0.004	0.005
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Constant	-8.359***	-8.813***
	(0.91)	(1.06)
N	2741	2742
Log Likelihood	-134.691	-138.712
X^2	90.251	88.664
Prob>X^2	0.000	0.000
Pseudo-R^2	0.246	0.224
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Model 3: including non-regional organizations and IFIs		

Polity IV: threshold 1		
	Model 1	***Model 3***
$IOScore_{it-1}$	0.098***	0.129***
	(0.03)	(0.04)
$\Delta IOScore_{it-1}$	0.013	-0.497**
	(0.06)	(0.19)
$pcGDP_{it-1}$	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.00)	(0.00)
$\Delta pcGDP_{it-1}$	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.00)	(0.00)
$Contagion_{it}$	0.035	0.042
	(0.04)	(0.04)
$PastDem_{it}$	1.533***	1.684***
	(0.42)	(0.43)
$RegConflict_{it}$	-0.374	-0.404*
	(0.24)	(0.23)
$IntViolence_{it-1}$	1.607***	1.580***
	(0.40)	(0.39)
$MilReg_{it}$	-1.486***	-1.505***
	(0.50)	(0.52)
$Indep_{it}$	0.004	0.005
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Constant	-5.725***	-6.529***
	(0.48)	(0.63)
N	2434	2435
Log Likelihood	-209.384	-207.978
X^2	64.059	65.049
Prob>X^2	0.000	0.000
Pseudo-R^2	0.154	0.160
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Model 3: including non-regional organizations and IFIs		

Polity IV: exrec & parcomp		
	Model 1	***Model 3***
$IOScore_{it-1}$	0.110***	0.114**
	(0.03)	(0.05)
$\Delta IOScore_{it-1}$	0.012	-0.055
	(0.07)	(0.11)
$pcGDP_{it-1}$	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.00)	(0.00)
$\Delta pcGDP_{it-1}$	-0.000	-0.001
	(0.00)	(0.00)
$Contagion_{it}$	0.009	0.015
	(0.04)	(0.04)
$PastDem_{it}$	1.991***	2.111***
	(0.52)	(0.52)
$RegConflict_{it}$	-0.418	-0.411*
	(0.26)	(0.24)
$IntViolence_{it-1}$	1.491***	1.471***
	(0.48)	(0.47)
$MilReg_{it}$	-1.673**	-1.758**
	(0.72)	(0.73)
$Indep_{it}$	0.008*	0.010**
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Constant	-6.618***	-7.093***
	(0.53)	(0.71)
N	2469	2470
Log Likelihood	-147.979	-150.824
X^2	79.549	60.819
Prob>X^2	0.000	0.000
Pseudo-R^2	0.195	0.179
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Model 3: including non-regional organizations and IFIs		

Polity IV: HYB; thresholds: 6 & -6		
	Model 1	***Model 3***
$IOScore_{it-1}$	0.062	0.050
	(0.08)	(0.12)
$\Delta IOScore_{it-1}$	-0.020	0.031
	(0.10)	(0.08)
$pcGDP_{it-1}$	0.000	0.000
	(0.00)	(0.00)
$\Delta pcGDP_{it-1}$	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.00)	(0.00)
$Contagion_{it}$	0.157**	0.165**
	(0.06)	(0.06)
$PastDem_{it}$	2.214*	2.312*
	(1.23)	(1.21)
$RegConflict_{it}$	-0.182	-0.185
	(0.25)	(0.24)
$IntViolence_{it-1}$	1.984*	2.014*
	(1.09)	(1.10)
$MilReg_{it}$	-1.165	-1.239
	(1.86)	(1.88)
$Indep_{it}$	-0.001	0.000
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	-9.145***	-9.311***
	(1.09)	(1.07)
N	2736	2737
Log Likelihood	-47.999	-48.333
X^2	65.358	40.925
Prob>X^2	0.000	0.000
Pseudo-R^2	0.206	0.200
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Model 3: including non-regional organizations and IFIs		

Polity IV: HYB; thresholds: 8 & 1		
	Model 1	***Model 3***
$IOScore_{it-1}$	0.078	0.059
	(0.06)	(0.09)
$\Delta IOScore_{it-1}$	0.082	0.012
	(0.10)	(0.13)
$pcGDP_{it-1}$	0.000	0.000
	(0.00)	(0.00)
$\Delta pcGDP_{it-1}$	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.00)	(0.00)
$Contagion_{it}$	0.058	0.067
	(0.07)	(0.07)
$PastDem_{it}$	2.544***	2.627***
	(0.90)	(0.88)
$RegConflict_{it}$	-0.227	-0.230
	(0.26)	(0.25)
$IntViolence_{it-1}$	2.079*	2.062*
	(1.23)	(1.18)
$MilReg_{it}$	-1.583	-1.699
	(1.18)	(1.19)
$Indep_{it}$	0.009	0.010
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	-9.031***	-9.062***
	(1.27)	(1.50)
N	2749	2750
Log Likelihood	-64.621	-65.689
X^2	39.236	30.032
Prob>X^2	0.000	0.001
Pseudo-R^2	0.217	0.205
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Model 3: including non-regional organizations and IFIs		

Przeworski et al. 2000		
	Model 1	***Model 3***
$IOScore_{it-1}$	0.074***	0.049
	(0.03)	(0.04)
$\Delta IOScore_{it-1}$	0.066	0.044
	(0.05)	(0.14)
$pcGDP_{it-1}$	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.00)	(0.00)
$\Delta pcGDP_{it-1}$	0.000	-0.000
	(0.00)	(0.00)
$Contagion_{it}$	0.030	0.031
	(0.04)	(0.04)
$PastDem_{it}$	1.436***	1.567***
	(0.44)	(0.43)
$RegConflict_{it}$	-0.278	-0.293*
	(0.17)	(0.17)
$IntViolence_{it-1}$	2.239***	2.223***
	(0.50)	(0.49)
$MilReg_{it}$	-2.184***	-2.261***
	(0.64)	(0.66)
$Indep_{it}$	0.009**	0.011**
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Constant	-6.387***	-6.416***
	(0.56)	(0.65)
N	2552	2553
Log Likelihood	-204.812	-208.697
X^2	85.377	63.183
Prob>X^2	0.000	0.000
Pseudo-R^2	0.193	0.178
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Model 3: including non-regional organizations and IFIs		

Reich 2002		
	Model 1	***Model 3***
$IOScore_{it-1}$	0.062**	0.101***
	(0.03)	(0.04)
$\Delta IOScore_{it-1}$	0.007	-0.184
	(0.04)	(0.20)
$pcGDP_{it-1}$	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.00)	(0.00)
$\Delta pcGDP_{it-1}$	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.00)	(0.00)
$Contagion_{it}$	0.032	0.037
	(0.03)	(0.03)
$PastDem_{it}$	1.136***	1.214***
	(0.33)	(0.33)
$RegConflict_{it}$	-0.452***	-0.461***
	(0.17)	(0.18)
$IntViolence_{it-1}$	1.456***	1.436***
	(0.38)	(0.37)
$MilReg_{it}$	-0.971**	-0.944**
	(0.44)	(0.45)
$Indep_{it}$	0.002	0.002
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Constant	-5.086***	-5.817***
	(0.49)	(0.62)
N	2309	2310
Log Likelihood	-239.775	-238.608
X^2	47.353	44.927
Prob>X^2	0.000	0.000
Pseudo-R^2	0.103	0.107
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Model 3: including non-regional organizations and IFIs		

Reich 2002: HYB		
	Model 1	***Model 3***
$IOScore_{it-1}$	0.027	0.030
	(0.04)	(0.04)
$\Delta IOScore_{it-1}$	0.065	-0.341
	(0.05)	(0.21)
$pcGDP_{it-1}$	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.00)	(0.00)
$\Delta pcGDP_{it-1}$	-0.001**	-0.001
	(0.00)	(0.00)
$Contagion_{it}$	0.067*	0.074*
	(0.04)	(0.04)
$PastDem_{it}$	2.534***	2.661***
	(0.55)	(0.51)
$RegConflict_{it}$	-0.679*	-0.696*
	(0.35)	(0.37)
$IntViolence_{it-1}$	1.225**	1.138*
	(0.59)	(0.60)
$MilReg_{it}$	-2.139***	-2.178***
	(0.72)	(0.71)
$Indep_{it}$	0.005	0.006
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Constant	-6.130***	-6.338***
	(0.69)	(0.77)
N	2533	2534
Log Likelihood	-109.570	-108.794
X^2	70.044	75.330
Prob>X^2	0.000	0.000
Pseudo-R^2	0.164	0.170
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Model 3: including non-regional organizations and IFIs		

Svolik 2012		
	Model 1	***Model 3***
$IOScore_{it-1}$	0.069**	0.070
	(0.03)	(0.05)
$\Delta IOScore_{it-1}$	0.038	0.027
	(0.08)	(0.17)
$pcGDP_{it-1}$	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.00)	(0.00)
$\Delta pcGDP_{it-1}$	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.00)	(0.00)
$Contagion_{it}$	0.037	0.040
	(0.04)	(0.04)
$PastDem_{it}$	1.770***	1.889***
	(0.48)	(0.46)
$RegConflict_{it}$	-0.374	-0.383
	(0.25)	(0.24)
$IntViolence_{it-1}$	1.558***	1.557***
	(0.45)	(0.45)
$MilReg_{it}$	-2.838***	-2.911***
	(0.89)	(0.90)
$Indep_{it}$	0.011**	0.012**
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	-6.166***	-6.465***
	(0.58)	(0.73)
N	2507	2508
Log Likelihood	-175.119	-176.859
X^2	84.646	66.137
Prob>X^2	0.000	0.000
Pseudo-R^2	0.195	0.187
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Model 3: including non-regional organizations and IFIs		

Ulfelder 2012		
	Model 1	***Model 3***
$IOScore_{it-1}$	0.050*	0.045
	(0.03)	(0.05)
$\Delta IOScore_{it-1}$	0.046	-0.269
	(0.05)	(0.26)
$pcGDP_{it-1}$	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.00)	(0.00)
$\Delta pcGDP_{it-1}$	-0.001	-0.000
	(0.00)	(0.00)
$Contagion_{it}$	0.028	0.032
	(0.04)	(0.04)
$PastDem_{it}$	1.646***	1.785***
	(0.40)	(0.38)
$RegConflict_{it}$	-0.241	-0.260
	(0.16)	(0.16)
$IntViolence_{it-1}$	1.559***	1.524***
	(0.40)	(0.40)
$MilReg_{it}$	-2.606***	-2.661***
	(0.81)	(0.85)
$Indep_{it}$	0.012**	0.013***
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Constant	-5.677***	-5.842***
	(0.51)	(0.65)
N	2436	2436
Log Likelihood	-199.846	-200.137
X^2	73.690	87.448
Prob>X^2	0.000	0.000
Pseudo-R^2	0.180	0.179
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Model 3: including non-regional organizations and IFIs		

Wahman et al. 2013		
	Model 1	***Model 3***
$IOScore_{it-1}$	0.049	0.042
	(0.04)	(0.05)
$\Delta IOScore_{it-1}$	0.058	-0.473
	(0.06)	(0.38)
$pcGDP_{it-1}$	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.00)	(0.00)
$\Delta pcGDP_{it-1}$	0.000	0.000
	(0.00)	(0.00)
$Contagion_{it}$	0.069*	0.083**
	(0.04)	(0.04)
$PastDem_{it}$	2.145***	2.251***
	(0.50)	(0.54)
$RegConflict_{it}$	-0.668**	-0.695**
	(0.34)	(0.34)
$IntViolence_{it-1}$	1.759***	1.673***
	(0.52)	(0.51)
$MilReg_{it}$	-3.729***	-3.791***
	(0.84)	(0.86)
$Indep_{it}$	0.010**	0.013***
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Constant	-5.757***	-5.911***
	(0.61)	(0.80)
N	1589	1589
Log Likelihood	-124.929	-123.762
X^2	71.663	61.878
Prob>X^2	0.000	0.000
Pseudo-R^2	0.257	0.264
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Model 3: including non-regional organizations and IFIs		

Appendix V: Robustness Checks: Donno 2013

Boix et al. 2013		
	Model 3	***Model 5***
Competitive Authoritarian Regime (CAR)	-0.3806	-1.2232*
	(0.4692)	(0.6816)
Opposition Coalition	-4.1178***	-4.6046***
	(0.3498)	(0.6374)
CAR * Opp. Coalition	4.7133***	6.7091***
	(0.7758)	(1.1145)
International Conditionality	-4.8555***	-10.0136***
	(0.5935)	(1.3695)
CAR * Conditionality	5.0154***	11.5480***
	(1.1086)	(1.6645)
Main Election	0.0000	0.0000
	(.)	(.)
Incumbent running	-1.0790***	-2.4780***
	(0.3988)	(0.8941)
# Previous elections	0.0438	-0.1498**
	(0.0412)	(0.0726)
GDP per capita (lagged 1 year)	-0.4149	-0.3513
	(0.2630)	(0.3488)
GDP growth (lagged 1 year)	-0.0182	0.1212*
	(0.0392)	(0.0672)
Central and Eastern Europe	0.0000	0.0000
	(.)	(.)
Americas	1.2513*	4.0677***
	(0.7472)	(1.2917)
Alternation, Previous Elec.		7.4721***
		(0.5948)
Misconduct Intensity		-3.1344***
		(0.9188)
Prior Liberalization		0.8238**
		(0.3839)
Regime Openness		-0.4232
		(0.4520)
Constant	1.7530	6.0051**
	(1.8799)	(2.9161)
N	92	92
Pseudo-R2	0.235	0.565
Log Likelihood	-22.546	-12.819
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.		

Cheibub et al. 2010		
	Model 3	***Model 5***
Competitive Authoritarian Regime (CAR)	0.1308	-0.2269
	(0.5031)	(0.6323)
Opposition Coalition	-3.8858***	-3.7273***
	(0.4105)	(0.7145)
CAR * Opp. Coalition	4.1618***	4.6038***
	(0.9640)	(0.8910)
International Conditionality	0.0000	0.0000
	(.)	(.)
CAR * Conditionality	0.0000	0.0000
	(.)	(.)
Main Election	0.0000	0.0000
	(.)	(.)
Incumbent running	-0.6908	-0.9230*
	(0.4279)	(0.5583)
# Previous elections	0.0687	-0.0080
	(0.0476)	(0.0820)
GDP per capita (lagged 1 year)	-0.3892	-0.4627
	(0.2578)	(0.4205)
GDP growth (lagged 1 year)	-0.0155	0.0778
	(0.0487)	(0.0558)
Central and Eastern Europe	0.0000	0.0000
	(.)	(.)
Americas	0.4058	1.3189*
	(0.6367)	(0.7792)
Alternation, Previous Elec.		0.0000
		(.)
Misconduct Intensity		-1.1863**
		(0.4753)
Prior Liberalization		1.1603**
		(0.5542)
Regime Openness		-0.0168
		(0.3356)
Constant	0.9856	2.4630
	(1.8294)	(2.3511)
N	79	78
Pseudo-R2	0.139	0.372
Log Likelihood	-20.360	-13.276
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.		

FH: free, FIW		
	Model 3	***Model 5***
Competitive Authoritarian Regime (CAR)	-0.5328	-31.3667
	(0.6369)	(.)
Opposition Coalition	0.0000	0.0000
	(.)	(.)
CAR * Opp. Coalition	0.0000	0.0000
	(.)	(.)
International Conditionality	-5.1090***	-12.2400
	(0.7091)	(.)
CAR * Conditionality	6.6558***	203.2266
	(1.0801)	(.)
Main Election	0.0000	0.0000
	(.)	(.)
Incumbent running	-1.5014***	-118.4691
	(0.4835)	(.)
# Previous elections	0.1725***	10.7278
	(0.0662)	(.)
GDP per capita (lagged 1 year)	-0.9531**	-91.6948
	(0.3946)	(.)
GDP growth (lagged 1 year)	0.0638	9.7749
	(0.0816)	(.)
Central and Eastern Europe	0.0000	0.0000
	(.)	(.)
Americas	1.7829**	263.1907
	(0.8223)	(.)
Alternation, Previous Elec.		0.0000
		(.)
Misconduct Intensity		-101.8379
		(.)
Prior Liberalization		21.3266
		(.)
Regime Openness		-53.7516
		(.)
Constant	3.3470	642.6951
	(2.2857)	(.)
N	77	75
Pseudo-R2	0.318	1.000
Log Likelihood	-10.731	0.000
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.		

FH: partly free, FIW		
	Model 3	***Model 5***
Competitive Authoritarian Regime (CAR)	-0.0424	0.0187
	(0.4540)	(0.4944)
Opposition Coalition	-3.8412***	-3.9728***
	(0.4780)	(0.4693)
CAR * Opp. Coalition	4.3555***	4.6558***
	(0.7397)	(0.7964)
International Conditionality	0.0000	0.0000
	(.)	(.)
CAR * Conditionality	0.0000	0.0000
	(.)	(.)
Main Election	0.2372	0.5636
	(0.4346)	(0.4892)
Incumbent running	-0.6128	-0.8257*
	(0.4335)	(0.4425)
# Previous elections	-0.0003	-0.0326
	(0.0453)	(0.0487)
GDP per capita (lagged 1 year)	-0.6586***	-0.6227**
	(0.2438)	(0.2596)
GDP growth (lagged 1 year)	0.0078	0.0206
	(0.0182)	(0.0196)
Central and Eastern Europe	0.0000	0.0000
	(.)	(.)
Americas	0.0000	0.0000
	(.)	(.)
Alternation, Previous Elec.		0.0000
		(.)
Misconduct Intensity		-0.3457
		(0.2313)
Prior Liberalization		0.0535
		(0.1160)
Regime Openness		-0.5613**
		(0.2519)
Constant	2.6856	4.5059**
	(1.6393)	(1.9602)
N	144	142
Pseudo-R2	0.181	0.261
Log Likelihood	-31.823	-28.590
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.		

FH: free, PR		
	Model 3	***Model 5***
Competitive Authoritarian Regime (CAR)	-0.2587	-16.8659
	(0.6444)	(.)
Opposition Coalition	0.0000	0.0000
	(.)	(.)
CAR * Opp. Coalition	0.0000	0.0000
	(.)	(.)
International Conditionality	-5.3405***	-73.2702
	(0.7861)	(.)
CAR * Conditionality	6.8312***	200.8569
	(1.1025)	(.)
Main Election	0.0000	0.0000
	(.)	(.)
Incumbent running	-1.8898***	-72.1978
	(0.6270)	(.)
# Previous elections	0.2188***	7.8973
	(0.0838)	(.)
GDP per capita (lagged 1 year)	-1.3584**	-63.6061
	(0.5297)	(.)
GDP growth (lagged 1 year)	0.0085	6.6888
	(0.0637)	(.)
Central and Eastern Europe	0.0000	0.0000
	(.)	(.)
Americas	1.8440**	173.3312
	(0.9039)	(.)
Alternation, Previous Elec.		71.6246
		(.)
Misconduct Intensity		-65.9759
		(.)
Prior Liberalization		13.0388
		(.)
Regime Openness		-33.3844
		(.)
Constant	5.9028*	422.1852
	(3.0246)	(.)
N	77	77
Pseudo-R2	0.371	1.000
Log Likelihood	-11.638	0.000
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.		

FH: partly free, PR		
	Model 3	***Model 5***
Competitive Authoritarian Regime (CAR)	-0.2359	-0.2431
	(0.4073)	(0.4644)
Opposition Coalition	-4.1556***	-4.3760***
	(0.3566)	(0.4405)
CAR * Opp. Coalition	4.6137***	5.0183***
	(0.6456)	(0.7114)
International Conditionality	0.0000	0.0000
	(.)	(.)
CAR * Conditionality	0.0000	0.0000
	(.)	(.)
Main Election	0.4409	0.7044*
	(0.3718)	(0.4144)
Incumbent running	-0.8299**	-0.9498**
	(0.3833)	(0.3974)
# Previous elections	0.0051	-0.0412
	(0.0395)	(0.0432)
GDP per capita (lagged 1 year)	-0.4497**	-0.3815**
	(0.1905)	(0.1728)
GDP growth (lagged 1 year)	-0.0113	0.0026
	(0.0230)	(0.0259)
Central and Eastern Europe	0.0000	0.0000
	(.)	(.)
Americas	0.0000	0.0000
	(.)	(.)
Alternation, Previous Elec.		0.0000
		(.)
Misconduct Intensity		-0.5963**
		(0.2497)
Prior Liberalization		-0.0379
		(0.1484)
Regime Openness		-0.3913*
		(0.2101)
Constant	1.6757	3.1483**
	(1.3014)	(1.4786)
N	144	142
Pseudo-R2	0.137	0.249
Log Likelihood	-37.666	-32.631
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.		

FH: HYB, FIW	
Model 3	***Model 5***
gdpgrowth_lag1 > 6.7 predicts data perfectly	*gdpgrowth_lag1 > 6.7 predicts data perfectly*

FH: HYB, PR	
Model 3	***Model 5***
gdpgrowth_lag1 > 6.7 predicts data perfectly	*gdpgrowth_lag1 > 6.7 predicts data perfectly*

Gasiorowski 1996	
Model 3	***Model 5***
hm_incrun_fill <= 0 predicts data perfectly	*hm_incrun_fill <= 0 predicts data perfectly*

Gasiorowski 1996: HYB	
Model 3	***Model 5***
hm_incrun_fill > 0 predicts data perfectly	*hm_incrun_fill > 0 predicts data perfectly*

Gates et al. 2006		
	Model 3	***Model 5***
Competitive Authoritarian Regime (CAR)	-0.9414 (0.8088) 0.0000	*overdetermined*
Opposition Coalition	(.) 0.0000	
CAR * Opp. Coalition	(.) -4.6306***	
International Conditionality	(0.9303) 7.5594***	
CAR * Conditionality	(1.5910) 0.0000	
Main Election	(.) -0.9451	
Incumbent running	(0.7074) -0.1072	
# Previous elections	(0.1008) -1.5946***	
GDP per capita (lagged 1 year)	(0.4669) -0.1169*	
GDP growth (lagged 1 year)	(0.0682) 0.0000	
Central and Eastern Europe	(.) 3.2860***	
Americas	(1.0697)	
Alternation, Previous Elec.		
Misconduct Intensity		
Prior Liberalization		
Regime Openness		
Constant	9.7355*** (3.1050)	
N	47	
Pseudo-R2	0.495	
Log Likelihood	-9.059	
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.		

Geddes et al. 2014		
	Model 3	***Model 5***
Competitive Authoritarian Regime (CAR)	0.0826 (0.5866) -4.2539***	*convergence not achieved*
Opposition Coalition	(0.3782) 5.0252***	
CAR * Opp. Coalition	(0.7732) -5.0203***	
International Conditionality	(0.6932) 4.7606***	
CAR * Conditionality	(1.2528) 0.0000	
Main Election	(.) -1.2762***	
Incumbent running	(0.4009) 0.0636	
# Previous elections	(0.0397) -0.4507	
GDP per capita (lagged 1 year)	(0.3013) -0.0278	
GDP growth (lagged 1 year)	(0.0429) 0.0000	
Central and Eastern Europe	(.)	
Americas	1.5621** (0.7794)	
Constant	1.7752 (2.1500)	
N	91	
Pseudo-R2	0.351	
Log Likelihood	-21.770	
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.		

Magaloni et al. 2013		
	Model 3	***Model 5***
Competitive Authoritarian Regime (CAR)	-0.3325	-0.6307
	(0.4184)	(0.4425)
Opposition Coalition	-4.0928***	-3.6537***
	(0.4059)	(0.6722)
CAR * Opp. Coalition	5.0548***	5.4350***
	(0.7099)	(0.9616)
International Conditionality	-4.7637***	-6.1311***
	(0.5777)	(1.1299)
CAR * Conditionality	4.8935***	6.8362***
	(1.0729)	(1.4828)
Main Election	1.4452**	1.7811*
	(0.6591)	(1.0271)
Incumbent running	-0.7419*	-0.7227
	(0.4168)	(0.5504)
# Previous elections	0.0749**	0.0191
	(0.0309)	(0.0556)
GDP per capita (lagged 1 year)	-0.4698*	-0.3940*
	(0.2597)	(0.2382)
GDP growth (lagged 1 year)	-0.0346	0.0096
	(0.0316)	(0.0323)
Central and Eastern Europe	0.0000	0.0000
	(.)	(.)
Americas	1.7637***	2.7026***
	(0.6218)	(0.6951)
Alternation, Previous Elec.		2.6826***
		(0.7256)
Misconduct Intensity		-1.3154***
		(0.4336)
Prior Liberalization		0.2839
		(0.2587)
Regime Openness		-0.1322
		(0.2526)
Constant	0.1281	0.8686
	(1.8392)	(1.9328)
N	173	173
Pseudo-R2	0.342	0.528
Log Likelihood	-25.158	-18.047
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.		

Polity IV: AN=AUT		
	Model 3	***Model 5***
Competitive Authoritarian Regime (CAR)	-0.3756	-0.3961
	(0.4833)	(0.5252)
Opposition Coalition	-3.7593***	-2.4852***
	(0.4459)	(0.9409)
CAR * Opp. Coalition	5.3161***	4.6425***
	(0.8983)	(1.1400)
International Conditionality	0.0000	0.0000
	(.)	(.)
CAR * Conditionality	0.0000	0.0000
	(.)	(.)
Main Election	1.1666	1.5350
	(0.7782)	(1.0904)
Incumbent running	-0.2017	-0.3461
	(0.6172)	(0.6738)
# Previous elections	0.1060**	0.0969*
	(0.0452)	(0.0573)
GDP per capita (lagged 1 year)	-0.7925**	-0.9762***
	(0.3193)	(0.3572)
GDP growth (lagged 1 year)	-0.0583	-0.0486
	(0.0370)	(0.0400)
Central and Eastern Europe	0.0000	0.0000
	(.)	(.)
Americas	2.4424***	3.2891***
	(0.7024)	(0.9616)
Alternation, Previous Elec.		0.0000
		(.)
Misconduct Intensity		-0.9583**
		(0.3926)
Prior Liberalization		0.2138
		(0.2488)
Regime Openness		-0.1046
		(0.2795)
Constant	1.7466	3.6119
	(1.9716)	(2.2031)
N	154	152
Pseudo-R2	0.394	0.495
Log Likelihood	-20.780	-17.248
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.		

Polity IV: AN=DEM		
	Model 3	***Model 5***
Competitive Authoritarian Regime (CAR)	-0.6659**	-1.0775***
	(0.3220)	(0.4013)
Opposition Coalition	0.5090	1.3156*
	(0.6860)	(0.7980)
CAR * Opp. Coalition	-0.1428	-0.3166
	(0.9539)	(1.0431)
International Conditionality	0.2849	-1.5283**
	(0.4960)	(0.7263)
CAR * Conditionality	0.3558	2.1147**
	(0.7042)	(1.0659)
Main Election	0.0498	-0.1819
	(0.3672)	(0.4627)
Incumbent running	0.0146	0.6496*
	(0.3571)	(0.3697)
# Previous elections	0.0335	0.0291
	(0.0372)	(0.0512)
GDP per capita (lagged 1 year)	-0.4948***	-0.5460**
	(0.1859)	(0.2494)
GDP growth (lagged 1 year)	0.0168	0.0644**
	(0.0226)	(0.0300)
Central and Eastern Europe	0.0000	0.0000
	(.)	(.)
Americas	1.0191	1.8600**
	(0.6397)	(0.9443)
Alternation, Previous Elec.		2.3504***
		(0.6850)
Misconduct Intensity		-0.0967
		(0.2344)
Prior Liberalization		-0.5855***
		(0.1601)
Regime Openness		-0.7089**
		(0.3211)
Constant	1.4052	3.1517
	(1.2110)	(2.2275)
N	173	173
Pseudo-R2	0.129	0.400
Log Likelihood	-33.288	-22.931
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.		

Polity IV: threshold 7	
Model 3	***Model 5***
overdetermined	*overdetermined*

Polity IV: threshold 1		
	Model 3	***Model 5***
Competitive Authoritarian Regime	-0.1833	-0.0989
(CAR)	(0.3479)	(0.3303)
	-4.6030***	-4.2777***
Opposition Coalition	(0.6204)	(0.4918)
	tm	5.6920***
CAR * Opp. Coalition	(0.7422)	(0.6348)
	1.1722**	1.3763
International Conditionality	(0.5926)	(0.8551)
	-0.9772	-0.8809
CAR * Conditionality	(0.8380)	(1.0948)
	1.1363***	1.3906***
Main Election	(0.3937)	(0.3692)
	-0.3023	-0.3125
Incumbent running	(0.3460)	(0.3824)
	0.0138	-0.0292
# Previous elections	(0.0355)	(0.0408)
	-0.2431	-0.1422
GDP per capita (lagged 1 year)	(0.1608)	(0.1647)
	0.0088	0.0180
GDP growth (lagged 1 year)	(0.0321)	(0.0315)
	0.0000	0.0000
Central and Eastern Europe	(.)	(.)
	1.0680**	1.4813***
Americas	(0.4721)	(0.5472)
		0.2495
Alternation, Previous Elec.		(0.8990)
		-0.6512***
Misconduct Intensity		(0.2014)
		0.0790
Prior Liberalization		(0.1413)
		-0.3613
Regime Openness		(0.2529)
Constant	-0.6365	0.4611
	(1.1107)	(1.3944)
N	173	173
Pseudo-R2	0.260	0.337
Log Likelihood	-42.768	-38.286
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.		

Polity IV: exrec & parcomp		
	Model 3	***Model 5***
Competitive Authoritarian Regime	-0.4707	-0.3676
(CAR)	(0.3542)	(0.3577)
	-4.1179***	-4.8795***
Opposition Coalition	(0.3794)	(0.4934)
	5.2090***	6.1896***
CAR * Opp. Coalition	(0.5897)	(0.7412)
	-4.6774***	-4.8516***
International Conditionality	(0.4987)	(0.4895)
	4.7569***	5.1871***
CAR * Conditionality	(0.8914)	(1.0729)
	1.1386***	1.5887***
Main Election	(0.4152)	(0.3985)
	-0.7959**	-1.0300**
Incumbent running	(0.3727)	(0.4269)
	-0.0229	-0.0706*
# Previous elections	(0.0402)	(0.0400)
	-0.3085*	-0.2063
GDP per capita (lagged 1 year)	(0.1776)	(0.1761)
	-0.0064	-0.0033
GDP growth (lagged 1 year)	(0.0257)	(0.0252)
	0.0000	0.0000
Central and Eastern Europe	(.)	(.)
	1.5457***	2.0771***
Americas	(0.5179)	(0.6254)
		0.0000
Alternation, Previous Elec.		(.)
		-0.6057**
Misconduct Intensity		(0.2418)
		0.0110
Prior Liberalization		(0.1312)
		-0.4856*
Regime Openness		(0.2618)
Constant	0.3311	1.7548
	(1.1729)	(1.5803)
N	168	165
Pseudo-R2	0.281	0.371
Log Likelihood	-32.907	-28.641
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.		

Polity IV: HYB; thresholds: 6 & -6	
Model 3	***Model 5***
gdpgrowth_lag1 > 6.7 predicts data perfectly	*gdpgrowth_lag1 > 6.7 predicts data perfectly*

Polity IV: HYB; thresholds: 8 & 1	
Model 3	***Model 5***
hm_incrun_fill > 0 predicts data perfectly	*hm_incrun_fill > 0 predicts data perfectly*

Przeworski et al. 2000		
	Model 3	***Model 5***
Competitive Authoritarian Regime (CAR)	-0.3919 (0.4759)	*convergence not achieved*
Opposition Coalition	-4.1547*** (0.3827)	
CAR * Opp. Coalition	4.5298*** (0.9083)	
International Conditionality	0.8757 (1.2394)	
CAR * Conditionality	0.0218 (1.4795)	
Main Election	0.0000 (.)	
Incumbent running	-0.7156* (0.4283)	
# Previous elections	0.1091** (0.0444)	
GDP per capita (lagged 1 year)	-0.5540* (0.2830)	
GDP growth (lagged 1 year)	-0.0156 (0.0446)	
Central and Eastern Europe	0.0000 (.)	
Americas	1.1935 (0.7486)	
Constant	2.0889 (1.9708)	
N	66	
Pseudo-R2	0.221	
Log Likelihood	-20.486	
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.		

Reich 2002		
	Model 3	***Model 5***
Competitive Authoritarian Regime (CAR)	-0.3792	-0.3047
	(0.4845)	(0.5460)
Opposition Coalition	-4.2329***	-3.6964***
	(0.5704)	(0.7781)
CAR * Opp. Coalition	4.3979***	3.9795***
	(0.9271)	(1.0140)
International Conditionality	-4.9293***	1.6078
	(0.6888)	(0.9992)
CAR * Conditionality	6.2633***	0.0000
	(1.2283)	(.)
Main Election	1.0218*	1.6159**
	(0.5459)	(0.7962)
Incumbent running	-0.0713	0.0010
	(0.6348)	(0.5603)
# Previous elections	0.0406	0.0175
	(0.0626)	(0.0651)
GDP per capita (lagged 1 year)	-0.7431**	-0.7546*
	(0.3703)	(0.4544)
GDP growth (lagged 1 year)	-0.0255	-0.0358
	(0.0316)	(0.0296)
Central and Eastern Europe	0.0000	0.0000
	(.)	(.)
Americas	2.0665**	2.6546***
	(0.8617)	(0.9480)
Alternation, Previous Elec.		0.0000
		(.)
Misconduct Intensity		-0.7699
		(0.4905)
Prior Liberalization		0.0211
		(0.2469)
Regime Openness		-0.3381
		(0.3053)
Constant	2.4620	3.8715
	(2.3452)	(2.5028)
N	74	71
Pseudo-R2	0.284	0.374
Log Likelihood	-18.138	-15.643
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.		

Reich 2002: HYB	
Model 3	***Model 5***
convergence not achieved	*convergence not achieved*

Svolik 2012		
	Model 3	***Model 5***
Competitive Authoritarian Regime (CAR)	0.0072	-0.0884
	(0.4830)	(0.6107)
Opposition Coalition	-3.9916***	-4.5643***
	(0.4157)	(0.5320)
CAR * Opp. Coalition	3.8106***	5.1688***
	(0.7655)	(0.9728)
International Conditionality	-5.1135***	-9.6924***
	(0.6064)	(1.3058)
CAR * Conditionality	5.3903***	10.6809***
	(1.0303)	(1.5577)
Main Election	0.0000	0.0000
	(.)	(.)
Incumbent running	-1.4072***	-1.9563***
	(0.4108)	(0.6597)
# Previous elections	0.0195	-0.1200*
	(0.0413)	(0.0675)
GDP per capita (lagged 1 year)	-0.6795**	-0.5775*
	(0.3307)	(0.3476)
GDP growth (lagged 1 year)	-0.0312	0.0205
	(0.0361)	(0.0393)
Central and Eastern Europe	0.0000	0.0000
	(.)	(.)
Americas	2.4353***	3.8184***
	(0.7465)	(1.0283)
Alternation, Previous Elec.		5.8354***
		(0.5918)
Misconduct Intensity		-1.6414***
		(0.5640)
Prior Liberalization		0.5385*
		(0.3011)
Regime Openness		-0.3907
		(0.2660)
Constant	3.6620*	6.4152**
	(2.2029)	(2.5311)
N	91	91
Pseudo-R2	0.356	0.551
Log Likelihood	-22.849	-15.934
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.		

Ulfelder 2012		
	Model 3	***Model 5***
Competitive Authoritarian Regime (CAR)	-0.0691	-0.1284
	(0.3687)	(0.3502)
Opposition Coalition	-4.6724***	-4.6314***
	(0.3692)	(0.4876)
CAR * Opp. Coalition	4.7194***	4.9534***
	(0.7502)	(0.7699)
International Conditionality	-5.3721***	-6.7157***
	(0.4812)	(1.0108)
CAR * Conditionality	5.3474***	6.8603***
	(0.8697)	(1.2130)
Main Election	1.9384***	2.1973**
	(0.6290)	(0.8660)
Incumbent running	-1.2494***	-1.1915**
	(0.4049)	(0.4654)
# Previous elections	-0.0002	-0.0399
	(0.0272)	(0.0324)
GDP per capita (lagged 1 year)	-0.4435**	-0.3824**
	(0.2026)	(0.1762)
GDP growth (lagged 1 year)	0.0152	0.0510
	(0.0354)	(0.0392)
Central and Eastern Europe	0.0000	0.0000
	(.)	(.)
Americas	1.8763***	2.0342***
	(0.5092)	(0.5847)
Alternation, Previous Elec.		1.9139***
		(0.6620)
Misconduct Intensity		-0.7169**
		(0.3131)
Prior Liberalization		0.0643
		(0.1567)
Regime Openness		0.1039
		(0.2403)
Constant	0.3989	0.1559
	(1.4169)	(1.7168)
N	173	173
Pseudo-R2	0.365	0.448
Log Likelihood	-32.415	-28.167
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.		

Wahman et al. 2013		
	Model 3	***Model 5***
Competitive Authoritarian Regime (CAR)	0.0856	0.0081
	(0.4985)	(0.6806)
Opposition Coalition	-3.5641***	-2.8459***
	(0.3593)	(0.7823)
CAR * Opp. Coalition	4.0089***	3.5964***
	(0.8048)	(1.1469)
International Conditionality	-3.7319***	-3.5255***
	(0.6143)	(0.6236)
CAR * Conditionality	4.0905***	4.9939***
	(1.0243)	(1.1552)
Main Election	0.0000	0.0000
	(.)	(.)
Incumbent running	0.0280	0.0361
	(0.4826)	(0.5974)
# Previous elections	0.0550**	-0.0324
	(0.0273)	(0.0539)
GDP per capita (lagged 1 year)	-0.4058	-0.5021
	(0.2750)	(0.3245)
GDP growth (lagged 1 year)	-0.0315	-0.0014
	(0.0388)	(0.0567)
Central and Eastern Europe	0.0000	0.0000
	(.)	(.)
Americas	2.2690***	3.5085***
	(0.6077)	(0.6914)
Alternation, Previous Elec.		0.0000
		(.)
Misconduct Intensity		-1.2308**
		(0.5270)
Prior Liberalization		0.5246
		(0.3220)
Regime Openness		0.0070
		(0.2297)
Constant	0.5328	2.3752
	(1.8768)	(2.3105)
N	92	90
Pseudo-R2	0.280	0.432
Log Likelihood	-21.220	-16.617
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.		

Appendix VI: Robustness Checks: Andersen et al. 2014

Bernhard et al. 2001		
	Model 3	***Model 6***
Bureaucratic quality	-1.7793*	-1.9088
	(1.0605)	(1.2839)
Growth in GDP/cap.	9.6982**	9.7522*
	(4.7661)	(5.1197)
Oil value/cap. (log	0.0540	0.1011
	(0.0442)	(0.0837)
Armed conflict	1.7265*	1.6740
	(1.0268)	(1.1392)
International war	0.0000	0.0000
	(.)	(.)
Mixed (versus parliamentary) regime	0.5665	0.4377
	(0.8785)	(0.9959)
Presidential (versus parliamentary) regime	-0.4219	-0.2654
	(0.8469)	(0.9736)
time	-16.2544	-20.6232
	(16.1565)	(18.3082)
time2	0.3567	0.4452
	(0.3253)	(0.3721)
time3	-0.0025	-0.0031
	(0.0022)	(0.0025)
spellcount	0.0234	0.0398
	(0.0215)	(0.0349)
GDP/cap. (log)		-0.8596
		(0.9255)
Constant	238.1597	315.4434
	(266.3380)	(300.8187)
N	1080	1080
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.		

Boix et al. 2013		
	Model 3	***Model 6***
Bureaucratic quality	-0.4558***	-0.3234*
	(0.1707)	(0.1892)
Growth in GDP/cap.	-0.6132	-0.5237
	(2.6824)	(2.7486)
Oil value/cap. (log	0.0315	0.0451*
	(0.0199)	(0.0241)
Armed conflict	0.2671	0.1835
	(0.3154)	(0.3237)
International war	0.2323	-0.0738
	(0.5225)	(0.5554)
Mixed (versus parliamentary) regime	-0.7971*	-0.8158*
	(0.4614)	(0.4822)
Presidential (versus parliamentary) regime	-0.6608*	-0.6215*
	(0.3384)	(0.3410)
time	6.7968	6.6381
	(6.1111)	(6.0521)
time2	-0.1307	-0.1287
	(0.1176)	(0.1168)
time3	0.0008	0.0008
	(0.0007)	(0.0007)
spellcount	-0.0086	-0.0048
	(0.0096)	(0.0098)
GDP/cap. (log)		-0.3206
		(0.2024)
Constant	-118.3003	-112.2736
	(105.1184)	(103.8744)
N	1296	1296
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.		

Cheibub et al. 2010		
	Model 3	***Model 6***
Bureaucratic quality	-0.1922	0.0259
	(0.1727)	(0.2082)
Growth in GDP/cap.	-4.8721**	-4.7466**
	(2.1115)	(2.1598)
Oil value/cap. (log	0.0104	0.0300
	(0.0176)	(0.0224)
Armed conflict	0.5300*	0.4738
	(0.3046)	(0.3144)
International war	0.3821	0.0085
	(0.5463)	(0.5826)
Mixed (versus parliamentary) regime	-0.3561	-0.3688
	(0.3764)	(0.3955)
Presidential (versus parliamentary) regime	-0.7106**	-0.6910*
	(0.3543)	(0.3635)
time	1.7206	1.7499
	(5.1821)	(5.2136)
time2	-0.0314	-0.0334
	(0.0993)	(0.1002)
time3	0.0002	0.0002
	(0.0006)	(0.0006)
spellcount	-0.0298	-0.0253
	(0.0183)	(0.0171)
GDP/cap. (log)		-0.4356**
		(0.2151)
Constant	-32.8555	-28.8868
	(89.5133)	(89.7624)
N	1396	1396
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.		

FH: free, FIW		
	Model 3	***Model 6***
Bureaucratic quality	-0.3030**	-0.0611
	(0.1230)	(0.1466)
Growth in GDP/cap.	-2.5050	-2.2057
	(2.1024)	(2.1742)
Oil value/cap. (log	0.0306**	0.0436***
	(0.0130)	(0.0158)
Armed conflict	0.6350**	0.2820
	(0.2901)	(0.3238)
International war	0.3516	-0.0971
	(0.4726)	(0.5126)
Mixed (versus parliamentary) regime	-0.2742	-0.4547
	(0.3896)	(0.4409)
Presidential (versus parliamentary) regime	0.3506	0.2033
	(0.2852)	(0.3131)
time	11.0822***	12.6299***
	(3.8111)	(4.0910)
time2	-0.2035***	-0.2343***
	(0.0709)	(0.0761)
time3	0.0012***	0.0014***
	(0.0004)	(0.0005)
spellcount	-0.0117*	-0.0057
	(0.0063)	(0.0064)
GDP/cap. (log)		-0.5735***
		(0.1658)
Constant	-200.2292***	-221.3576***
	(67.8404)	(72.5656)
N	1173	1173
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.		

FH: partly free, FIW		
	Model 3	***Model 6***
Bureaucratic quality	-0.4575*	-0.4246
	(0.2635)	(0.3035)
Growth in GDP/cap.	-4.1742	-4.1150
	(2.6366)	(2.6568)
Oil value/cap. (log	-0.0044	-0.0014
	(0.0236)	(0.0274)
Armed conflict	0.5189	0.5099
	(0.4054)	(0.4068)
International war	0.8295	0.7664
	(0.6444)	(0.7040)
Mixed (versus parliamentary) regime	-0.3401	-0.3418
	(0.4840)	(0.4834)
Presidential (versus parliamentary) regime	-1.1872*	-1.1753*
	(0.6223)	(0.6248)
time	-0.8635	-0.8466
	(6.4613)	(6.4116)
time2	0.0214	0.0208
	(0.1224)	(0.1216)
time3	-0.0002	-0.0002
	(0.0008)	(0.0008)
spellcount	-0.0309	-0.0291
	(0.0340)	(0.0330)
GDP/cap. (log)		-0.0660
		(0.2999)
Constant	9.0718	9.5586
	(112.8492)	(111.9404)
N	1583	1583
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.		

FH: free, PR		
	Model 3	***Model 6***
Bureaucratic quality	-0.3212***	-0.0659
	(0.1079)	(0.1301)
Growth in GDP/cap.	-0.2517	0.4781
	(1.9633)	(2.0489)
Oil value/cap. (log	0.0219**	0.0299**
	(0.0109)	(0.0130)
Armed conflict	0.5733**	0.2996
	(0.2442)	(0.2620)
International war	-0.1661	-0.7046
	(0.5213)	(0.5800)
Mixed (versus parliamentary) regime	-0.4648	-0.5617
	(0.3151)	(0.3522)
Presidential (versus parliamentary) regime	0.1898	0.1782
	(0.2215)	(0.2386)
time	5.8306*	5.8321*
	(3.1742)	(3.1764)
time2	-0.1020*	-0.1039*
	(0.0595)	(0.0597)
time3	0.0006	0.0006
	(0.0004)	(0.0004)
spellcount	-0.0118**	-0.0055
	(0.0056)	(0.0055)
GDP/cap. (log)		-0.5105***
		(0.1546)
Constant	-110.4410**	-104.8760*
	(56.0490)	(55.9456)
N	1199	1199
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.		

FH: partly free, PR		
	Model 3	***Model 6***
Bureaucratic quality	-0.2452	-0.0856
	(0.1691)	(0.2017)
Growth in GDP/cap.	-1.8984	-1.7723
	(2.1610)	(2.2250)
Oil value/cap. (log	-0.0082	0.0053
	(0.0171)	(0.0207)
Armed conflict	0.4272	0.3902
	(0.3159)	(0.3197)
International war	0.5404	0.2382
	(0.5586)	(0.5921)
Mixed (versus parliamentary) regime	-0.1042	-0.1017
	(0.3739)	(0.3873)
Presidential (versus parliamentary) regime	-0.7903**	-0.7388*
	(0.4020)	(0.4055)
time	3.3609	3.3457
	(4.2986)	(4.2593)
time2	-0.0629	-0.0636
	(0.0809)	(0.0803)
time3	0.0004	0.0004
	(0.0005)	(0.0005)
spellcount	-0.0326	-0.0251
	(0.0220)	(0.0190)
GDP/cap. (log)		-0.3207
		(0.2105)
Constant	-60.5010	-56.9141
	(75.5163)	(74.7169)
N	1583	1583
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.		

FH: HYB, FIW
not able to replicate (outcome does not vary)

FH: HYB, PR
not able to replicate (perfect predition)

Gasiorowski 1996		
not able to replicate (not convave)		

Gasiorowski 1996: HYB
not able to replicate (outcome does not vary)

Gates et al. 2006		
	Model 3	***Model 6***
Bureaucratic quality	-0.4788***	-0.3485*
	(0.1828)	(0.2109)
Growth in GDP/cap.	2.9046	3.0681
	(2.2614)	(2.2917)
Oil value/cap. (log	-0.0100	0.0003
	(0.0192)	(0.0209)
Armed conflict	0.3249	0.2503
	(0.3816)	(0.3827)
International war	0.3683	0.2236
	(0.5963)	(0.6147)
Mixed (versus parliamentary) regime	-0.3432	-0.2887
	(0.4479)	(0.4616)
Presidential (versus parliamentary) regime	-0.6578	-0.4803
	(0.4079)	(0.4259)
time	-5.4925	-3.3017
	(20.9792)	(20.8642)
time2	0.1243	0.0766
	(0.4317)	(0.4297)
time3	-0.0009	-0.0006
	(0.0030)	(0.0029)
spellcount	-0.0512	-0.0370
	(0.0415)	(0.0368)
GDP/cap. (log)		-0.3185
		(0.2343)
Constant	77.4029	46.6894
	(338.7462)	(336.4159)
N	797	797
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.		

Geddes et al. 2014		
	Model 3	***Model 6***
Bureaucratic quality	-0.4698***	-0.3256*
	(0.1698)	(0.1901)
Growth in GDP/cap.	1.6993	1.9660
	(1.9115)	(1.9533)
Oil value/cap. (log	-0.0021	0.0122
	(0.0147)	(0.0186)
Armed conflict	0.4168	0.3298
	(0.2910)	(0.3041)
International war	0.2729	-0.0174
	(0.5313)	(0.5627)
Mixed (versus parliamentary) regime	-0.1872	-0.1960
	(0.3574)	(0.3895)
Presidential (versus parliamentary) regime	-0.6601*	-0.5937
	(0.3467)	(0.3683)
time	5.3577	5.1373
	(4.7712)	(4.7239)
time2	-0.0987	-0.0957
	(0.0895)	(0.0888)
time3	0.0006	0.0006
	(0.0006)	(0.0006)
spellcount	-0.0064	-0.0003
	(0.0102)	(0.0109)
GDP/cap. (log)		-0.3732*
		(0.2090)
Constant	-97.2371	-89.5458
	(84.2229)	(83.1395)
N	1480	1480
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.		

Magaloni et al. 2013		
	Model 3	***Model 6***
Bureaucratic quality	-0.5174**	-0.4214*
	(0.2479)	(0.2527)
Growth in GDP/cap.	-5.1574*	-5.2234*
	(3.0511)	(3.1121)
Oil value/cap. (log	0.0030	0.0111
	(0.0176)	(0.0203)
Armed conflict	0.7717**	0.7144**
	(0.3284)	(0.3314)
International war	0.6925	0.4836
	(0.5740)	(0.6051)
Mixed (versus parliamentary) regime	-0.0789	-0.1738
	(0.4753)	(0.4970)
Presidential (versus parliamentary) regime	-0.1668	-0.1500
	(0.3922)	(0.3872)
time	2.7536	2.8092
	(5.3485)	(5.1412)
time2	-0.0487	-0.0506
	(0.0986)	(0.0950)
time3	0.0003	0.0003
	(0.0006)	(0.0006)
spellcount	-0.0004	0.0023
	(0.0097)	(0.0103)
GDP/cap. (log)		-0.2224
		(0.2129)
Constant	-53.7043	-52.1045
	(95.9465)	(91.9659)
N	1505	1505
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.		

Polity IV: AN=AUT		
	Model 3	***Model 6***
Bureaucratic quality	-0.3485**	-0.2283
	(0.1619)	(0.1749)
Growth in GDP/cap.	2.4018	2.8978
	(2.2957)	(2.3738)
Oil value/cap. (log	-0.0206	-0.0127
	(0.0142)	(0.0152)
Armed conflict	0.5898**	0.5155*
	(0.2903)	(0.2899)
International war	0.5758	0.3833
	(0.5704)	(0.5703)
Mixed (versus parliamentary) regime	-0.1177	-0.1717
	(0.4056)	(0.4134)
Presidential (versus parliamentary) regime	-0.0224	0.0085
	(0.3330)	(0.3321)
time	-1.5410	-1.5466
	(3.0851)	(3.0489)
time2	0.0289	0.0284
	(0.0588)	(0.0582)
time3	-0.0002	-0.0002
	(0.0004)	(0.0004)
spellcount	-0.0218	-0.0162
	(0.0142)	(0.0135)
GDP/cap. (log)		-0.2695*
		(0.1552)
Constant	25.1760	27.9510
	(53.3956)	(52.7161)
N	1465	1465
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.		

Polity IV: AN=DEM		
	Model 3	***Model 6***
Bureaucratic quality	-0.4590*	-0.2850
	(0.2635)	(0.3212)
Growth in GDP/cap.	-0.1499	0.2540
	(3.7332)	(4.0757)
Oil value/cap. (log	-0.0043	0.0201
	(0.0248)	(0.0337)
Armed conflict	0.2663	0.1282
	(0.4629)	(0.5036)
International war	0.7911	0.4213
	(0.6267)	(0.6625)
Mixed (versus parliamentary) regime	-0.2842	-0.2508
	(0.4759)	(0.5046)
Presidential (versus parliamentary) regime	0.0000	0.0000
	(.)	(.)
time	1.7686	1.3382
	(6.4699)	(6.3755)
time2	-0.0316	-0.0256
	(0.1221)	(0.1209)
time3	0.0002	0.0002
	(0.0008)	(0.0008)
spellcount	-0.0207	-0.0165
	(0.0273)	(0.0262)
GDP/cap. (log)		-0.5029
		(0.3551)
Constant	-33.6989	-20.4095
	(113.4273)	(111.5043)
N	957	957
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.		

Polity IV: threshold 7		
	Model 3	***Model 6***
Bureaucratic quality	-0.8829***	-0.8080***
	(0.2600)	(0.2720)
Growth in GDP/cap.	-6.1385**	-5.9780**
	(2.9086)	(3.0103)
Oil value/cap. (log	0.0265	0.0386*
	(0.0176)	(0.0221)
Armed conflict	0.0554	-0.0283
	(0.3629)	(0.3736)
International war	0.5836	0.2554
	(0.6153)	(0.6926)
Mixed (versus parliamentary) regime	-0.3344	-0.5088
	(0.4782)	(0.5274)
Presidential (versus parliamentary) regime	-0.5874	-0.6150
	(0.4275)	(0.4422)
time	2.9849	3.3680
	(5.0159)	(5.0561)
time2	-0.0495	-0.0570
	(0.0929)	(0.0937)
time3	0.0003	0.0003
	(0.0006)	(0.0006)
spellcount	-0.0004	0.0037
	(0.0106)	(0.0114)
GDP/cap. (log)		-0.3141
		(0.2686)
Constant	-59.6979	-63.7101
	(89.5593)	(90.1260)
N	1345	1345
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.		

Polity IV: threshold 1		
	Model 3	***Model 6***
Bureaucratic quality	-0.2999*	-0.0810
	(0.1579)	(0.1880)
Growth in GDP/cap.	-0.1729	-0.0037
	(2.1134)	(2.2112)
Oil value/cap. (log	-0.0074	0.0131
	(0.0159)	(0.0204)
Armed conflict	0.6294**	0.5872**
	(0.2848)	(0.2971)
International war	0.3062	-0.0806
	(0.5427)	(0.5685)
Mixed (versus parliamentary) regime	-0.2402	-0.2468
	(0.3393)	(0.3628)
Presidential (versus parliamentary) regime	-0.9965***	-0.9278**
	(0.3765)	(0.3832)
time	4.8885	4.8368
	(4.3884)	(4.2859)
time2	-0.0908	-0.0915
	(0.0819)	(0.0803)
time3	0.0006	0.0006
	(0.0005)	(0.0005)
spellcount	-0.0342*	-0.0260
	(0.0206)	(0.0169)
GDP/cap. (log)		-0.4737**
		(0.2027)
Constant	-88.0789	-82.1845
	(77.7538)	(75.6634)
N	1551	1551
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.		

Polity IV: exrec & parcomp		
	Model 3	***Model 6***
Bureaucratic quality	-0.3143**	-0.0893
	(0.1558)	(0.1867)
Growth in GDP/cap.	6.4026**	6.8778**
	(2.5510)	(2.7145)
Oil value/cap. (log	-0.0077	0.0146
	(0.0160)	(0.0211)
Armed conflict	0.5788*	0.5287*
	(0.3051)	(0.3197)
International war	0.4084	0.0209
	(0.5380)	(0.5630)
Mixed (versus parliamentary) regime	-0.0860	-0.0533
	(0.3432)	(0.3724)
Presidential (versus parliamentary) regime	-0.9950**	-0.8635**
	(0.3983)	(0.4075)
time	6.9568	5.8914
	(4.6382)	(4.4480)
time2	-0.1306	-0.1121
	(0.0866)	(0.0834)
time3	0.0008	0.0007
	(0.0005)	(0.0005)
spellcount	-0.0317	-0.0246
	(0.0201)	(0.0165)
GDP/cap. (log)		-0.4955**
		(0.2065)
Constant	-123.7668	-100.0024
	(82.1855)	(78.6234)
N	1533	1533
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.		

Polity IV: HYB; thresholds: 6 & -6
not able to replicate (not concave)

Polity IV: HYB; thresholds: 8 & 1		
	Model 3	***Model 6***
Bureaucratic quality	-0.8159	-0.6440
	(0.6685)	(0.6374)
Growth in GDP/cap.	-3.6909	-4.1667
	(7.3453)	(7.8874)
Oil value/cap. (log	0.0094	0.0260
	(0.0409)	(0.0522)
Armed conflict	1.2333	1.0970
	(0.7942)	(0.7810)
International war	0.0000	0.0000
	(.)	(.)
Mixed (versus parliamentary) regime	-0.4550	-0.7036
	(0.9536)	(1.0315)
Presidential (versus parliamentary) regime	-1.1424	-1.0922
	(1.0722)	(0.9339)
time	5.7132	5.1124
	(14.4152)	(12.9796)
time2	-0.0993	-0.0903
	(0.2660)	(0.2406)
time3	0.0006	0.0005
	(0.0016)	(0.0015)
spellcount	-0.0087	-0.0111
	(0.0341)	(0.0337)
GDP/cap. (log)		-0.3849
		(0.5216)
Constant	-109.3787	-93.8902
	(258.7611)	(232.1322)
N	1156	1156
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.		

Przeworski et al. 2000		
	Model 3	***Model 6***
Bureaucratic quality	-0.1952	0.0283
	(0.1915)	(0.2305)
Growth in GDP/cap.	-5.5789**	-5.7376**
	(2.5331)	(2.6903)
Oil value/cap. (log	0.0118	0.0359
	(0.0200)	(0.0270)
Armed conflict	0.1811	0.0997
	(0.3785)	(0.3906)
International war	0.4679	0.0915
	(0.5530)	(0.6096)
Mixed (versus parliamentary) regime	-0.3613	-0.2902
	(0.4610)	(0.4835)
Presidential (versus parliamentary) regime	-0.5129	-0.4429
	(0.4171)	(0.4441)
time	-1.3197	0.2349
	(12.2715)	(12.6325)
time2	0.0330	-0.0004
	(0.2516)	(0.2592)
time3	-0.0003	-0.0000
	(0.0017)	(0.0018)
spellcount	-0.0239	-0.0196
	(0.0192)	(0.0193)
GDP/cap. (log)		-0.5127*
		(0.2748)
Constant	14.9618	-4.9848
	(198.6181)	(204.1642)
N	953	953
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.		

Reich 2002		
	Model 3	***Model 6***
Bureaucratic quality	-0.2258	0.1172
	(0.2404)	(0.3197)
Growth in GDP/cap.	6.0307	6.3582
	(4.1149)	(4.4494)
Oil value/cap. (log	0.0087	0.0419
	(0.0257)	(0.0367)
Armed conflict	0.7401	0.7337
	(0.5521)	(0.6030)
International war	0.0000	0.0000
	(.)	(.)
Mixed (versus parliamentary) regime	0.4145	0.7194
	(0.6418)	(0.7519)
Presidential (versus parliamentary) regime	-0.6524	-0.3281
	(0.6021)	(0.6495)
time	79.2470	109.1262
	(61.7239)	(73.0617)
time2	-1.6482	-2.2796
	(1.2870)	(1.5229)
time3	0.0114	0.0158
	(0.0089)	(0.0106)
spellcount	-0.0394	-0.0329
	(0.0435)	(0.0368)
GDP/cap. (log)		-0.8318*
		(0.4642)
Constant	-1268.1653	-1731.3989
	(984.6730)	(1164.8090)
N	621	621
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.		

Reich 2002: HYB		
	Model 3	***Model 6***
Bureaucratic quality	-0.2842	0.1354
	(0.4542)	(0.6281)
Growth in GDP/cap.	-2.1272	-1.9118
	(7.0986)	(8.2481)
Oil value/cap. (log	-0.0026	0.1180
	(0.0428)	(0.1275)
Armed conflict	0.9778	0.7513
	(0.7919)	(0.8330)
International war	0.0000	0.0000
	(.)	(.)
Mixed (versus parliamentary) regime	0.6068	0.6675
	(0.7693)	(1.0132)
Presidential (versus parliamentary) regime	0.0000	0.0000
	(.)	(.)
time	49.5253	103.2930
	(178.6271)	(215.9438)
time2	-0.9802	-2.0991
	(3.6563)	(4.4264)
time3	0.0065	0.0142
	(0.0249)	(0.0302)
spellcount	-0.0093	0.0064
	(0.0424)	(0.0684)
GDP/cap. (log)		-1.6590
		(1.4478)
Constant	-834.5399	-1681.3797
	(2905.6308)	(3505.3085)
N	327	327
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.		

Svolik 2012		
	Model 3	***Model 6***
Bureaucratic quality	-0.3194	-0.1903
	(0.2323)	(0.2633)
Growth in GDP/cap.	-1.2695	-1.0144
	(3.0296)	(3.1294)
Oil value/cap. (log	0.0094	0.0273
	(0.0240)	(0.0325)
Armed conflict	0.3168	0.2632
	(0.4471)	(0.4613)
International war	0.5432	0.3199
	(0.6341)	(0.6815)
Mixed (versus parliamentary) regime	0.0085	0.0379
	(0.5381)	(0.5995)
Presidential (versus parliamentary) regime	-0.5055	-0.4389
	(0.5112)	(0.5524)
time	3.0406	3.2005
	(7.4849)	(7.6290)
time2	-0.0547	-0.0583
	(0.1440)	(0.1468)
time3	0.0003	0.0003
	(0.0009)	(0.0009)
spellcount	-0.0188	-0.0117
	(0.0187)	(0.0197)
GDP/cap. (log)		-0.3843
		(0.3227)
Constant	-57.4425	-57.0029
	(128.9828)	(131.4416)
N	1309	1309
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.		

Ulfelder 2012		
	Model 3	***Model 6***
Bureaucratic quality	-0.3338***	-0.0850
	(0.1105)	(0.1335)
Growth in GDP/cap.	2.1145	2.6429
	(1.6194)	(1.7043)
Oil value/cap. (log	-0.0077	0.0067
	(0.0103)	(0.0121)
Armed conflict	0.4281**	0.2806
	(0.2167)	(0.2261)
International war	0.2983	-0.1451
	(0.5004)	(0.5111)
Mixed (versus parliamentary) regime	0.0207	-0.0049
	(0.2724)	(0.2949)
Presidential (versus parliamentary) regime	-0.1853	-0.1085
	(0.2369)	(0.2500)
time	3.8823	4.4816
	(3.1487)	(3.1275)
time2	-0.0725	-0.0857
	(0.0585)	(0.0583)
time3	0.0005	0.0005
	(0.0004)	(0.0004)
spellcount	-0.0122	-0.0042
	(0.0080)	(0.0077)
GDP/cap. (log)		-0.4783***
		(0.1281)
Constant	-70.5121	-75.6263
	(56.0883)	(55.4517)
N	1425	1425
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.		

Wahman et al. 2013		
	Model 3	***Model 6***
Bureaucratic quality	-0.3212**	-0.0606
	(0.1285)	(0.1542)
Growth in GDP/cap.	-2.3730	-1.6732
	(2.1909)	(2.3879)
Oil value/cap. (log	-0.0017	0.0150
	(0.0123)	(0.0148)
Armed conflict	0.5159*	0.3658
	(0.2744)	(0.2991)
International war	0.6383	0.0110
	(0.4776)	(0.5425)
Mixed (versus parliamentary) regime	-0.4051	-0.5919
	(0.3415)	(0.3976)
Presidential (versus parliamentary) regime	-0.1739	-0.1675
	(0.2694)	(0.2926)
time	10.0368**	10.7524**
	(4.4271)	(4.5604)
time2	-0.1834**	-0.1984**
	(0.0814)	(0.0839)
time3	0.0011**	0.0012**
	(0.0005)	(0.0005)
spellcount	-0.0155*	-0.0074
	(0.0084)	(0.0086)
GDP/cap. (log)		-0.6006***
		(0.1883)
Constant	-182.6619**	-189.1906**
	(79.7948)	(81.8194)
N	1395	1395
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.		

Appendix VII: Robustness Checks: Houle 2009

	Bernhard et al. 2001	Boix et al. 2013	Cheibub et al. 2010
Capital share	1.8185	3.2668*	convergence
	(1.2569)	(1.7682)	not achieved
Log GDP pc	-2.9407***	-1.8399**	
	(0.7269)	(0.8685)	
Growth	0.0028	-0.0080	
	(0.0046)	(0.0189)	
Oil	-0.3467	-1.5851	
	(0.6011)	(0.9896)	
Muslim	0.0018	0.0079	
	(0.0066)	(0.0082)	
Catholic	0.0125	0.0210**	
	(0.0077)	(0.0087)	
Protestant	-0.0053	0.0155	
	(0.0170)	(0.0169)	
Ethnic fractionalization	0.0067	-0.0176	
	(0.0077)	(0.0125)	
Religious fractionalization	-0.0194*	-0.0270**	
	(0.0105)	(0.0112)	
British colony	0.1462	-1.5224***	
	(0.3792)	(0.5616)	
New country	-0.6351	-0.1482	
	(0.5924)	(0.4945)	
Past transitions	0.4270***	1.2705***	
	(0.1521)	(0.2397)	
% democracies in the world	-0.2056	-3.4395	
	(3.4327)	(4.2568)	
Presidentialism	-1.2566***	0.0000	
	(0.3802)	(.)	
Latin America	-0.1704	0.1691	
	(0.6940)	(0.6687)	
Eastern Europe	-0.8570	-0.1152	
	(0.9623)	(0.8228)	
Western Europe	0.0000	-1.8853*	
	(.)	(0.9935)	
Africa	0.3048	0.4924	
	(0.4291)	(0.4963)	
Middle East	0.8717	0.0280	
	(0.9011)	(0.8453)	
Decade: 60ies	-0.1606	0.5035	
	(0.7851)	(1.0785)	
Decade: 70ies	0.3329	0.1727	
	(0.9587)	(1.2413)	
Decade: 80ies	-0.1133	0.1537	
	(0.7523)	(0.9120)	
Constant	7.8642**	6.0484	
	(3.2862)	(4.1392)	
N	856	1215	
Pseudo-R2	0.331	0.632	
Log Likelihood	-82.489	-51.701	
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.			

	Freedom House (FIW: free)	Freedom House (FIW: partly free)	Freedom House (PR: free)	Freedom House (PR: partly free)	Freedom House (FIW: hybrid)	Freedom House (PR: hybrid)
Capital share	3.4348***	1.6267*	3.3438***	1.2776	outcome	outcome
	(1.1849)	(0.8422)	(1.0799)	(0.7794)	does not vary	does not vary
Log GDP pc	-2.1449***	-0.7358**	-1.8226***	-0.8368***		
	(0.5272)	(0.3346)	(0.4890)	(0.3086)		
Growth	-0.0502***	-0.0224*	-0.0669***	-0.0085		
	(0.0195)	(0.0124)	(0.0195)	(0.0140)		
Oil	0.1040	0.0974	-0.1915	0.7441**		
	(0.4122)	(0.3154)	(0.4073)	(0.3026)		
Muslim	-0.0037	0.0058	0.0037	0.0000		
	(0.0065)	(0.0044)	(0.0059)	(0.0038)		
Catholic	0.0089	0.0098	0.0118	0.0008		
	(0.0081)	(0.0062)	(0.0079)	(0.0056)		
Protestant	0.0052	0.0103	-0.0025	0.0066		
	(0.0097)	(0.0073)	(0.0101)	(0.0061)		
Ethnic fractionalization	-0.0001	-0.0066	0.0054	0.0012		
	(0.0074)	(0.0048)	(0.0067)	(0.0044)		
Religious fractionalization	0.0063	-0.0066	-0.0104	-0.0009		
	(0.0105)	(0.0068)	(0.0107)	(0.0064)		
British colony	-0.4971	-0.3784*	0.2768	-0.3320*		
	(0.4672)	(0.2101)	(0.4510)	(0.1961)		
New country	0.3931	-0.1166	-0.9270*	0.1140		
	(0.4784)	(0.2544)	(0.5344)	(0.2557)		
Past transitions	0.2237*	0.1370	0.1517	0.2496**		
	(0.1359)	(0.1032)	(0.1116)	(0.0973)		
% democracies in the world	0.6972	0.9005	1.6032	1.8264		
	(2.8480)	(2.3572)	(2.5673)	(2.2507)		
Presidentialism	-1.0899**	-0.9259***	-0.8771**	-1.6234***		
	(0.4320)	(0.3165)	(0.3849)	(0.3932)		
Latin America	-0.5108	-0.3441	-1.0206*	0.2944		
	(0.4983)	(0.4727)	(0.5290)	(0.4071)		
Eastern Europe	-0.7028	-0.1438	-1.8764**	0.0000		
	(0.6614)	(0.5365)	(0.7570)	(.)		
Western Europe	-1.0737	0.0000	-1.8466**	0.0000		
	(0.7987)	(.)	(0.8056)	(.)		
Africa	-0.3245	0.1741	-0.4442	0.3895		
	(0.4258)	(0.3101)	(0.4036)	(0.2513)		
Middle East	0.2650	0.9938***	-0.2203	0.7904**		
	(0.8745)	(0.3662)	(0.7508)	(0.3329)		
Decade: 60ies	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000		
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)		
Decade: 70ies	0.3004	0.2845	0.2117	0.6724		
	(0.7892)	(0.6577)	(0.7206)	(0.6355)		
Decade: 80ies	-0.3661	0.2387	-0.2128	0.6927		
	(0.5959)	(0.4873)	(0.5271)	(0.4669)		
Constant	3.3319	-0.5967	3.3167	-1.2550		
	(3.0270)	(2.0026)	(2.8436)	(1.8775)		
N	1053	1399	1076	1162		
Pseudo-R2	0.385	0.164	0.367	0.181		
Log Likelihood	-96.434	-151.823	-116.322	-173.928		
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.						

	Gasiorowski 1996	Gasiorowski 1996 (hybrid)	Gates 2006	Geddes et al. 2014	Magaloni et al. 2013
Capital share	-2.4295	outcome	2.5702**	3.7883***	2.2646
	(1.6703)	does not vary	(1.2655)	(1.4261)	(2.2411)
Log GDP pc	-2.5460***		-2.7784***	-3.3556***	-2.5689**
	(0.6820)		(0.6330)	(0.8923)	(1.0390)
Growth	-0.0193		-0.0150	0.0042	-0.0470
	(0.0229)		(0.0127)	(0.0038)	(0.0300)
Oil	1.0701**		-1.0099	-0.0078	-1.8087*
	(0.5021)		(0.6687)	(0.7331)	(1.0982)
Muslim	-0.0030		0.0068	-0.0177**	0.0130
	(0.0064)		(0.0050)	(0.0073)	(0.0096)
Catholic	0.0045		0.0158**	-0.0110	0.0291***
	(0.0079)		(0.0073)	(0.0067)	(0.0110)
Protestant	0.0084		0.0043	0.0033	-0.0092
	(0.0155)		(0.0092)	(0.0097)	(0.0219)
Ethnic fractionalization	0.0127		-0.0028	0.0148	-0.0111
	(0.0084)		(0.0070)	(0.0111)	(0.0170)
Religious fractionalization	-0.0070		-0.0263***	0.0103	-0.0502**
	(0.0104)		(0.0102)	(0.0126)	(0.0246)
British colony	-0.5735		-0.1487	-0.4204	-1.3843*
	(0.3872)		(0.3807)	(0.4714)	(0.8349)
New country	-1.4560**		-1.3046**	0.3016	-1.2781
	(0.6786)		(0.5825)	(0.5063)	(1.3374)
Past transitions	0.6647***		0.4750***	0.7652***	0.6428***
	(0.2224)		(0.1321)	(0.1922)	(0.2060)
% democracies in the world	-3.5385		0.0645	-2.6208	9.0762
	(4.2470)		(3.2647)	(4.0010)	(5.6153)
Presidentialism	0.0000		-1.6761***	-2.4442***	-3.8918***
	(.)		(0.3830)	(0.5493)	(0.8811)
Latin America	-0.7063		-0.6398	1.6748**	-1.4477
	(0.6850)		(0.5952)	(0.7155)	(0.9231)
Eastern Europe	0.0000		-1.3876	1.6190*	0.0000
	(.)		(1.0050)	(0.8654)	(.)
Western Europe	0.0000		-0.8282	0.9394	0.0000
	(.)		(0.7820)	(0.8838)	(.)
Africa	0.2625		0.2050	1.3758***	-0.3603
	(0.4264)		(0.3224)	(0.4858)	(0.5173)
Middle East	0.1223		0.1945	1.8614***	-0.9202
	(0.7367)		(0.6194)	(0.7134)	(1.1456)
Decade: 60ies	-0.3129		0.2897	0.0053	3.7227**
	(0.8592)		(0.7906)	(0.9813)	(1.5126)
Decade: 70ies	0.0871		0.6266	0.3955	4.5169**
	(1.0196)		(0.9353)	(1.1718)	(1.8063)
Decade: 80ies	-0.2698		0.2535	-0.2126	3.6178***
	(0.8006)		(0.7011)	(0.9062)	(1.3973)
Constant	10.8912***		8.0911**	5.7026	4.7111
	(3.9693)		(3.3642)	(3.7302)	(5.5580)
N	394		1773	1483	735
Pseudo-R2	0.309		0.408	0.546	0.531
Log Likelihood	-83.192		-94.752	-68.428	-47.984

* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.

	Polity IV (AN=AUT)	Polity IV (AN=DEM)	Polity IV (threshold: 7)	Polity IV (threshold: 1)	Polity IV (exrec & parcomp)	Polity IV (hybrid: 6 & -6)	Polity IV (8 & 1)
Capital share	2.4145	0.8995	0.9004	1.7199	2.6252*	outcome does not vary	outcome does not vary
	(1.4984)	(0.9499)	(2.0491)	(1.0844)	(1.3584)		
Log GDP pc	-3.5152***	-1.1087***	-3.0869***	-2.6645***	-2.9542***		
	(0.8242)	(0.4280)	(1.0691)	(0.5960)	(0.7462)		
Growth	-0.0322	-0.0030	-0.0596*	-0.0122	-0.0064		
	(0.0255)	(0.0100)	(0.0304)	(0.0102)	(0.0129)		
Oil	-1.0787	0.9174***	-0.5642	-0.6033	-0.6649		
	(0.7329)	(0.3480)	(0.7702)	(0.6017)	(0.6846)		
Muslim	0.0030	-0.0024	0.0172*	0.0015	0.0018		
	(0.0071)	(0.0042)	(0.0103)	(0.0045)	(0.0054)		
Catholic	0.0176*	-0.0010	0.0367***	0.0089	0.0091		
	(0.0102)	(0.0058)	(0.0137)	(0.0062)	(0.0082)		
Protestant	0.0052	-0.0017	-0.0083	0.0017	0.0186*		
	(0.0160)	(0.0079)	(0.0195)	(0.0079)	(0.0113)		
Ethnic fractionalization	0.0142	0.0030	0.0091	0.0015	0.0092		
	(0.0097)	(0.0048)	(0.0117)	(0.0062)	(0.0079)		
Religious fractionalization	-0.0300*	0.0026	-0.0460**	-0.0156*	-0.0161		
	(0.0159)	(0.0074)	(0.0190)	(0.0082)	(0.0119)		
British colony	-0.0695	-0.3721	-0.2991	-0.1836	-0.0404		
	(0.5118)	(0.2364)	(0.6096)	(0.3285)	(0.4584)		
New country	-0.6927	0.3676	-0.6238	-0.8069*	-1.5750**		
	(0.8246)	(0.3743)	(1.0148)	(0.4796)	(0.7301)		
Past transitions	0.4495***	0.5207***	0.2209	0.3984***	0.3587**		
	(0.1631)	(0.1248)	(0.1681)	(0.1247)	(0.1451)		
% democracies in the world	-0.3366	-5.0656*	2.9215	-0.8390	0.7025		
	(3.6632)	(2.9088)	(4.0929)	(3.0413)	(3.6200)		
Presidentialism	-1.2182***	0.0000	-2.0336***	-1.3404***	-1.2809***		
	(0.4399)	(.)	(0.5573)	(0.3430)	(0.3807)		
Latin America	-0.8412	0.2173	-0.9647	-0.1840	-0.8119		
	(0.6626)	(0.4866)	(0.7332)	(0.5140)	(0.7153)		
Eastern Europe	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	-0.4411	-1.1501		
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(0.8845)	(1.2424)		
Western Europe	-0.5135	-0.2317	-1.6591	-0.1065	0.0000		
	(1.0092)	(0.6435)	(1.0542)	(0.6513)	(.)		
Africa	0.0490	0.4941*	-0.6762	0.3132	0.5583		
	(0.4063)	(0.2796)	(0.5157)	(0.3063)	(0.3733)		
Middle East	0.7756	0.8089**	0.2515	0.5155	0.1003		
	(0.8384)	(0.4078)	(0.9033)	(0.5835)	(0.6799)		
Decade: 60ies	0.2471	-0.3075	0.6549	0.4518	0.1715		
	(0.8552)	(0.6939)	(0.9994)	(0.7464)	(0.8977)		
Decade: 70ies	0.5889	-0.0987	0.9595	0.8315	1.0511		
	(1.0596)	(0.8092)	(1.2358)	(0.8838)	(1.0373)		
Decade: 80ies	0.3641	-0.0279	0.5967	0.3613	0.4000		
	(0.7827)	(0.6421)	(0.8905)	(0.6862)	(0.7932)		
Constant	9.7107**	2.3025	9.0909*	7.2263**	6.8936*		
	(4.2709)	(2.5867)	(5.4112)	(2.9813)	(3.8103)		
N	1496	1680	1388	1879	989		
Pseudo-R2	0.413	0.306	0.438	0.377	0.344		
Log Likelihood	-69.806	-136.247	-58.770	-115.832	-85.862		

* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.

	Przeworski et al. 2000	Reich 2002	Reich 2002 (hybrid)	Svolik 2012	Ulfelder 2012	Wahman et al. 2013
Capital share	convergence	-2.5996*	outcome	0.3813	1.2198	1.7559
	not achieved	(1.5091)	does not vary	(2.1519)	(1.0589)	(1.2451)
Log GDP pc		-2.9109***		-2.7036**	-2.2950***	-2.1621***
		(0.6469)		(1.1742)	(0.4974)	(0.6578)
Growth		-0.0150		0.0000	0.0111**	-0.0439*
		(0.0215)		(0.0077)	(0.0051)	(0.0238)
Oil		1.2994***		-0.9851	-0.3149	-0.0597
		(0.4931)		(0.9406)	(0.5656)	(0.4951)
Muslim		-0.0054		0.0294**	0.0001	0.0133**
		(0.0059)		(0.0124)	(0.0045)	(0.0063)
Catholic		0.0035		0.0290**	0.0056	0.0214**
		(0.0071)		(0.0115)	(0.0055)	(0.0096)
Protestant		-0.0015		0.0189	-0.0017	-0.0044
		(0.0118)		(0.0210)	(0.0085)	(0.0153)
Ethnic fractionalization		0.0165**		-0.0230*	0.0053	-0.0074
		(0.0080)		(0.0124)	(0.0057)	(0.0080)
Religious fractionalization		-0.0065		-0.0318	-0.0095	-0.0249*
		(0.0096)		(0.0213)	(0.0071)	(0.0135)
British colony		-0.5073		-1.0409	-0.1112	-0.0758
		(0.3515)		(0.7617)	(0.3071)	(0.5370)
New country		-1.2302**		-2.3255*	-0.5898	-0.6243
		(0.5977)		(1.2724)	(0.4413)	(0.5370)
Past transitions		0.7455***		0.9076***	0.3614***	0.0243
		(0.1992)		(0.2165)	(0.1214)	(0.1501)
% democracies in the world		-6.9307*		-6.6763	-3.2714	3.5490
		(3.6705)		(4.5636)	(2.8794)	(3.2937)
Presidentialism		0.0000		-4.3208***	-1.3539***	-1.1501***
		(.)		(0.9233)	(0.3076)	(0.3840)
Latin America		-0.4524		-0.0083	-0.0931	-0.8672
		(0.6389)		(0.9158)	(0.4694)	(0.5588)
Eastern Europe		0.0000		0.0000	-0.1632	-1.3752*
		(.)		(.)	(0.7791)	(0.7572)
Western Europe		-1.9963**		-2.6665*	-0.5348	0.0000
		(0.9066)		(1.4097)	(0.6315)	(.)
Africa		0.4456		-0.3336	0.4814*	-0.9780**
		(0.3996)		(0.6099)	(0.2822)	(0.4852)
Middle East		0.5731		-1.6319	0.4783	0.2531
		(0.6334)		(1.2720)	(0.5255)	(0.8154)
Decade: 60ies		-0.4575		-0.1640	-0.0479	0.0000
		(0.8577)		(1.1435)	(0.6999)	(.)
Decade: 70ies		-0.3191		-0.1270	0.2919	0.3805
		(1.0110)		(1.3252)	(0.8382)	(0.9462)
Decade: 80ies		-0.4539		-0.3999	-0.0364	0.4022
		(0.8270)		(0.9742)	(0.6489)	(0.6535)
Constant		13.0538***		13.9903**	7.1125***	5.5765
		(3.7799)		(5.7093)	(2.7501)	(3.5079)
N		1145		1513	1677	606
Pseudo-R2		0.456		0.594	0.387	0.282
Log Likelihood		-92.525		-48.334	-126.963	-81.446

* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.

Appendix VIII: Robustness Checks: Burke and Leigh 2010

a) all potential reformers

Freedom House (FIW, any change)				
	T3, M1	***T3, M2***	***T3, M3***	***T3, M4***
GDP per capita growth (t-2)	0.9710***	0.9705***	0.9880	0.9949
	(0.0079)	(0.0092)	(0.0096)	(0.0108)
Country-specific development level (t-2)		1.1882		0.9912
		(0.1727)		(0.1488)
Polity score (t-2)		0.9106***		1.0247
		(0.0182)		(0.0160)
Tenure of regime (t-1)		0.9879*		1.0043
		(0.0064)		(0.0058)
Democracy in the region (t-1)		1.0060		1.0014
		(0.0069)		(0.0076)
N	3678	3072	3577	3050
Pseudo-R2	0.040	0.057	0.063	0.069
Prob > F	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

Freedom House PR, any change)				
	T3, M1	***T3, M2***	***T3, M3***	***T3, M4***
GDP per capita growth (t-2)	0.9684***	0.9706**	0.9840	0.9959
	(0.0107)	(0.0116)	(0.0106)	(0.0132)
Country-specific development level (t-2)		1.0645		1.0352
		(0.2420)		(0.2120)
Polity score (t-2)		0.9213***		1.0201
		(0.0201)		(0.0209)
Tenure of regime (t-1)		0.9791**		1.0088
		(0.0100)		(0.0087)
Democracy in the region (t-1)		1.0043		0.9979
		(0.0084)		(0.0105)
N	3146	2575	2883	2425
Pseudo-R2	0.040	0.055	0.067	0.062
Prob > F	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

Freedom House (FIW, 1+ points)				
	T3, M1	***T3, M2***	***T3, M3***	***T3, M4***
GDP per capita growth (t-2)	0.9667	0.9699	0.9578**	0.9617*
	(.)	(.)	(0.0207)	(0.0211)
Country-specific development level (t-2)		1.1469		1.1186
		(.)		(0.4007)
Polity score (t-2)		0.8983		1.0894**
		(.)		(0.0402)
Tenure of regime (t-1)		0.9667		1.0350
		(.)		(0.0481)
Democracy in the region (t-1)		1.0011		0.9722*
		(.)		(0.0161)
N	2354	1869	1802	1488
Pseudo-R2	0.100	0.139	0.154	0.185
Prob > F	.	.	0.000	0.000

Freedom House (PR, 1+ points)				
	T3, M1	***T3, M2***	***T3, M3***	***T3, M4***
GDP per capita growth (t-2)	0.9703***	0.9742**	0.9797*	0.9915
	(0.0112)	(0.0122)	(0.0114)	(0.0138)
Country-specific development level (t-2)		0.9664		0.9999
		(0.2156)		(0.1997)
Polity score (t-2)		0.9209***		1.0161
		(0.0210)		(0.0214)
Tenure of regime (t-1)		0.9766**		1.0108
		(0.0097)		(0.0089)
Democracy in the region (t-1)		1.0054		0.9981
		(0.0082)		(0.0106)
N	3130	2561	2882	2424
Pseudo-R2	0.050	0.066	0.088	0.081
Prob > F	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

Gasiorowski (hybrid)				
	T3, M1	***T3, M2***	***T3, M3***	***T3, M4***
GDP per capita growth (t-2)	0.9498*	0.9560	0.9817	1.0111
	(0.0263)	(0.0810)	(0.0226)	(0.0450)
Country-specific development level (t-2)		14.2190***		1.1061
		(11.1110)		(0.7188)
Polity score (t-2)		0.7732		1.3848***
		(0.1277)		(0.1519)
Tenure of regime (t-1)		1.1511		1.2358
		(0.1386)		(0.1675)
Democracy in the region (t-1)		1.0963*		0.9216***
		(0.0523)		(0.0283)
N	410	271	498	413
Pseudo-R2	0.286	0.461	0.241	0.455
Prob > F	.	.	.	.

Gates et al. 2006 (any change)				
	T3, M1	***T3, M2***	***T3, M3***	***T3, M4***
GDP per capita growth (t-2)	0.9662**	0.9610**	0.9551***	0.9553**
	(0.0157)	(0.0180)	(0.0162)	(0.0203)
Country-specific development level (t-2)		1.1450		0.6982
		(0.2706)		(0.1917)
Polity score (t-2)		0.8078***		1.1448***
		(0.0281)		(0.0459)
Tenure of regime (t-1)		0.9928		1.0561**
		(0.0099)		(0.0272)
Democracy in the region (t-1)		0.9993		0.9874
		(0.0135)		(0.0166)
N	2587	1985	1739	1460
Pseudo-R2	0.075	0.166	0.105	0.161
Prob > F	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

Polity IV (any change)				
	T3, M1	***T3, M2***	***T3, M3***	***T3, M4***
GDP per capita growth (t-2)	0.9621***	0.9571***	0.9783	0.9804
	(0.0085)	(0.0105)	(0.0131)	(0.0182)
Country-specific development level (t-2)		0.8920		0.7842
		(0.1855)		(0.1592)
Polity score (t-2)		0.7846***		1.2088***
		(0.0267)		(0.0484)
Tenure of regime (t-1)		0.9928		1.0768***
		(0.0089)		(0.0286)
Democracy in the region (t-1)		1.0070		0.9922
		(0.0108)		(0.0131)
N	3752	2959	3083	2598
Pseudo-R2	0.072	0.163	0.070	0.150
Prob > F	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

Polity IV (3+ points)				
	T3, M1	***T3, M2***	***T3, M3***	***T3, M4***
GDP per capita growth (t-2)	0.9499***	0.9490**	0.9562**	0.9486*
	(0.0161)	(0.0213)	(0.0195)	(0.0262)
Country-specific development level (t-2)		0.9404		0.8387
		(0.4043)		(0.2650)
Polity score (t-2)		0.6191***		1.3767***
		(0.0469)		(0.0651)
Tenure of regime (t-1)		1.0003		1.0554
		(0.0209)		(0.0377)
Democracy in the region (t-1)		1.0322**		0.9606***
		(0.0158)		(0.0138)
N	2392	1734	1757	1757
Pseudo-R2	0.141	0.318	0.138	0.304
Prob > F	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

Polity IV (5+ points)				
	T3, M1	***T3, M2***	***T3, M3***	***T3, M4***
GDP per capita growth (t-2)	0.9387**	0.9512*	0.9522*	0.9312*
	(0.0246)	(0.0244)	(0.0279)	(0.0376)
Country-specific development level (t-2)		1.2159		0.5334
		(0.5128)		(0.2353)
Polity score (t-2)		0.6435***		1.2434***
		(0.0559)		(0.0937)
Tenure of regime (t-1)		0.9884		1.1903***
		(0.0232)		(0.0615)
Democracy in the region (t-1)		1.0466*		0.9438***
		(0.0280)		(0.0211)
N	1632	1123	1066	1066
Pseudo-R2	0.232	0.351	0.249	0.349
Prob > F	0.000	0.000	0.000	.

Reich 2002 (hybrid)				
	T3, M1	***T3, M2***	***T3, M3***	***T3, M4***
GDP per capita growth (t-2)	0.9463**	0.9409	0.9851	1.0422
	(0.0261)	(0.0467)	(0.0224)	(0.0399)
Country-specific development level (t-2)		1.1262		0.8606
		(0.3968)		(0.4923)
Polity score (t-2)		0.8258*		1.3340***
		(0.0838)		(0.0767)
Tenure of regime (t-1)		0.9301		1.0545
		(0.0413)		(0.0615)
Democracy in the region (t-1)		1.0679*		0.8905***
		(0.0398)		(0.0303)
N	706	449	716	619
Pseudo-R2	0.265	0.352	0.202	0.375
Prob > F	.	.	.	.

Skaaning et al. 2015				
	T3, M1	***T3, M2***	***T3, M3***	***T3, M4***
GDP per capita growth (t-2)	0.9751*	0.9704**	0.9288***	0.9089***
	(0.0136)	(0.0143)	(0.0191)	(0.0189)
Country-specific development level (t-2)		0.9159		0.6234*
		(0.2879)		(0.1703)
Polity score (t-2)		1.0144		1.0954**
		(0.0357)		(0.0430)
Tenure of regime (t-1)		0.9971		1.0375
		(0.0153)		(0.0356)
Democracy in the region (t-1)		1.0370**		0.9666**
		(0.0155)		(0.0144)
N	2272	1511	2021	1560
Pseudo-R2	0.121	0.176	0.146	0.202
Prob > F	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

Wahman et al. 2013 (any change)				
	T3, M1	***T3, M2***	***T3, M3***	***T3, M4***
GDP per capita growth (t-2)	0.9673***	0.9658***	0.9876	0.9892
	(0.0072)	(0.0084)	(0.0093)	(0.0119)
Country-specific development level (t-2)		1.1335		1.0797
		(0.1574)		(0.1599)
Polity score (t-2)		0.8986***		1.0601***
		(0.0176)		(0.0184)
Tenure of regime (t-1)		0.9861**		1.0082
		(0.0056)		(0.0083)
Democracy in the region (t-1)		1.0007		1.0014
		(0.0072)		(0.0074)
N	3729	3123	3771	3178
Pseudo-R2	0.050	0.070	0.062	0.069
Prob > F	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

Wahman et al. 2013 (1.5+ points)				
	T3, M1	***T3, M2***	***T3, M3***	***T3, M4***
GDP per capita growth (t-2)	0.9613**	0.9562*	0.9551**	0.9369**
	(0.0181)	(0.0257)	(0.0181)	(0.0264)
Country-specific development level (t-2)		0.6817		0.8880
		(0.3111)		(0.5175)
Polity score (t-2)		0.6296***		1.3003***
		(0.0620)		(0.0772)
Tenure of regime (t-1)		0.9596		1.0748
		(0.0241)		(0.0528)
Democracy in the region (t-1)		1.0272		0.9416**
		(0.0257)		(0.0229)
N	1823	1426	1202	1058
Pseudo-R2	0.147	0.392	0.145	0.292
Prob > F	0.000	0.000	0.000	.

V-Dem: Electoral Democracy (continuous)				
	T3, M1	***T3, M2***	***T3, M3***	***T3, M4***
GDP per capita growth (t-2)	0.9754*	0.9739**	0.9456***	0.9446***
	(0.0128)	(0.0131)	(0.0156)	(0.0173)
Country-specific development level (t-2)		1.1290		0.9977
		(0.1975)		(0.2517)
Polity score (t-2)		0.9712		1.0016
		(0.0203)		(0.0261)
Tenure of regime (t-1)		0.9596***		0.9987
		(0.0136)		(0.0160)
Democracy in the region (t-1)		0.9908		0.9805
		(0.0096)		(0.0158)
N	3574	3034	2763	2311
Pseudo-R2	0.093	0.113	0.085	0.093
Prob > F	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

V-Dem: Liberal Democracy (continuous)				
	T3, M1	***T3, M2***	***T3, M3***	***T3, M4***
GDP per capita growth (t-2)	0.9819	0.9910	0.9567***	0.9589**
	(0.0157)	(0.0157)	(0.0155)	(0.0171)
Country-specific development level (t-2)		1.2225		0.8262
		(0.2451)		(0.2047)
Polity score (t-2)		0.9814		1.0442*
		(0.0204)		(0.0264)
Tenure of regime (t-1)		0.9432***		1.0223
		(0.0129)		(0.0172)
Democracy in the region (t-1)		0.9866		0.9816
		(0.0088)		(0.0165)
N	3522	3021	2532	2155
Pseudo-R2	0.119	0.139	0.076	0.089
Prob > F	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

V-Dem: Participatory Democracy (continuous)				
	T3, M1	***T3, M2***	***T3, M3***	***T3, M4***
GDP per capita growth (t-2)	0.9732**	0.9815	0.9698**	0.9760
	(0.0119)	(0.0120)	(0.0151)	(0.0173)
Country-specific development level (t-2)		1.4330**		0.9860
		(0.2412)		(0.1884)
Polity score (t-2)		1.0073		1.0512**
		(0.0208)		(0.0252)
Tenure of regime (t-1)		0.9646***		1.0042
		(0.0098)		(0.0141)
Democracy in the region (t-1)		0.9891		0.9800
		(0.0076)		(0.0132)
N	4163	3645	2990	2656
Pseudo-R2	0.097	0.106	0.061	0.071
Prob > F	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

V-Dem: Deliberative Democracy (continuous)				
	T3, M1	***T3, M2***	***T3, M3***	***T3, M4***
GDP per capita growth (t-2)	0.9815	0.9819	0.9633**	0.9560***
	(0.0133)	(0.0122)	(0.0155)	(0.0164)
Country-specific development level (t-2)		1.0425		0.5705**
		(0.1669)		(0.1314)
Polity score (t-2)		1.0042		1.0243
		(0.0203)		(0.0277)
Tenure of regime (t-1)		0.9739***		1.0213
		(0.0099)		(0.0145)
Democracy in the region (t-1)		0.9894		0.9806
		(0.0083)		(0.0127)
N	3886	3432	2282	2134
Pseudo-R2	0.095	0.095	0.066	0.080
Prob > F	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

V-Dem: Egalitarian Democracy (continuous)				
	T3, M1	***T3, M2***	***T3, M3***	***T3, M4***
GDP per capita growth (t-2)	0.9758*	0.9856	0.9351***	0.9379***
	(0.0137)	(0.0134)	(0.0184)	(0.0213)
Country-specific development level (t-2)		1.2597		0.9434
		(0.2198)		(0.2246)
Polity score (t-2)		1.0024		1.0648**
		(0.0206)		(0.0281)
Tenure of regime (t-1)		0.9466***		1.0094
		(0.0154)		(0.0161)
Democracy in the region (t-1)		0.9972		0.9830
		(0.0088)		(0.0159)
N	3729	3250	2500	2274
Pseudo-R2	0.103	0.125	0.080	0.094
Prob > F	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

V-Dem: Electoral Democracy (ordinal)				
	T3, M1	***T3, M2***	***T3, M3***	***T3, M4***
GDP per capita growth (t-2)	0.9889	0.9821	1.0106	1.0065
	(0.0125)	(0.0123)	(0.0170)	(0.0169)
Country-specific development level (t-2)		1.0520		0.6699
		(0.1662)		(0.2570)
Polity score (t-2)		0.9753		1.0012
		(0.0214)		(0.0593)
Tenure of regime (t-1)		0.9680***		1.0531
		(0.0098)		(0.0343)
Democracy in the region (t-1)		0.9969		1.0103
		(0.0091)		(0.0195)
N	3606	3047	1221	1175
Pseudo-R2	0.064	0.070	0.132	0.162
Prob > F	0.000	0.000	0.000	.

V-Dem: Liberal Democracy (ordinal)				
	T3, M1	***T3, M2***	***T3, M3***	***T3, M4***
GDP per capita growth (t-2)	0.9729*	0.9767	0.9631	0.9516*
	(0.0152)	(0.0169)	(0.0258)	(0.0255)
Country-specific development level (t-2)		1.3803		0.6807
		(0.3627)		(0.1971)
Polity score (t-2)		1.0150		0.8143***
		(0.0294)		(0.0390)
Tenure of regime (t-1)		0.9571**		1.0946***
		(0.0173)		(0.0305)
Democracy in the region (t-1)		0.9795*		1.0095
		(0.0121)		(0.0164)
N	2817	2501	1138	1108
Pseudo-R2	0.136	0.156	0.148	0.232
Prob > F	0.000	0.000	0.000	.

V-Dem: Participatory Democracy (ordinal)				
	T3, M1	***T3, M2***	***T3, M3***	***T3, M4***
GDP per capita growth (t-2)	0.9834	0.9865	1.0235	1.0162
	(0.0164)	(0.0171)	(0.0364)	(0.0374)
Country-specific development level (t-2)		1.1365		0.4804
		(0.2476)		(0.2371)
Polity score (t-2)		1.0268		0.9293
		(0.0276)		(0.0457)
Tenure of regime (t-1)		0.9545**		1.0341
		(0.0190)		(0.0279)
Democracy in the region (t-1)		0.9906		0.9856
		(0.0112)		(0.0224)
N	3055	2717	1016	1014
Pseudo-R2	0.096	0.116	0.171	0.206
Prob > F	0.000	0.000	.	.

V-Dem: Deliberative Democracy (ordinal)				
	T3, M1	***T3, M2***	***T3, M3***	***T3, M4***
GDP per capita growth (t-2)	0.9889	0.9866	0.9819	0.9680
	(0.0168)	(0.0170)	(0.0270)	(0.0269)
Country-specific development level (t-2)		0.9448		0.5340**
		(0.2120)		(0.1356)
Polity score (t-2)		1.0488*		1.0150
		(0.0274)		(0.0962)
Tenure of regime (t-1)		0.9608**		1.0655**
		(0.0174)		(0.0340)
Democracy in the region (t-1)		0.9702***		0.9828
		(0.0092)		(0.0147)
N	3117	2816	1408	1407
Pseudo-R2	0.117	0.130	0.144	0.173
Prob > F	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

V-Dem: Egalitarian Democracy (ordinal)				
	T3, M1	***T3, M2***	***T3, M3***	***T3, M4***
GDP per capita growth (t-2)	0.9973	0.9944	0.9782	0.9620
	(0.0174)	(0.0192)	(0.0234)	(0.0230)
Country-specific development level (t-2)		1.1580		0.9761
		(0.2985)		(0.4186)
Polity score (t-2)		0.9799		0.7969***
		(0.0334)		(0.0525)
Tenure of regime (t-1)		0.9600**		1.0178
		(0.0163)		(0.0329)
Democracy in the region (t-1)		0.9891		1.0381*
		(0.0106)		(0.0198)
N	3184	2731	1209	1145
Pseudo-R2	0.120	0.142	0.160	0.238
Prob > F	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

b) DEM/ AUT only

Freedom House (FIW, any change)				
	T3, M1	***T3, M2***	***T3, M3***	***T3, M4***
GDP per capita growth (t-2)	0.9677***	0.9700**	1.0015	1.0106
	(0.0106)	(0.0124)	(0.0220)	(0.0225)
Country-specific development level (t-2)		1.3411		1.0319
		(0.2675)		(0.2327)
Polity score (t-2)		1.0010		0.9003**
		(0.0312)		(0.0454)
Tenure of regime (t-1)		0.9903		1.0320
		(0.0094)		(0.0266)
Democracy in the region (t-1)		1.0051		1.0191*
		(0.0124)		(0.0105)
N	2174	1577	1539	1532
Pseudo-R2	0.060	0.068	0.107	0.125
Prob > F	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

Freedom House PR, any change)				
	T3, M1	***T3, M2***	***T3, M3***	***T3, M4***
GDP per capita growth (t-2)	0.9625***	0.9693**	0.9826	0.9960
	(0.0132)	(0.0150)	(0.0221)	(0.0243)
Country-specific development level (t-2)		1.3905		1.0032
		(0.3498)		(0.3057)
Polity score (t-2)		1.0276		0.8670*
		(0.0318)		(0.0655)
Tenure of regime (t-1)		0.9802		1.1096**
		(0.0125)		(0.0449)
Democracy in the region (t-1)		1.0057		1.0096
		(0.0112)		(0.0150)
N	2128	1562	1197	1194
Pseudo-R2	0.064	0.080	0.073	0.131
Prob > F	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

Freedom House (FIW, 1+ points)				
	T3, M1	***T3, M2***	***T3, M3***	***T3, M4***
GDP per capita growth (t-2)	0.9523	0.9496	0.8788***	0.8351***
	(.)	(.)	(0.0344)	(0.0421)
Country-specific development level (t-2)		1.3026		0.9670
		(.)		(0.2992)
Polity score (t-2)		1.0387		0.8057***
		(.)		(0.0614)
Tenure of regime (t-1)		0.9798		1.1708***
		(.)		(0.0551)
Democracy in the region (t-1)		1.0145		1.0134
		(.)		(0.0194)
N	1462	1053	647	642
Pseudo-R2	0.141	0.173	0.244	0.365
Prob > F	.	.	0.000	.

Freedom House (PR, 1+ points)				
	T3, M1	***T3, M2***	***T3, M3***	***T3, M4***
GDP per capita growth (t-2)	0.9643**	0.9732*	0.9821	0.9964
	(0.0136)	(0.0156)	(0.0224)	(0.0248)
Country-specific development level (t-2)		1.2926		1.0622
		(0.3275)		(0.3319)
Polity score (t-2)		1.0315		0.8504**
		(0.0331)		(0.0664)
Tenure of regime (t-1)		0.9767*		1.1209***
		(0.0128)		(0.0451)
Democracy in the region (t-1)		1.0077		1.0130
		(0.0104)		(0.0157)
N	2128	1554	1194	1191
Pseudo-R2	0.075	0.097	0.090	0.158
Prob > F	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

Gasiorowski (hybrid)		
		T3, M3
GDP per capita growth (t-2)		0.9458
		(0.1527)
Country-specific development level (t-2)		
Polity score (t-2)		
Tenure of regime (t-1)		
Democracy in the region (t-1)		
N		95
Pseudo-R2		
Prob > F		

Gates et al. 2006 (any change)				
	T3, M1	***T3, M2***	***T3, M3***	***T3, M4***
GDP per capita growth (t-2)	0.9621	0.9628	0.9814	0.9579
	(0.0227)	(0.0273)	(0.0342)	(0.0386)
Country-specific development level (t-2)		0.8427		0.3052**
		(0.2902)		(0.1774)
Polity score (t-2)		0.9680		1.0228
		(0.0629)		(0.1911)
Tenure of regime (t-1)		1.0162		1.3049***
		(0.0132)		(0.1056)
Democracy in the region (t-1)		1.0136		0.9589
		(0.0169)		(0.0282)
N	1687	1121	658	658
Pseudo-R2	0.163	0.171	0.253	0.446
Prob > F	0.000	0.000	0.000	.

Polity IV (any change)				
	T3, M1	***T3, M2***	***T3, M3***	***T3, M4***
GDP per capita growth (t-2)	0.9468***	0.9587**	0.9913	0.9895
	(0.0131)	(0.0163)	(0.0162)	(0.0226)
Country-specific development level (t-2)		0.8623		0.6652*
		(0.3049)		(0.1603)
Polity score (t-2)		0.6535***		1.0662
		(0.0656)		(0.1055)
Tenure of regime (t-1)		1.0092		1.1796***
		(0.0176)		(0.0461)
Democracy in the region (t-1)		1.0662***		0.9836
		(0.0177)		(0.0131)
N	2149	1358	1360	1360
Pseudo-R2	0.167	0.247	0.106	0.188
Prob > F	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

Polity IV (3+ points)				
	T3, M1	***T3, M2***	***T3, M3***	***T3, M4***
GDP per capita growth (t-2)	0.9406***	0.9497*	0.9550	0.9319**
	(0.0195)	(0.0265)	(0.0283)	(0.0317)
Country-specific development level (t-2)		1.1757		0.3641*
		(0.5365)		(0.2022)
Polity score (t-2)		0.8951		0.9568
		(0.1125)		(0.1656)
Tenure of regime (t-1)		1.0757**		1.3221***
		(0.0355)		(0.0826)
Democracy in the region (t-1)		1.0615***		0.9317***
		(0.0216)		(0.0238)
N	1732	1118	834	834
Pseudo-R2	0.258	0.315	0.210	0.352
Prob > F	0.000	0.000	.	.

Polity IV (5+ points)				
	T3, M1	***T3, M2***	***T3, M3***	***T3, M4***
GDP per capita growth (t-2)	0.9380***	0.9491*	0.9494*	0.9211**
	(0.0217)	(0.0277)	(0.0295)	(0.0338)
Country-specific development level (t-2)		0.8872		0.4264*
		(0.4300)		(0.2092)
Polity score (t-2)		0.9762		1.0605
		(0.1412)		(0.1883)
Tenure of regime (t-1)		1.0429		1.2871***
		(0.0469)		(0.0874)
Democracy in the region (t-1)		1.0662**		0.9220***
		(0.0335)		(0.0269)
N	1336	873	774	774
Pseudo-R2	0.298	0.334	0.257	0.390
Prob > F	0.000	.	.	.

Reich 2002 (hybrid)				
	T3, M1	***T3, M2***	***T3, M3***	***T3, M4***
GDP per capita growth (t-2)	no observations	no observations	not concave	not concave
Country-specific development level (t-2)				
Polity score (t-2)				
Tenure of regime (t-1)				
Democracy in the region (t-1)				
N				
Pseudo-R2				
Prob > F				

Skaaning et al. 2015			
T3, M1	***T3, M2***	***T3, M3***	***T3, M4***

Not estimated because no threshold between DEM/ AUT

Wahman et al. 2013 (any change)				
	T3, M1	***T3, M2***	***T3, M3***	***T3, M4***
GDP per capita growth (t-2)	0.9625***	0.9643***	1.0022	1.0056
	(0.0094)	(0.0109)	(0.0216)	(0.0219)
Country-specific development level (t-2)		1.1286		1.1130
		(0.1928)		(0.2314)
Polity score (t-2)		0.9369**		0.8606
		(0.0304)		(0.0936)
Tenure of regime (t-1)		0.9948		1.0956***
		(0.0081)		(0.0323)
Democracy in the region (t-1)		1.0040		1.0139
		(0.0109)		(0.0108)
N	2402	1792	1383	1383
Pseudo-R2	0.080	0.086	0.119	0.138
Prob > F	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

Wahman et al. 2013 (1.5+ points)				
	T3, M1	***T3, M2***	***T3, M3***	***T3, M4***
GDP per capita growth (t-2)	0.9507**	0.9531*	0.9654	not
	(0.0232)	(0.0277)	(.)	concave
Country-specific development level (t-2)		0.6352		
		(0.3304)		
Polity score (t-2)		0.7003***		
		(0.0765)		
Tenure of regime (t-1)		0.9688		
		(0.0249)		
Democracy in the region (t-1)		1.0241		
		(0.0270)		
N	1325	980	230	
Pseudo-R2	0.191	0.308	0.393	
Prob > F	0.000	0.000	.	

Appendix IX: Robustness Checks: Cornell 2013

a) all potential reformers

	Freedom House (FIW, any change)	Freedom House (PR, any change)	Freedom House (FIW: 1+points)	Freedom House (PR: 1+points)
Democracy aid	61.1950***	20.6502	57.9976***	21.9191
	(15.1009)	(18.4736)	(9.1796)	(18.9972)
Other aid	0.1495	-0.0973	-0.0128	-0.1532
	(0.1477)	(0.1269)	(0.1365)	(0.1622)
GDP per capita	0.0085	0.0069	0.0038	0.0059
	(0.0064)	(0.0055)	(0.0054)	(0.0065)
Trade openness	-0.0000	0.0000	0.0001	0.0001
	(0.0002)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0002)
Economic growth	-0.0046***	-0.0030***	-0.0021***	-0.0030***
	(0.0011)	(0.0010)	(0.0008)	(0.0011)
Religious fractionalization	0.0267	-0.0003	-0.0031	-0.0086
	(0.0428)	(0.0451)	(0.0252)	(0.0487)
Ethnic fractionalization	0.0367	0.0439	0.0383	0.0587
	(0.0263)	(0.0347)	(0.0256)	(0.0412)
Monarchy	0.0591	0.0557	-0.0041	0.0593
	(0.0597)	(0.0459)	(0.0301)	(0.0501)
Military regime	0.1217***	0.0958**	0.0501*	0.0955**
	(0.0453)	(0.0388)	(0.0273)	(0.0404)
Limited multi-party regime	0.0600	0.0554	-0.0021	0.0548
	(0.0412)	(0.0376)	(0.0268)	(0.0425)
Other regimes	0.1652***	0.1568***	0.0912**	0.1539***
	(0.0567)	(0.0483)	(0.0365)	(0.0495)
Democracy	-0.0358	-0.0401	-0.0558*	0.0564
	(0.0530)	(0.0456)	(0.0308)	(0.0663)
Monarchy * democracy aid	-66.0467***	-25.0233	-61.2776***	-25.5857
	(15.6662)	(18.7889)	(9.8595)	(19.1735)
Military regime * democracy aid	-62.9894***	-18.6355	-62.0312***	-19.7996
	(17.8179)	(21.4002)	(9.3744)	(21.6946)
Limited multi-party regime * democracy aid	-61.1811***	-20.7037	-58.3444***	-21.9384
	(15.0922)	(18.5144)	(9.2185)	(19.0116)
Other regimes * democracy aid	-44.9823***	-2.3659	-58.9861***	-3.5342
	(15.6906)	(18.6366)	(10.2038)	(18.9767)
Democracy * democracy aid	-62.2346***	-20.5991	-57.7519***	-23.6436
	(15.0788)	(18.4754)	(9.4681)	(19.0114)
Constant	0.0888	0.0998	0.1350**	0.1723*
	(0.0803)	(0.0704)	(0.0571)	(0.0939)
N	1915	1775	1638	1419
R2	0.053	0.053	0.055	0.049
Prob > F	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

	Gasiorowski (hybrid)	Gates et al. 2006 (any change)	Polity IV (any change)	Polity IV (3+ points)	Polity IV (5+ points)
Democracy aid	121.9018	32.4767	46.2489**	33.9180*	42.5880**
	(.)	(24.7706)	(19.8624)	(17.4925)	(17.2859)
Other aid	-0.3117	-0.0824	0.1246	0.0894	0.0669
	(.)	(0.1462)	(0.1584)	(0.1623)	(0.2078)
GDP per capita	-0.0005	-0.0046	0.0105*	0.0066	0.0018
	(.)	(0.0040)	(0.0057)	(0.0045)	(0.0044)
Trade openness	0.0007	0.0001	-0.0001	-0.0002**	-0.0000
	(.)	(0.0002)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)
Economic growth	0.0008	-0.0023**	-0.0024*	-0.0013	-0.0010
	(.)	(0.0011)	(0.0012)	(0.0009)	(0.0008)
Religious fractionalization	0.1461	-0.0151	-0.0102	-0.0266	-0.0412
	(.)	(0.0316)	(0.0375)	(0.0296)	(0.0334)
Ethnic fractionalization	-0.0002	-0.0088	-0.0624*	-0.0152	0.0091
	(.)	(0.0401)	(0.0377)	(0.0252)	(0.0262)
Monarchy	-0.0979	-0.0933**	-0.0100	-0.0115	0.0305
	(.)	(0.0435)	(0.0545)	(0.0303)	(0.0368)
Military regime	0.0724	0.0304	0.0692	0.0695**	0.0725**
	(.)	(0.0423)	(0.0432)	(0.0321)	(0.0349)
Limited multi-party regime	0.0383	-0.0316	-0.0410	-0.0077	0.0262
	(.)	(0.0384)	(0.0425)	(0.0270)	(0.0286)
Other regimes	0.3391	0.1481	0.0001	-0.0065	0.0295
	(.)	(0.0927)	(0.0573)	(0.0400)	(0.0454)
Democracy	-0.0282	-0.1000**	-0.1199**	-0.0770**	-0.0197
	(.)	(0.0418)	(0.0489)	(0.0340)	(0.0505)
Monarchy * democracy aid	-190.8728	-32.0736	-49.7729**	-32.6033*	-43.1492**
	(.)	(24.8162)	(21.6189)	(18.9991)	(18.8325)
Military regime * democracy aid	-122.2822	-33.3651	-35.8808*	-38.5111**	-44.2851**
	(.)	(26.2464)	(20.9977)	(17.9173)	(18.6834)
Limited multi-party regime * democracy aid	-130.2216	-29.4172	-46.2592**	-35.9448**	-45.5534***
	(.)	(25.1250)	(19.8797)	(17.6739)	(17.3604)
Other regimes * democracy aid	-397.8828	-188.1423**	11.6637	-31.1485	-47.2561**
	(.)	(90.2452)	(27.4382)	(20.5571)	(20.4675)
Democracy * democracy aid	-121.1696	-34.5063	-46.2308**	-34.7763**	-43.5461**
	(.)	(24.4170)	(19.8112)	(17.4695)	(17.2398)
Constant	-0.1181	0.1546***	0.2044***	0.1872***	0.1113
	(.)	(0.0555)	(0.0638)	(0.0601)	(0.0705)
N	161	901	1709	1368	1089
R2	0.173	0.060	0.078	0.046	0.035
Prob > F	.	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

	Reich 2002 (hybrid)	Skaaning et al. 2015	Wahman et al. 2013 (any change)	Wahman et al. 2013 (1.5+ points)
Democracy aid	35.4970	32.0170	67.5590***	53.7257***
	(36.8065)	(24.5775)	(16.3281)	(9.0427)
Other aid	0.1637	0.0188	0.0651	0.0350
	(0.1932)	(0.1638)	(0.1499)	(0.0869)
GDP per capita	-0.0019	-0.0028	0.0087	0.0012
	(0.0054)	(0.0051)	(0.0071)	(0.0024)
Trade openness	-0.0003*	-0.0001	-0.0000	-0.0000
	(0.0002)	(0.0001)	(0.0002)	(0.0001)
Economic growth	0.0012	0.0005	-0.0054***	-0.0015**
	(0.0011)	(0.0008)	(0.0013)	(0.0007)
Religious fractionalization	0.1441***	-0.0142	0.0255	0.0024
	(0.0508)	(0.0369)	(0.0534)	(0.0266)
Ethnic fractionalization	-0.1354	-0.0269	0.0443	0.0019
	(0.0854)	(0.0350)	(0.0308)	(0.0182)
Monarchy	0.1501**	-0.0195	0.0436	0.0054
	(0.0697)	(0.0515)	(0.0698)	(0.0239)
Military regime	0.0517	0.0561	0.1567***	0.0606**
	(0.0383)	(0.0436)	(0.0474)	(0.0273)
Limited multi-party regime	0.0802**	-0.0096	0.0580	0.0075
	(0.0344)	(0.0416)	(0.0473)	(0.0222)
Other regimes	0.2298***	0.0577	0.1295**	0.0656**
	(0.0752)	(0.0516)	(0.0590)	(0.0333)
Democracy	0.0122	0.0000	-0.0529	-0.0289
	(0.0302)	(.)	(0.0605)	(0.0266)
Monarchy * democracy aid	-43.2982	-38.8568	-72.1734***	-55.3920***
	(36.0790)	(23.6331)	(17.5600)	(9.0603)
Military regime * democracy aid	-35.2628	-22.5489	-58.1747***	-56.8549***
	(36.5699)	(25.9439)	(19.2091)	(10.4651)
Limited multi-party regime * democracy aid	-36.9539	-32.3468	-65.9406***	-54.0792***
	(37.5993)	(24.4883)	(16.4120)	(9.0517)
Other regimes * democracy aid	-133.3476*	-15.9485	-49.3876***	-53.1112***
	(73.3240)	(24.3394)	(17.1713)	(9.8640)
Democracy * democracy aid	-37.7711	0.0000	-68.5522***	-53.4936***
	(36.4500)	(.)	(16.3272)	(9.0448)
Constant	0.0182	0.2553**	0.1053	0.0900**
	(0.0997)	(0.1065)	(0.0847)	(0.0457)
N	502	1008	1921	1766
R2	0.078	0.070	0.072	0.058
Prob > F	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

V-Dem continuous:

	V-Dem: Electoral Democracy	**V-Dem: Liberal Democracy**	**V-Dem: Participatory Democracy**	**V-Dem: Deliberative Democracy**	**V-Dem: Egalitarian Democracy**
Democracy aid	55.4172***	54.9099***	45.3655***	58.7193***	22.8969*
	(10.9996)	(10.9203)	(10.9893)	(19.4848)	(13.2004)
Other aid	0.2273**	0.2771***	0.2465**	0.2303**	0.1509
	(0.1020)	(0.1063)	(0.1201)	(0.1153)	(0.1270)
GDP per capita	-0.0049	0.0020	0.0032	0.0011	0.0013
	(0.0039)	(0.0050)	(0.0048)	(0.0052)	(0.0060)
Trade openness	-0.0001	-0.0002	-0.0003**	0.0000	-0.0000
	(0.0001)	(0.0002)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)
Economic growth	-0.0016	-0.0030***	-0.0023**	-0.0031***	-0.0012
	(0.0010)	(0.0011)	(0.0011)	(0.0011)	(0.0010)
Religious fractionalization	0.0455	0.0403	0.0001	0.0227	0.0045
	(0.0300)	(0.0405)	(0.0385)	(0.0425)	(0.0419)
Ethnic fractionalization	0.0112	0.0491	0.0343	0.0441	0.0219
	(0.0290)	(0.0300)	(0.0282)	(0.0296)	(0.0315)
Monarchy	-0.0358	-0.0447	-0.0526	0.0117	-0.0579
	(0.0386)	(0.0380)	(0.0365)	(0.0447)	(0.0393)
Military regime	0.0743**	0.0588	0.0584*	0.0947**	0.0401
	(0.0349)	(0.0404)	(0.0338)	(0.0378)	(0.0371)
Limited multi-party regime	-0.0050	0.0031	-0.0049	0.0109	-0.0026
	(0.0319)	(0.0347)	(0.0365)	(0.0391)	(0.0381)
Other regimes	0.0392	0.0510	0.0049	0.0845	0.0416
	(0.0476)	(0.0515)	(0.0515)	(0.0529)	(0.0469)
Democracy	-0.0403	-0.0293	-0.0359	-0.0200	-0.0296
	(0.0413)	(0.0427)	(0.0458)	(0.0468)	(0.0482)
Monarchy * democracy aid	-58.3717***	-57.5409***	-48.1295***	-65.5507***	-25.1992*
	(11.1596)	(10.6820)	(10.8086)	(19.5131)	(13.0572)
Military regime * democracy aid	-51.9919***	-54.7381***	-27.8017**	-62.0812***	-25.4132*
	(12.7010)	(11.8519)	(12.5607)	(20.4947)	(14.4037)
Limited multi-party regime * democracy aid	-56.0982***	-55.3541***	-45.9776***	-57.9744***	-23.6271*
	(11.0104)	(10.9082)	(11.0015)	(19.5300)	(13.2210)
Other regimes * democracy aid	-36.8792***	-35.0166***	-24.1956*	-38.9844*	-3.8585
	(12.2680)	(13.3692)	(12.4529)	(20.2939)	(13.7083)
Democracy * democracy aid	-55.4553***	-54.9511***	-45.0944***	-58.2532***	-21.9561*
	(10.9682)	(10.8713)	(10.9514)	(19.4807)	(13.2055)
Constant	0.0477	0.0424	0.0889	0.0007	0.0496
	(0.0472)	(0.0574)	(0.0606)	(0.0625)	(0.0539)
N	1841	1841	1841	1824	1841
R2	0.063	0.054	0.060	0.051	0.032
Prob > F	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

V-Dem ordinal

	V-Dem: Electoral Democracy	**V-Dem: Liberal Democracy**	**V-Dem: Participatory Democracy**	**V-Dem: Deliberative Democracy**	**V-Dem: Egalitarian Democracy**
Democracy aid	7.5750	60.7241***	14.8081*	8.7264	11.8757
	(17.4345)	(7.5063)	(7.5847)	(7.8748)	(9.9313)
Other aid	0.2338*	0.1194*	0.0052	0.1544	0.1448
	(0.1211)	(0.0678)	(0.0688)	(0.1053)	(0.0994)
GDP per capita	0.0045	0.0019	0.0032	0.0035	0.0000
	(0.0052)	(0.0026)	(0.0039)	(0.0044)	(0.0030)
Trade openness	-0.0000	-0.0001	-0.0001	-0.0001	-0.0001*
	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)
Economic growth	-0.0014	-0.0009	-0.0006	-0.0015*	-0.0004
	(0.0010)	(0.0009)	(0.0008)	(0.0009)	(0.0008)
Religious fractionalization	-0.0179	0.0362	0.0110	0.0522**	-0.0042
	(0.0291)	(0.0254)	(0.0311)	(0.0206)	(0.0328)
Ethnic fractionalization	0.0000	-0.0106	0.0095	-0.0098	-0.0248
	(0.0377)	(0.0284)	(0.0233)	(0.0244)	(0.0227)
Monarchy	-0.0436	0.0430*	-0.0038	-0.0031	-0.0338
	(0.0294)	(0.0236)	(0.0249)	(0.0315)	(0.0379)
Military regime	0.0456**	0.0827***	0.0478*	0.0708**	0.0189
	(0.0191)	(0.0277)	(0.0248)	(0.0305)	(0.0240)
Limited multi-party regime	-0.0333	0.0425**	0.0291	0.0218	-0.0121
	(0.0275)	(0.0217)	(0.0233)	(0.0254)	(0.0265)
Other regimes	0.0072	0.0892***	0.0399	0.0673*	0.0220
	(0.0391)	(0.0339)	(0.0286)	(0.0363)	(0.0340)
Democracy	-0.0315	0.0242	-0.0016	-0.0187	-0.0324
	(0.0299)	(0.0284)	(0.0246)	(0.0322)	(0.0307)
Monarchy * democracy aid	-11.7935	-63.5962***	-14.2581*	-11.0130	7.1912
	(17.3680)	(7.4713)	(7.5996)	(7.9007)	(13.2524)
Military regime * democracy aid	-7.3528	-63.0368***	-15.1791*	-9.2568	-9.7018
	(17.7538)	(8.5029)	(9.0477)	(9.1142)	(10.7093)
Limited multi-party regime * democracy aid	-7.8139	-61.0266***	-15.1812**	-7.4535	-12.1202
	(17.3909)	(7.5156)	(7.5708)	(7.8410)	(9.9462)
Other regimes * democracy aid	5.1790	-43.4810***	3.6678	7.4389	8.2251
	(17.9805)	(7.6761)	(7.5948)	(9.2103)	(10.0115)
Democracy * democracy aid	-7.9400	-61.4672***	-15.1459**	-6.0113	-11.1670
	(17.3258)	(7.5123)	(7.5430)	(7.9391)	(9.9296)
Constant	0.0961**	-0.0214	0.0354	-0.0140	0.0776*
	(0.0432)	(0.0382)	(0.0433)	(0.0468)	(0.0419)
N	1712	1802	1841	1780	1816
R2	0.030	0.055	0.032	0.040	0.042
Prob > F	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

b) AUT only

	Freedom House (FIW, any change)	**Freedom House (PR, any change)**	**Freedom House (FIW: 1+points)**	**Freedom House (PR: 1+points)**
Democracy aid	62.2380***	19.2872	57.9110***	19.2872
	(15.4711)	(21.8863)	(12.7137)	(21.8863)
Other aid	0.2215	0.1420	0.0259	0.1420
	(0.3195)	(0.2085)	(0.2110)	(0.2085)
GDP per capita	-0.0030	0.0012	0.0025	0.0012
	(0.0106)	(0.0081)	(0.0073)	(0.0081)
Trade openness	0.0001	0.0001	0.0002	0.0001
	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)
Economic growth	-0.0046***	-0.0030**	-0.0022**	-0.0030**
	(0.0012)	(0.0012)	(0.0009)	(0.0012)
Religious fractionalization	0.0462	0.0131	0.0036	0.0131
	(0.0581)	(0.0530)	(0.0334)	(0.0530)
Ethnic fractionalization	0.1117***	0.0643*	0.0626**	0.0643*
	(0.0392)	(0.0368)	(0.0294)	(0.0368)
Monarchy	0.0739	0.0633	-0.0159	0.0633
	(0.0815)	(0.0570)	(0.0470)	(0.0570)
Military regime	0.1102**	0.1018**	0.0431	0.1018**
	(0.0561)	(0.0402)	(0.0391)	(0.0402)
Limited multi-party regime	0.0582	0.0702	0.0007	0.0702
	(0.0576)	(0.0462)	(0.0370)	(0.0462)
Other regimes	0.1514**	0.1680***	0.0818	0.1680***
	(0.0695)	(0.0528)	(0.0499)	(0.0528)
Democracy	0.0000	-0.2389	0.0000	-0.2389
	(.)	(0.7665)	(.)	(0.7665)
Monarchy * democracy aid	-64.8148***	-25.4021	-63.4593***	-25.4021
	(16.4438)	(21.0521)	(14.0561)	(21.0521)
Military regime * democracy aid	-63.1326***	-17.3253	-62.6574***	-17.3253
	(19.3258)	(23.6924)	(12.9608)	(23.6924)
Limited multi-party regime * democracy aid	-55.8983***	-19.3321	-56.7759***	-19.3321
	(15.3659)	(21.8020)	(12.9078)	(21.8020)
Other regimes * democracy aid	-47.0343***	-2.6987	-59.4919***	-2.6987
	(15.9694)	(21.3729)	(13.6634)	(21.3729)
Democracy * democracy aid	0.0000	-14.5390	0.0000	-14.5390
	(.)	(100.0123)	(.)	(100.0123)
Constant	0.1358	0.1335	0.2193**	0.1335
	(0.1240)	(0.1067)	(0.1091)	(0.1067)
N	1090	1137	1090	1137
R2	0.061	0.054	0.061	0.054
Prob > F	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

	Gasiorowski (hybrid)	Gates et al. 2006 (any change)	Polity IV (any change)	Polity IV (3+ points)	Polity IV (5+ points)
Democracy aid	no	32.9746	41.4601	32.9637	40.8277*
	observations	(34.1309)	(32.0147)	(24.8707)	(22.2834)
Other aid		0.0895	0.1342	0.1579	0.1500
		(0.3832)	(0.3686)	(0.2774)	(0.2944)
GDP per capita		-0.0217*	0.0137	0.0038	0.0004
		(0.0126)	(0.0110)	(0.0051)	(0.0039)
Trade openness		-0.0001	-0.0003*	-0.0002	-0.0000
		(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)
Economic growth		-0.0024**	-0.0018	-0.0013	-0.0007
		(0.0012)	(0.0012)	(0.0009)	(0.0009)
Religious fractionalization		0.0285	-0.0372	-0.0135	-0.0183
		(0.0533)	(0.0595)	(0.0477)	(0.0414)
Ethnic fractionalization		-0.0718	-0.0417	-0.0164	0.0323
		(0.0794)	(0.0647)	(0.0541)	(0.0437)
Monarchy		-0.0496	-0.0671	-0.0093	0.0213
		(0.0596)	(0.0808)	(0.0431)	(0.0463)
Military regime		0.0450	0.0162	0.0707	0.0649
		(0.0539)	(0.0611)	(0.0487)	(0.0437)
Limited multi-party regime		0.0360	-0.0696	0.0273	0.0320
		(0.0450)	(0.0688)	(0.0387)	(0.0400)
Other regimes		0.1752*	-0.0819	-0.0352	0.0073
		(0.1063)	(0.0908)	(0.0628)	(0.0575)
Democracy		0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
		(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Monarchy * democracy aid		-39.0597	-45.4738	-36.1656	-44.4556*
		(33.5176)	(33.0960)	(25.6349)	(23.3946)
Military regime * democracy aid		-35.6304	-31.7010	-37.2769	-41.0856*
		(35.7912)	(32.9681)	(25.4740)	(23.7065)
Limited multi-party regime * democracy aid		-39.7544	-38.3341	-33.6378	-41.6847*
		(35.7083)	(33.6305)	(26.0811)	(23.5843)
Other regimes * democracy aid		-191.2576*	-4.3093	-19.0090	-42.1004
		(107.8575)	(40.0045)	(28.3047)	(25.9513)
Democracy * democracy aid		0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
		(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Constant		0.1974	0.5512***	0.3869**	0.2001*
		(0.1414)	(0.1623)	(0.1636)	(0.1158)
N		470	799	799	799
R2		0.059	0.072	0.056	0.043
Prob > F		0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

	Reich 2002 (hybrid)	Skaaning et al. 2015	Wahman et al. 2013 (any change)	Wahman et al. 2013 (1.5+ points)
Democracy aid	no observations	no thresholds for DEM/ AUT	67.5590***	53.7257***
			(16.3281)	(9.0427)
Other aid			0.0651	0.0350
			(0.1499)	(0.0869)
GDP per capita			0.0087	0.0012
			(0.0071)	(0.0024)
Trade openness			-0.0000	-0.0000
			(0.0002)	(0.0001)
Economic growth			-0.0054***	-0.0015**
			(0.0013)	(0.0007)
Religious fractionalization			0.0255	0.0024
			(0.0534)	(0.0266)
Ethnic fractionalization			0.0443	0.0019
			(0.0308)	(0.0182)
Monarchy			0.0436	0.0054
			(0.0698)	(0.0239)
Military regime			0.1567***	0.0606**
			(0.0474)	(0.0273)
Limited multi-party regime			0.0580	0.0075
			(0.0473)	(0.0222)
Other regimes			0.1295**	0.0656**
			(0.0590)	(0.0333)
Democracy			-0.0529	-0.0289
			(0.0605)	(0.0266)
Monarchy * democracy aid			-72.1734***	-55.3920***
			(17.5600)	(9.0603)
Military regime * democracy aid			-58.1747***	-56.8549***
			(19.2091)	(10.4651)
Limited multi-party regime * democracy aid			-65.9406***	-54.0792***
			(16.4120)	(9.0517)
Other regimes * democracy aid			-49.3876***	-53.1112***
			(17.1713)	(9.8640)
Democracy * democracy aid			-68.5522***	-53.4936***
			(16.3272)	(9.0448)
Constant			0.1053	0.0900**
			(0.0847)	(0.0457)
N			1921	1766
R2			0.072	0.058
Prob > F			0.000	0.000

Appendix X: Robustness Checks: Ansell and Samuels 2010

a) all potential reformers

	Freedom House (FIW, any change)		Freedom House (PR, any change)		Freedom House (FIW, 1+ points)		Freedom House (PR, 1+ points)	
	T3, MC	**T3, ME**	**T3, MC**	**T3, ME**	**T3, MC**	**T3, ME**	**T3, MC**	**T3, ME**
Lag Democracy Score	0.0854***	0.0898***	0.0622***	0.0642***	0.0299***	0.0246**	0.0416***	0.1021
	(0.0111)	(0.0093)	(0.0079)	(0.0073)	(0.0077)	(0.0098)	(0.0142)	(0.0801)
Gini	-0.2351	6.6289**	-0.2820	7.5098*	0.4285	10.5823	-0.0679	-86.9676
	(0.5252)	(3.2298)	(0.4178)	(3.9553)	(0.4768)	(9.7770)	(0.6214)	(96.8753)
GDP per capita	-0.0000**	-0.0000*	-0.0000	0.0000	-0.0000	-0.0000	-0.0000	0.0001
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0001)
Rural inequality	-0.1046	-0.0868	-0.0571	-0.0327	-0.0923	-0.0502	-0.0668	-0.4442
	(0.1540)	(0.1431)	(0.1319)	(0.1324)	(0.1086)	(0.1215)	(0.1351)	(0.7051)
Vanhanen Knowledge	-0.0075**	-0.0065***	-0.0102***	-0.0092***	-0.0054**	-0.0053***	-0.0109***	-0.0078
	(0.0031)	(0.0022)	(0.0025)	(0.0021)	(0.0022)	(0.0019)	(0.0035)	(0.0105)
Year	0.0090***	0.0066**	0.0109***	0.0075***	0.0046**	0.0012	0.0121***	0.0244
	(0.0027)	(0.0026)	(0.0024)	(0.0028)	(0.0019)	(0.0038)	(0.0027)	(0.0172)
Constant	-17.5376***	-15.8858***	-21.2548***	-18.1433***	-9.1126**	-7.1304	-23.7043***	-8.8248
	(5.1626)	(4.7781)	(4.7606)	(4.7370)	(3.7953)	(4.4212)	(5.3742)	(26.3605)
N	2207	2206	1999	1998	1834	1833	1587	1587
R2	0.050		0.056		0.020		0.035	
Prob > F	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.282	0.000	1.000

	Gasiorowski 1996 (hybrid)		Gates et al. 2006 (any change)		Polity IV (any change)		Polity IV (3+ points)		Polity IV (5+ points)	
	T3, MC	**T3, ME**	**T3, MC**	**T3, ME**	**T3, MC**	**T3, ME**	**T3, MC**	**T3, ME**	**T3, MC**	**T3, ME**
Lag Democracy Score	-0.0224**	-0.0243***	-0.1610***	-0.1606***	-0.0099***	-0.0103***	-0.0058***	-0.0057***	-0.0025	-0.0025*
	(0.0085)	(0.0063)	(0.0211)	(0.0162)	(0.0017)	(0.0014)	(0.0019)	(0.0014)	(0.0022)	(0.0015)
Gini	0.2866	-1.4650	0.1197	1.1520*	0.0446	0.8302	0.1723	1.0149	0.1799	0.4370
	(0.2122)	(1.6875)	(0.1711)	(0.6888)	(0.1545)	(0.8912)	(0.1945)	(0.9478)	(0.1802)	(0.8511)
GDP per capita	-0.0000	0.0000	-0.0000***	-0.0000**	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000**	0.0000***
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
Rural inequality	0.0167	-0.0277	-0.0960**	-0.0888*	-0.1010*	-0.0743	-0.0661	-0.0320	-0.0696	-0.0587
	(0.0289)	(0.0574)	(0.0477)	(0.0469)	(0.0510)	(0.0737)	(0.0518)	(0.0693)	(0.0485)	(0.0624)
Vanhanen Knowledge	0.0001	-0.0003	-0.0027***	-0.0024***	-0.0031**	-0.0030**	-0.0035**	-0.0031**	-0.0043***	-0.0042***
	(0.0009)	(0.0008)	(0.0008)	(0.0008)	(0.0015)	(0.0012)	(0.0014)	(0.0012)	(0.0012)	(0.0011)
Year	0.0008	0.0000	0.0032***	0.0031***	0.0046***	0.0047***	0.0040***	0.0042***	0.0040***	0.0041***
	(0.0006)	(0.0010)	(0.0009)	(0.0007)	(0.0014)	(0.0011)	(0.0014)	(0.0010)	(0.0012)	(0.0009)
Constant	-1.6174	0.6881	-6.1236***	-6.2959***	-8.8343***	-9.5434***	-7.8162***	-8.6820***	-7.9346***	-8.1177***
	(1.2463)	(2.5596)	(1.6909)	(1.3949)	(2.7910)	(2.2870)	(2.7879)	(2.1923)	(2.2896)	(1.9261)
N	1949	1949	3602	3601	2948	2947	2512	2511	2265	2265
R2	0.014		0.033		0.029		0.022		0.033	
Prob > F	0.135	0.999	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

	Reich 2002 (hybrid)		Skaaning et al. 2015		Wahman et al. 2013 (any change)		Wahman et al. 2013 (1.5+ points)	
	T3, MC	**T3, ME**	**T3, MC**	**T3, ME**	**T3, MC**	**T3, ME**	**T3, MC**	**T3, ME**
Lag Democracy Score	-0.0201***	-0.0197***	-0.0474**	0.1847	-0.0481***	-0.0521***	-0.0234***	-0.0242***
	(0.0056)	(0.0038)	(0.0200)	(0.5082)	(0.0061)	(0.0060)	(0.0044)	(0.0032)
Gini	0.0670	-0.1183	-0.2230	114.2926	-0.3103	7.0360**	0.4131	4.7208
	(0.0825)	(0.2591)	(0.9169)	(248.6343)	(0.4936)	(3.5409)	(0.3062)	(2.8768)
GDP per capita	-0.0000**	-0.0000**	-0.0000	-0.0001	-0.0000***	-0.0000**	-0.0000	-0.0000
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0003)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
Rural inequality	-0.0059	-0.0123	-0.0869	0.6900	-0.1556	-0.1229	-0.0408	-0.0319
	(0.0332)	(0.0273)	(0.1388)	(1.8286)	(0.1677)	(0.1522)	(0.1051)	(0.0839)
Vanhanen Knowledge	-0.0004	-0.0005	-0.0120**	-0.0066	-0.0082***	-0.0073***	-0.0052***	-0.0048***
	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0049)	(0.0179)	(0.0030)	(0.0023)	(0.0017)	(0.0013)
Year	0.0012**	0.0012***	0.0187***	-0.0024	0.0121***	0.0101***	0.0059***	0.0041**
	(0.0005)	(0.0004)	(0.0038)	(0.0480)	(0.0030)	(0.0028)	(0.0017)	(0.0019)
Constant	-2.2397**	-2.1474***	-36.2772***	-47.1822	-22.9262***	-22.3818***	-11.5615***	-9.9160***
	(1.0181)	(0.7971)	(7.4536)	(36.3747)	(5.7762)	(5.1779)	(3.3009)	(3.1340)
N	3265	3265	1386	1386	2215	2214	1968	1967
R2	0.011		0.048		0.044		0.039	
Prob > F	0.013	0.971	0.000	1.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

	V-Dem: Electoral Democracy		V-Dem: Liberal Democracy		V-Dem: Participatory Democracy		V-Dem: Deliberative Democracy		V-Dem: Egalitarian Democracy	
	T3, MC	**T3, ME**	**T3, MC**	**T3, ME**	**T3, MC**	**T3, ME**	**T3, MC**	**T3, ME**	**T3, MC**	**T3, ME**
Lag Democracy Score	-0.2357***	-0.2369***	-0.1500***	-0.1606***	-0.2173***	-0.2252***	-0.1853***	-0.1876***	-0.1838***	-0.1895***
	(0.0421)	(0.0298)	(0.0404)	(0.0340)	(0.0646)	(0.0499)	(0.0365)	(0.0321)	(0.0537)	(0.0401)
Gini	0.1841	0.3553	0.1722	1.0257*	0.2558*	1.0467	0.2741*	0.7293	0.1258	0.6964
	(0.1314)	(0.6222)	(0.1119)	(0.6037)	(0.1526)	(0.6766)	(0.1614)	(0.6367)	(0.1109)	(0.5975)
GDP per capita	-0.0000	-0.0000	-0.0000**	-0.0000**	-0.0000	-0.0000	-0.0000**	-0.0000**	-0.0000*	-0.0000
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
Rural inequality	-0.0595	-0.0549	-0.0842	-0.0617	-0.1607**	-0.1392**	-0.1634***	-0.1508**	-0.1145**	-0.0989*
	(0.0553)	(0.0571)	(0.0574)	(0.0547)	(0.0643)	(0.0623)	(0.0613)	(0.0589)	(0.0560)	(0.0549)
Vanhanen Knowledge	-0.0017*	-0.0016*	-0.0014	-0.0010	-0.0018	-0.0015	-0.0017	-0.0015	-0.0014	-0.0012
	(0.0010)	(0.0009)	(0.0010)	(0.0009)	(0.0014)	(0.0010)	(0.0012)	(0.0009)	(0.0010)	(0.0009)
Year	0.0036***	0.0036***	0.0035***	0.0035***	0.0038***	0.0038***	0.0036***	0.0036***	0.0031***	0.0031***
	(0.0010)	(0.0008)	(0.0011)	(0.0008)	(0.0013)	(0.0009)	(0.0011)	(0.0008)	(0.0009)	(0.0008)
Constant	-6.8727***	-6.9470***	-6.7869***	-7.1882***	-7.3856***	-7.7338***	-7.0359***	-7.2248***	-5.9414***	-6.1866***
	(1.9259)	(1.6271)	(2.0856)	(1.5653)	(2.5053)	(1.7867)	(2.0521)	(1.6772)	(1.7870)	(1.5599)
N	3827	3826	3827	3826	3827	3826	3827	3826	3827	3826
R2	0.021		0.018		0.021		0.023		0.017	
Prob > F	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

	V-Dem: Electoral Democracy (ordinal)		V-Dem: Liberal Democracy (ordinal)		V-Dem: Participatory Democracy (ordinal)		V-Dem: Deliberative Democracy (ordinal)		V-Dem: Egalitarian Democracy (ordinal)	
	T3, MC	**T3, ME**	**T3, MC**	**T3, ME**	**T3, MC**	**T3, ME**	**T3, MC**	**T3, ME**	**T3, MC**	**T3, ME**
Lag Democracy Score	-0.1592***	-0.1711***	-0.1650***	-0.1950***	-0.2268***	-0.2315***	-0.1817***	-0.1968***	-0.2340***	-0.2984***
	(0.0457)	(0.0410)	(0.0344)	(0.0308)	(0.0309)	(0.0247)	(0.0312)	(0.0259)	(0.0494)	(0.0382)
Gini	-0.0128	1.3387	0.1459	1.9318*	-0.0038	0.4101	0.0729	1.2144*	0.1927	4.0567***
	(0.1481)	(1.2735)	(0.1180)	(1.0581)	(0.0916)	(0.4462)	(0.1135)	(0.7197)	(0.1325)	(1.1787)
GDP per capita	0.0000**	0.0000***	0.0000	0.0000***	-0.0000	-0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
Rural inequality	-0.1030*	-0.0556	-0.0407	0.0185	-0.1242***	-0.1132***	-0.1024**	-0.0682	-0.1305***	0.0065
	(0.0589)	(0.0758)	(0.0480)	(0.0585)	(0.0393)	(0.0409)	(0.0405)	(0.0512)	(0.0465)	(0.0667)
Vanhanen Knowledge	-0.0040***	-0.0039***	-0.0032***	-0.0031***	-0.0022**	-0.0020***	-0.0020*	-0.0017**	-0.0011	-0.0004
	(0.0013)	(0.0011)	(0.0011)	(0.0008)	(0.0008)	(0.0007)	(0.0011)	(0.0008)	(0.0013)	(0.0009)
Year	0.0037***	0.0043***	0.0035***	0.0042***	0.0029***	0.0029***	0.0037***	0.0039***	0.0021**	0.0036***
	(0.0011)	(0.0011)	(0.0009)	(0.0008)	(0.0009)	(0.0006)	(0.0009)	(0.0007)	(0.0010)	(0.0009)
Constant	-7.1192***	-8.8979***	-6.8657***	-9.0016***	-5.5633***	-5.7648***	-7.1256***	-8.0032***	-3.9834**	-8.7642***
	(2.1354)	(2.5548)	(1.7991)	(1.9196)	(1.7972)	(1.1826)	(1.6703)	(1.5256)	(1.9928)	(2.1572)
N	2996	2995	3343	3342	3810	3809	3419	3418	3374	3373
R2	0.021		0.029		0.032		0.036		0.033	
Prob > F	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

b) AUT only

	Freedom House (FIW, any change)		Freedom House (PR, any change)		Freedom House (FIW, 1+ points)		Freedom House (PR, 1+ points)	
	T3, MC	**T3, ME**	**T3, MC**	**T3, ME**	**T3, MC**	**T3, ME**	**T3, MC**	**T3, ME**
Lag Democracy Score	0.0435**	0.1538	0.0366**	0.0738**	-0.0070	0.0324	0.0346**	0.0784**
	(0.0205)	(0.1008)	(0.0149)	(0.0302)	(0.0158)	(0.0431)	(0.0156)	(0.0319)
Gini	-0.5464	-57.9453	-0.2816	-18.7371	0.7809	-19.6845	-0.2008	-21.8923*
	(0.8605)	(47.1835)	(0.6729)	(12.0208)	(0.8408)	(20.1655)	(0.7344)	(12.7030)
GDP per capita	-0.0000	0.0002	-0.0000	0.0001	-0.0000	0.0001	-0.0000	0.0001
	(0.0000)	(0.0002)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0001)	(0.0000)	(0.0001)
Rural inequality	-0.0029	-0.2694	0.0682	0.0099	-0.0225	-0.1175	0.0327	-0.0359
	(0.1345)	(0.4421)	(0.1119)	(0.1852)	(0.0838)	(0.1889)	(0.1111)	(0.1957)
Vanhanen Knowledge	-0.0077*	-0.0051	-0.0108***	-0.0094***	-0.0051**	-0.0042	-0.0105***	-0.0089**
	(0.0046)	(0.0076)	(0.0037)	(0.0034)	(0.0022)	(0.0032)	(0.0035)	(0.0036)
Year	0.0129***	0.0175**	0.0143***	0.0163***	0.0075***	0.0092***	0.0140***	0.0163***
	(0.0035)	(0.0083)	(0.0028)	(0.0037)	(0.0017)	(0.0035)	(0.0027)	(0.0039)
Constant	-25.0009***	-9.2195	-27.9867***	-23.8496***	-14.9724***	-9.3457	-27.3934***	-22.5308***
	(6.8121)	(19.5188)	(5.4240)	(7.3188)	(3.4401)	(8.3420)	(5.2670)	(7.7341)
N	1367	1367	1392	1392	1367	1367	1392	1392
R2	0.025		0.033		0.023		0.036	
Prob > F	0.001	0.757	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.989	0.000	0.000

	Gasiorowski 1996 (hybrid)		Gates et al. 2006 (any change)		Polity IV (any change)		Polity IV (3+ points)		Polity IV (5+ points)	
	T3, MC	**T3, ME**	**T3, MC**	**T3, ME**	**T3, MC**	**T3, ME**	**T3, MC**	**T3, ME**	**T3, MC**	**T3, ME**
Lag Democracy Score	insufficient observations		-0.1346	-0.3643**	0.0012	0.0011	0.0098*	0.0097***	0.0073	0.0073***
			(0.0869)	(0.1760)	(0.0060)	(0.0039)	(0.0057)	(0.0031)	(0.0047)	(0.0027)
Gini			0.6224	27.4112*	0.1550	0.5567	0.2528	0.6489	0.3001	0.2805
			(0.5716)	(15.2983)	(0.3295)	(0.7857)	(0.2753)	(0.6332)	(0.2573)	(0.5392)
GDP per capita			-0.0000	-0.0001*	0.0000	0.0000*	0.0000*	0.0000**	0.0000*	0.0000**
			(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
Rural inequality			-0.1140***	0.4461	-0.1102	-0.0889	-0.0886	-0.0676	-0.0086	-0.0096
			(0.0426)	(0.3476)	(0.1034)	(0.0951)	(0.0686)	(0.0766)	(0.0692)	(0.0653)
Vanhanen Knowledge			-0.0061***	0.0048	-0.0044*	-0.0042**	-0.0045**	-0.0044***	-0.0055***	-0.0055***
			(0.0016)	(0.0070)	(0.0022)	(0.0019)	(0.0017)	(0.0015)	(0.0017)	(0.0013)
Year			0.0071***	0.0098***	0.0059**	0.0061***	0.0046**	0.0047***	0.0051***	0.0051***
			(0.0013)	(0.0031)	(0.0026)	(0.0017)	(0.0019)	(0.0014)	(0.0017)	(0.0012)
Constant			-13.9160***	-31.6344***	-11.5352**	-12.0600***	-8.9028**	-9.4202***	-9.9251***	-9.8996***
			(2.5341)	(11.4297)	(5.1221)	(3.4454)	(3.7374)	(2.7768)	(3.3390)	(2.3644)
N			1843	1843	1904	1904	1904	1904	1904	1904
R2			0.030		0.030		0.036		0.033	
Prob > F			0.000	1.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.000

	Reich 2002 (hybrid)		Skaaning et al. 2015		Wahman et al. 2013 (any change)		Wahman et al. 2013 (1.5+ points)	
	T3, MC	**T3, ME**	**T3, MC**	**T3, ME**	**T3, MC**	**T3, ME**	**T3, MC**	**T3, ME**
Lag Democracy Score	insufficient observations		no DEM/ AUT threshold		-0.0182	-0.0490**	0.0006	-0.0121
					(0.0136)	(0.0229)	(0.0111)	(0.0115)
Gini					-0.6576	-25.3300*	1.0121**	-9.1285
					(0.5983)	(14.4428)	(0.4820)	(7.2471)
GDP per capita					-0.0000	-0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
					(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
Rural inequality					-0.1118	-0.2400	-0.0455	-0.0982
					(0.1405)	(0.2427)	(0.0953)	(0.1218)
Vanhanen Knowledge					-0.0137***	-0.0115***	-0.0092***	-0.0084***
					(0.0048)	(0.0044)	(0.0027)	(0.0022)
Year					0.0179***	0.0206***	0.0087***	0.0098***
					(0.0036)	(0.0047)	(0.0018)	(0.0024)
Constant					-34.3658***	-28.4234***	-17.3684***	-14.9260***
					(7.0280)	(9.4961)	(3.4188)	(4.7650)
N					1500	1500	1500	1500
R2					0.041		0.037	
Prob > F					0.000	0.000	0.000	0.114

Appendix XI: Robustness Checks: Gibler and Randazzo 2011

a) all potential reformers

	Freedom House (FIW, any change)	**Freedom House (PR, any change)**	**Freedom House (FIW, 1+ points)**	**Freedom House (PR, 1+ points)**
Established Judiciary	-0.506**	-0.777***	-1.155**	-0.721***
	(0.20)	(0.28)	(0.50)	(0.28)
Newly Formed Judiciary	0.269	0.586**	0.749*	0.636**
	(0.26)	(0.29)	(0.42)	(0.29)
Independent Legislature	-0.018	-0.349**	-0.474**	-0.375**
	(0.13)	(0.16)	(0.24)	(0.16)
Wealth (log of GDP)	-0.209***	-0.257***	-0.379***	-0.220***
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.13)	(0.08)
Age of Democracy (logged)	-0.011***	-0.009	-0.002	-0.011*
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Past Democratic Reversions	0.169	0.227	0.333	0.217
	(0.12)	(0.15)	(0.23)	(0.15)
Economic Crisis	-0.142	0.013	-0.086	0.030
	(0.12)	(0.15)	(0.23)	(0.15)
Presence of Territorial Rivalry	0.135	0.266	0.607**	0.301*
	(0.14)	(0.17)	(0.25)	(0.17)
Highest level of militarization among neighbors	0.124	0.018	-0.043	-0.036
	(0.13)	(0.16)	(0.25)	(0.17)
Constant	0.450	0.071	-0.235	-0.494
	(0.86)	(1.07)	(1.65)	(1.09)
N	3022	2739	2744	2736
Chi2	94.794	104.639	64.370	97.659
Prob>Chi2	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Pseudo-R2	0.043	0.067	0.081	0.065

	Gasiorowski 1996 (hybrid)	Gates et al. 2006 (any change)	Polity IV (any change)	Polity IV (3+ points)	Polity IV (5+ points)
Established Judiciary	-0.427	-1.138**	-1.564***	-3.255***	0.000
	(1.25)	(0.50)	(0.48)	(1.20)	(.)
Newly Formed Judiciary	1.387	0.440	0.642*	0.521	0.349
	(1.13)	(0.44)	(0.38)	(0.60)	(0.71)
Independent Legislature	-0.969*	-1.074***	-0.211	-1.086***	-2.374***
	(0.59)	(0.22)	(0.20)	(0.30)	(0.36)
Wealth (log of GDP)	0.035	-0.332***	-0.195*	-0.216	-0.485**
	(0.28)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.19)	(0.23)
Age of Democracy (logged)	0.018	-0.006	0.004	0.014	0.012
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Past Democratic Reversions	1.241**	0.465**	0.501***	0.502*	0.032
	(0.50)	(0.21)	(0.19)	(0.28)	(0.34)
Economic Crisis	-0.114	-0.247	0.152	-0.235	-0.157
	(0.46)	(0.21)	(0.19)	(0.28)	(0.33)
Presence of Territorial Rivalry	1.061**	0.559**	0.295	0.063	0.372
	(0.48)	(0.23)	(0.20)	(0.30)	(0.34)
Highest level of militarization among neighbors	-0.655	-0.062	-0.009	0.229	0.837**
	(0.69)	(0.24)	(0.21)	(0.32)	(0.34)
Constant	-8.294**	-0.169	-1.946	-0.644	5.357**
	(3.66)	(1.49)	(1.34)	(2.09)	(2.51)
N	2160	3192	3932	3325	1280
Chi2	20.306	104.659	61.928	62.313	70.125
Prob>Chi2	0.016	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Pseudo-R2	0.089	0.109	0.055	0.104	0.171

	Reich 2002 (hybrid)	Skaaning et al. 2015	Wahman et al. 2013 (any change)	Wahman et al. 2013 (1.5+ points)
Established Judiciary	-0.410	-2.842**	-0.469**	-0.979
	(0.92)	(1.12)	(0.20)	(0.77)
Newly Formed Judiciary	0.150	0.483	0.306	1.433**
	(1.06)	(0.56)	(0.25)	(0.59)
Independent Legislature	-0.581	-1.624***	0.173	-0.960**
	(0.47)	(0.25)	(0.13)	(0.40)
Wealth (log of GDP)	-0.119	-0.302**	-0.130**	-0.231
	(0.25)	(0.14)	(0.06)	(0.20)
Age of Democracy (logged)	-0.011	0.005	-0.013***	0.007
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Past Democratic Reversions	1.244***	0.603***	0.206*	0.679*
	(0.43)	(0.21)	(0.12)	(0.35)
Economic Crisis	-0.209	-0.146	-0.159	0.084
	(0.41)	(0.21)	(0.12)	(0.36)
Presence of Territorial Rivalry	1.004**	0.411*	0.145	0.690*
	(0.41)	(0.24)	(0.13)	(0.37)
Highest level of militarization among neighbors	-0.785	0.405*	-0.044	-0.404
	(0.56)	(0.24)	(0.13)	(0.43)
Constant	-7.583**	1.421	-1.077	-4.137
	(3.22)	(1.61)	(0.83)	(2.70)
N	3470	3394	3258	2884
Chi2	29.826	155.918	76.356	32.257
Prob>Chi2	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Pseudo-R2	0.097	0.162	0.033	0.081

	V-Dem: Electoral Democracy	V-Dem: Liberal Democracy	V-Dem: Participatory Democracy	V-Dem: Deliberative Democracy	V-Dem: Egalitarian Democracy
Established Judiciary	-0.774	-0.724	-0.043	-0.476	-0.732
	(0.49)	(0.44)	(0.33)	(0.39)	(0.45)
Newly Formed Judiciary	0.512	0.741*	0.387	0.547	0.614
	(0.49)	(0.42)	(0.41)	(0.42)	(0.45)
Independent Legislature	-0.851***	-0.521**	-0.548**	-1.309***	-0.450*
	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.22)	(0.24)	(0.24)
Wealth (log of GDP)	-0.196	-0.240*	-0.009	-0.178	-0.194
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.13)
Age of Democracy (logged)	-0.004	-0.000	0.003	-0.000	0.001
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Past Democratic Reversions	0.763***	0.762***	0.994***	1.019***	0.758***
	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.21)	(0.21)
Economic Crisis	-0.019	-0.061	0.028	-0.125	-0.020
	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.22)	(0.22)
Presence of Territorial Rivalry	0.368*	0.505**	0.368*	0.452**	0.399*
	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.22)
Highest level of militarization among neighbors	-0.175	-0.401	-0.240	-0.130	-0.170
	(0.23)	(0.25)	(0.21)	(0.23)	(0.24)
Constant	-2.481*	-3.335**	-4.544***	-1.891	-2.875*
	(1.45)	(1.56)	(1.42)	(1.60)	(1.55)
N	3894	3868	3817	2952	3941
Chi2	82.664	63.167	45.424	100.538	47.207
Prob>Chi2	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Pseudo-R2	0.078	0.065	0.042	0.110	0.051

	V-Dem: Electoral Democracy (ordinal)	V-Dem: Liberal Democracy (ordinal)	V-Dem: Participatory Democracy (ordinal)	V-Dem: Deliberative Democracy (ordinal)	V-Dem: Egalitarian Democracy (ordinal)
Established Judiciary	-1.228**	-0.400	-1.422**	-0.651	-0.382
	(0.54)	(0.49)	(0.72)	(0.41)	(0.45)
Newly Formed Judiciary	0.292	-0.027	-0.140	0.105	-0.580
	(0.49)	(0.63)	(0.77)	(0.49)	(0.74)
Independent Legislature	-1.983***	-3.248***	-3.213***	-3.059***	-1.583***
	(0.24)	(0.36)	(0.45)	(0.36)	(0.33)
Wealth (log of GDP)	-0.251*	-0.274	-0.089	-0.088	-0.188
	(0.14)	(0.18)	(0.23)	(0.17)	(0.18)
Age of Democracy (logged)	-0.011	0.001	0.004	0.001	-0.013
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Past Democratic Reversions	0.691***	0.183	0.353	0.293	0.643**
	(0.21)	(0.32)	(0.43)	(0.31)	(0.29)
Economic Crisis	-0.403*	-0.173	0.398	0.048	-0.115
	(0.22)	(0.32)	(0.39)	(0.30)	(0.31)
Presence of Territorial Rivalry	0.398*	0.586*	1.174***	0.576*	0.220
	(0.22)	(0.33)	(0.43)	(0.33)	(0.32)
Highest level of militarization among neighbors	0.357	0.116	0.583	-0.009	0.546*
	(0.24)	(0.35)	(0.38)	(0.30)	(0.31)
Constant	1.828	1.917	1.632	0.049	1.611
	(1.61)	(2.16)	(2.73)	(2.05)	(2.14)
N	2634	1990	1840	1855	2137
Chi2	208.077	140.108	102.981	105.049	72.241
Prob>Chi2	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Pseudo-R2	0.220	0.264	0.278	0.186	0.136

b) DEM only

	Freedom House (FIW, any change)	**Freedom House (PR, any change)**	**Freedom House (FIW, 1+ points)**	**Freedom House (PR, 1+ points)**
Established Judiciary	-0.530**	-0.990***	-0.724	-0.895***
	(0.25)	(0.34)	(0.52)	(0.34)
Newly Formed Judiciary	0.385	0.683*	0.672	0.744**
	(0.32)	(0.35)	(0.53)	(0.36)
Independent Legislature	-2.164***	-2.662***	-3.328***	-2.728***
	(0.46)	(0.52)	(0.51)	(0.52)
Wealth (log of GDP)	-0.422***	-0.295*	-0.533**	-0.288*
	(0.13)	(0.16)	(0.22)	(0.16)
Age of Democracy (logged)	-0.013**	-0.015*	-0.015	-0.016**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Past Democratic Reversions	0.050	0.217	0.331	0.296
	(0.21)	(0.27)	(0.39)	(0.27)
Economic Crisis	-0.241	-0.049	-0.066	-0.050
	(0.20)	(0.25)	(0.36)	(0.25)
Presence of Territorial Rivalry	0.324	0.093	0.797**	0.138
	(0.23)	(0.30)	(0.39)	(0.30)
Highest level of militarization among neighbors	0.081	-0.022	-0.184	-0.034
	(0.20)	(0.25)	(0.40)	(0.25)
Constant	4.425***	2.932	3.512	2.772
	(1.57)	(1.90)	(2.79)	(1.93)
N	1432	1399	1432	1399
Chi2	128.516	125.252	108.206	122.826
Prob>Chi2	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Pseudo-R2	0.133	0.179	0.266	0.181

	Gasiorowski 1996 (hybrid)	**Gates et al. 2006 (any change)**	**Polity IV (any change)**	**Polity IV (3+ points)**	**Polity IV (5+ points)**
Established Judiciary	0.589	-1.066*		-2.033*	0.000
	(1.28)	(0.59)	not concave	(1.08)	(.)
Newly Formed Judiciary	1.406	0.256		0.435	0.445
	(1.30)	(0.55)		(0.64)	(0.76)
Independent Legislature	-4.146***	0.000		-6.120***	-5.541***
	(0.86)	(.)		(0.80)	(0.63)
Wealth (log of GDP)	0.021	-0.739***		-0.811***	-0.758**
	(0.40)	(0.25)		(0.31)	(0.34)
Age of Democracy (logged)	0.072	-0.020		-0.007	-0.003
	(0.05)	(0.02)		(0.02)	(0.02)
Past Democratic Reversions	0.872	0.536		0.874*	0.678
	(0.77)	(0.40)		(0.46)	(0.54)
Economic Crisis	1.115	-0.156		0.231	0.089
	(0.73)	(0.38)		(0.44)	(0.50)
Presence of Territorial Rivalry	1.107*	-0.124		-0.217	0.168
	(0.67)	(0.44)		(0.52)	(0.54)
Highest level of militarization among neighbors	0.718	-0.091		0.088	0.134
	(1.03)	(0.40)		(0.46)	(0.51)
Constant	1.194	2.382		8.839***	7.752**
	(5.02)	(2.90)		(3.42)	(3.72)
N	176	1815		1939	905
Chi2	48.386	49.111		235.415	152.346
Prob>Chi2	0.000	0.000		0.000	0.000
Pseudo-R2	0.402	0.145		0.515	0.465

	Reich 2002 (hybrid)	Skaaning et al. 2015	Wahman et al. 2013 (any change)	Wahman et al. 2013 (1.5+ points)
Established Judiciary	-0.066	no thresholds	-0.377	-0.423
	(1.17)	for DEM/	(0.26)	(1.03)
Newly Formed Judiciary	0.326	AUT	-0.246	0.344
	(1.16)		(0.38)	(1.18)
Independent Legislature	-3.936***		0.000	0.000
	(0.70)		(.)	(.)
Wealth (log of GDP)	0.097		-0.543***	-0.292
	(0.33)		(0.14)	(0.60)
Age of Democracy (logged)	0.039		-0.012**	-0.005
	(0.04)		(0.01)	(0.02)
Past Democratic Reversions	0.596		0.490**	1.111
	(0.61)		(0.24)	(0.90)
Economic Crisis	0.353		-0.064	1.408
	(0.60)		(0.22)	(0.94)
Presence of Territorial Rivalry	1.200**		0.158	-0.423
	(0.58)		(0.25)	(1.22)
Highest level of militarization among neighbors	0.855		-0.175	-3.677**
	(0.67)		(0.22)	(1.63)
Constant	1.337		2.033	-19.981**
	(4.29)		(1.65)	(9.16)
N	350		1270	1270
Chi2	60.631		85.883	15.634
Prob>Chi2	0.000		0.000	0.048
Pseudo-R2	0.369		0.111	0.205

Appendix XII: Robustness Checks: Goldstone et al. 2010

a) all potential reformers

	Freedom House (FIW: any change)	Fredom House (PR: any change)	Freedom House (FIW: 1+ points)	Freedom House (PR: 1+ points)
Partial Autocracy	1.095	0.854	1.925	0.854
	(1.47)	(1.55)	(1.54)	(1.55)
Partial Democracy with Factionalism	5.279**	6.069**	5.463***	6.069**
	(2.08)	(2.59)	(2.11)	(2.59)
Partial Democracy without Factionalism	1.610	1.769	1.906	1.769
	(1.53)	(1.51)	(1.49)	(1.51)
Full Democracy	7.269**	4.138	4.185	4.138
	(3.20)	(6.96)	(3.96)	(6.96)
Infant mortality	4.084**	5.066**	3.559*	5.066**
	(1.96)	(2.50)	(1.93)	(2.50)
Armed conflict in 4+ Bordering States	15.873	12.642		12.642
	(3144.58)	(6801.26)		(6801.26)
State-Led Discrimination	-1.327	-0.849	-0.653	-0.849
	(1.09)	(1.12)	(1.03)	(1.12)
N	66	63	52	63
Chi2	30.265	31.631	23.141	31.631
Prob>Chi2	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.000
Pseudo-R2	0.625	0.702	0.634	0.702

	Gasiorowski 1996 (hybrid)	Gates et al. 2006 (any change)	Polity IV (any change)	Polity IV (3+ points)	Polity IV (5+ points)
Partial Autocracy	not concave	1.805	3.760***	3.434**	0.573
		(1.21)	(1.12)	(1.38)	(1.57)
Partial Democracy with Factionalism		3.898***	5.350***	5.425***	2.728*
		(1.32)	(1.16)	(1.42)	(1.40)
Partial Democracy without Factionalism		1.677	3.160***	3.221**	0.193
		(1.05)	(1.07)	(1.26)	(1.39)
Full Democracy		-15.569	2.510*	2.354	-0.183
		(3789.08)	(1.28)	(1.64)	(1.76)
Infant mortality		1.234*	1.471**	1.645**	1.807**
		(0.74)	(0.58)	(0.65)	(0.78)
Armed conflict in 4+ Bordering States		-0.394	-1.090	-1.367	0.000
		(7645.49)	(1.75)	(1.92)	(.)
State-Led Discrimination		0.390	-0.814	-1.074	-0.867
		(0.97)	(0.63)	(0.76)	(0.81)
N		81	185	148	98
Chi2		31.130	78.082	63.179	34.820
Prob>Chi2		0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Pseudo-R2		0.540	0.593	0.605	0.502

	Reich 2002 (hybrid)	Skaaning et al. 2015	Wahman et al. 2013 (any change)	Wahman et al. 2013 (1.5+ points)
Partial Autocracy	not concave	-16.009	1.568	not concave
		(7824.06)	(1.42)	
Partial Democracy with Factionalism		3.875***	4.929***	
		(1.33)	(1.73)	
Partial Democracy without Factionalism		1.596	2.834*	
		(1.40)	(1.51)	
Full Democracy		-12.346	4.678*	
		(5591.16)	(2.53)	
Infant mortality		2.043	2.255**	
		(1.93)	(1.02)	
Armed conflict in 4+ Bordering States		-16.980	-0.536	
		(4971.68)	(1.68)	
State-Led Discrimination		-0.009	-1.403	
		(1.26)	(0.96)	
N		67	80	
Chi2		33.309	31.530	
Prob>Chi2		0.000	0.000	
Pseudo-R2		0.708	0.545	

	V-Dem: Electoral Democracy	V-Dem: Liberal Democracy	V-Dem: Participatory Democracy	V-Dem: Deliberative Democracy	V-Dem: Egalitarian Democracy
Partial Autocracy	1.704*	not concave	2.412**	1.694	2.320**
	(0.87)		(1.03)	(1.35)	(1.03)
Partial Democracy with Factionalism	3.080***		2.712***	3.249***	3.202***
	(0.95)		(0.86)	(1.24)	(1.05)
Partial Democracy without Factionalism	1.921**		2.584**	2.337*	2.320**
	(0.93)		(1.03)	(1.24)	(1.01)
Full Democracy	0.815		2.950*	1.010	1.937
	(1.19)		(1.55)	(1.92)	(1.39)
Infant mortality	0.541		1.418*	1.421	0.817
	(0.61)		(0.83)	(1.01)	(0.65)
Armed conflict in 4+ Bordering States	14.481		-16.781	14.069	14.347
	(2247.90)		(3187.08)	(4187.88)	(1886.29)
State-Led Discrimination	-0.196		0.460	-0.199	-0.388
	(0.74)		(0.70)	(0.83)	(0.84)
N	89		87	68	77
Chi2	23.757		22.944	24.234	21.420
Prob>Chi2	0.003		0.002	0.002	0.003
Pseudo-R2	0.373		0.372	0.491	0.387

	V-Dem: Electoral Democracy (ordinal)	V-Dem: Liberal Democracy (ordinal)	V-Dem: Participatory Democracy (ordinal)	V-Dem: Deliberative Democracy (ordinal)	V-Dem: Egalitarian Democracy (ordinal)
Partial Autocracy	0.433	35.394	not concave	not concave	not concave
	(1.51)	(48632700.04)			
Partial Democracy with Factionalism	19.976	34.018			
	(5593.66)	(48632700.04)			
Partial Democracy without Factionalism	1.313	32.549			
	(1.25)	(48632700.04)			
Full Democracy	-1.639	16.928			
	(1.81)	(48632700.20)			
Infant mortality	0.309	2.341			
	(0.95)	(2.15)			
Armed conflict in 4+ Bordering States	16.362	0.000			
	(12681.42)	(.)			
State-Led Discrimination	-0.641	-0.578			
	(1.28)	(1.64)			
N	54	27			
Chi2	22.990	12.476			
Prob>Chi2	0.003	0.014			
Pseudo-R2	0.571	0.620			

b) DEM only

	Freedom House (FIW: any change)	Fredom House (PR: any change)	Freedom House (FIW: 1+ points)	Freedom House (PR: 1+ points)
Partial Autocracy	not concave	not concave	not concave	not concave
Partial Democracy with Factionalism				
Partial Democracy without Factionalism				
Full Democracy				
Infant mortality				
Armed conflict in 4+ Bordering States				
State-Led Discrimination				
N				
Chi2				
Prob>Chi2				
Pseudo-R2				

	Gasiorowski 1996 (hybrid)	Gates et al. 2006 (any change)	Polity IV (any change)	Polity IV (3+ points)	Polity IV (5+ points)
Partial Autocracy	not concave	not concave	2.788	1.890	-32.585
			(2.68)	(2.80)	(28969612.04)
Partial Democracy with Factionalism			2.103	1.983	-32.179
			(2.09)	(2.01)	(28969612.04)
Partial Democracy without Factionalism			-18.244	-18.348	-52.012
			(6723.31)	(8058.92)	(28969613.08)
Full Democracy			-51.839	-52.477	-50.849
			(12538.36)	(14791.67)	(28969612.70)
Infant mortality			1.577*	1.643*	1.566*
			(0.88)	(0.91)	(0.87)
Armed conflict in 4+ Bordering States			-17.783	-18.020	0.000
			(7971.39)	(9092.26)	(.)
State-Led Discrimination			-2.314	-1.998	-1.468
			(1.59)	(1.57)	(1.52)
N			81	77	68
Chi2			40.909	38.801	33.452
Prob>Chi2			0.000	0.000	0.000
Pseudo-R2			0.712	0.710	0.692

	Reich 2002 (hybrid)	Skaaning et al. 2015	Wahman et al. 2013 (any change)	Wahman et al. 2013 (1.5+ points)
Partial Autocracy	not concave	no thresholds for DEM/ AUT	not concave	not concave
Partial Democracy with Factionalism				
Partial Democracy without Factionalism				
Full Democracy				
Infant mortality				
Armed conflict in 4+ Bordering States				
State-Led Discrimination				
N				
Chi2				
Prob>Chi2				
Pseudo-R2				

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